Prioritizing Case Closure at the Expense of Adjudication Quality: Where Is the "Expeditious Trial"? Joint Statement Opposing the Enactment of the "Criminal Speedy Trial Act"

Mr. Ch'en Yuan-ch'ing's book, Thirty Years of Wandering in Court, sparked the legal community's attention on the issue of speedy trials. Although that case has finally concluded, cases that wander in the courts for more than a decade or even decades remain ubiquitous. Whether a state exercises its prosecuting power or punishment power, there are statutory limitation periods. Why is it that trial duration can be dragged out indefinitely? Therefore, alongside the pursuit of "appropriateness" in trials, "speed" is also quite necessary. On May 14 this year, our country officially ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Citing Article 14, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 3 of the Covenant—which provides that in the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in equality: "... (c) To be tried without undue delay"—the Judicial Yuan drafted the "Criminal Speedy Trial Act" consisting of more than ten provisions in a very short period. This draft was passed by the Judicial Yuan Council, sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation as an urgent item, and even heavily publicized in the media at great public expense.

However, looking at the contents of the provisions, one finds it impossible to agree. The reasons are as follows:

I. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Draft Disregards the Rights of Parties to Clear Backlogs, Akin to Cutting off an Arrow to Treat a Wound

The most egregious of all is Article 9 of the Draft. Paragraph 1 of this article stipulates: "Where a case has been pending in the first instance for more than six years and has been remanded by the Supreme Court for the third time or more, if the second instance court upon retrial upholds the not-guilty judgment rendered by the first instance court, or if its not-guilty judgment upon retrial has been preceded by two or more not-guilty judgments by the court of the same instance prior to the retrial, no appeal may be lodged with the Supreme Court." This paragraph is originally commendable; however, Paragraph 2 stipulates: "Where a case has been pending in the first instance for more than six years and has been remanded by the Supreme Court for the third time or more, except for the circumstances in the preceding paragraph, an appeal may be lodged with the Supreme Court, but the grounds for appeal shall be limited to the following: 1. The laws and regulations applied in the judgment contravene the Constitution. 2. The judgment violates interpretations by the Judicial Yuan. 3. The judgment violates precedents." This is nothing less than trading away the people's right of appeal to achieve the court's eager desire to close cases. That the court would strip people of their fundamental rights in exchange for a speedy trial is utterly unreasonable! Furthermore, looking at prominent cases that have been dragged out for many years, the culprit behind the uncertainty is often unclear facts and insufficient evidence. If appeals based on factual grounds are restricted, it is precisely like cutting off an arrow to treat a wound, which is clearly inappropriate.

II. Compared to Judges, Imposing the Duty to Promote Litigation on Parties Is Manifestly Unbalanced

The court holds the power to direct litigation and decides the progress of the proceedings ex officio; thus, it should naturally be responsible for the speed of the litigation. Yet, the hortatory provisions of Articles 4 and 5 merely "remind" judges to conduct centralized trials. Conversely, Article 3 of the Draft imposes upon parties the duty to exercise their procedural rights in good faith and not to delay proceedings without cause, while Article 11 empowers the court to transfer prosecutors and defense counsel whom it deems to have delayed litigation without cause to their respective supervisory authorities or bar associations for disciplinary action. Combined with Article 14, which authorizes the Judicial Yuan to enact litigation rules binding upon parties to promote speedy trials, this inevitably invites criticism of being "strict with others while lenient with oneself." Furthermore, can such provisions truly accelerate trials? Has the Judicial Yuan ever conducted empirical research to show whether long-pending backlogs are caused by parties delaying litigation?

Moreover, Article 3 stipulates: "Parties, agents, defense counsel, and other persons participating in judicial proceedings to perform procedural acts shall exercise their procedural rights in accordance with the principle of good faith, shall not abuse them, and shall not delay proceedings without cause." What does it mean to exercise procedural rights in good faith? Does exercising the right to remain silent also need to comply with good faith? In the future, intimidated by the might of Articles 11 and 14 of the Draft, how many defense counsel will hesitate to apply for the investigation of evidence out of a "chilling effect"? And how many judges will use this command as leverage to defiantly dismiss parties' applications for evidence investigation as acts of delaying litigation, thereby hastily closing cases?

III. Enacting Special Legislation Is Not a Panacea for Resolving Case Delays

In practice, the reason why our criminal procedure cannot gain the trust of the majority of the people does not lie entirely in the enactment of a speedy trial act; the fundamental solution must be premised on resolving the human factor. For example:

1. The majority of judges do not conduct trials in accordance with the presumption of innocence principle prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. To thoroughly implement adversarial principles, Paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—which allows courts to investigate evidence ex officio—should logically be deleted, making prosecutors bear the full burden of proof.
3. Since the investigative stage is the initial phase of a criminal case and offers the highest probability of grasping all critical evidence and clarifying the facts, police and prosecutors should uphold the spirit of scientific investigation, break the myth of putting defendant confessions above all else, and improve investigative quality. Only then will cases not be repeatedly remanded for retrial over factual investigations years later, thereby delaying litigation.

On the other hand, the Judicial Yuan should strive for more resources and budget to improve the trial environment for judges, making judges' workloads reasonable, which is also an important foundation for achieving the requirements of a speedy trial. Furthermore, establishing a mechanism to supervise judges and allowing unqualified judges to leave trial work is also an important condition for promoting trial quality.

From practical experience, the longer a trial drags on, the less room there is for "truth" and "justice." We should naturally welcome the Judicial Yuan's willingness to face the reality of snail-paced trials. However, without any empirical research foundation, the Judicial Yuan hastily introduced a bill that sacrifices the rights of parties. While this might achieve its goal of speeding up trials, the cost is the loss of "appropriateness" in adjudication. How can such provisions be called balanced in both appropriateness and speed? How can they convince parties whose rights are sacrificed? For these reasons, we oppose the contents of this bill and demand that the Judicial Yuan immediately withdraw it from the Legislative Yuan. Instead, it should conduct empirical research on current backlogs, identify the root causes of case delays, and then seek solutions.