Here Comes Another Monster? Statement of JRF on the Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee

Today (October 17), the Procedure Committee of the Legislative Yuan passed a motion to submit the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee," proposed by legislator Lin Ts'ang-min and 53 others, to the relevant committees for review. The Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF) considers the draft deeply flawed and potentially violative of the constitutional order, and hereby urges the Legislative Yuan to think twice.

Since the National Judicial Reform Conference in 1999 (the 88th year of the Republic), the progress of judicial reform has fallen short of expectations, and public trust in the judiciary has failed to improve. The Judicial Yuan indeed has areas that warrant review. Most participants in the original National Judicial Reform Conference were legal professionals, failing to broadly incorporate voices from other sectors of civil society, which also alienated the public from judicial reform issues. Furthermore, the apathy of other government departments toward judicial reform and the failure to complete legislation on key judicial reform bills have all hindered the progress and efficacy of judicial reform. Therefore, when legislators are willing to propose relevant bills to promote judicial reform—specifically intending to emulate Japan's "Judicial Reform Advisory Council" established in 1999 to invite representatives from all walks of life to jointly deliberate on a judicial system desired by the people—the JRF is not only optimistic about this initiative but is eager to strongly facilitate it.

However, the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee" recently proposed by Lin Tsang-min and 53 others is alarming. Although it claims to emulate Japan's 1999 "Judicial Reform Advisory Council," it differs from the Japanese approach in ways that risk violating the principle of separation of powers in a democratic constitutional state. The JRF firmly opposes this and elaborates with the following examples:

1. Japan's 1999 "Judicial Reform Advisory Council" was established under the Cabinet. After two years of investigation and deliberation, it submitted a "Final Opinions" report to the Cabinet in September 2001, allowing the Cabinet to conduct judicial reform referencing its views. Crucially, the advisory nature of Japan's "Judicial Reform Advisory Council" meant it served solely as a consultative body to put forth opinions; it did not override the Cabinet to make direct decisions regarding judicial reform, with the ultimate decision-making power remaining with the Cabinet. In contrast, Article 2 of the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee" grants the proposed committee the power to investigate, deliberate, and propose reform plans regarding judicial system reform, while mandating that the Judicial Yuan fully accept them and submit bills for legislative review within a specified deadline. Thus, the committee would evidently become a "super-Judicial Yuan," completely marginalizing the Judicial Yuan while bearing no accountability. Consequently, the legislators' version of the draft act risks undermining the constitutional order and confusing the principle of separation of powers.
2. Article 3 of the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee" completely excludes individuals currently engaged in judicial practice, including practicing attorneys, from the committee's composition. Consequently, the only committee members with legal connections would be law professors, raising serious doubts about the feasibility of the reform proposals they might produce. While the JRF agrees that non-legal voices should be broadly incorporated into judicial reform and that the proportion of non-legal members should exceed that of legal professionals, completely excluding judicial professionals is overly extreme and concerning.
3. Articles 3 and 4 of the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee" stipulate that, aside from 3 members selected by the President of the Judicial Yuan, the remaining members of the 21-member body would be nominated by the Legislative Yuan based on party proportionality, akin to the Truth-Seeking Commission (TRC) and the National Communications Commission (NCC). However, Justices' Interpretations Nos. 585 and 613 have explicitly pointed out that, except for bodies established under the legislative power (such as the second TRC) whose appointments may be passed by the plenary Legislative Yuan according to party proportionality, any legislative party-proportional recommendation mechanism that interferes with the personnel authority of other heads of agencies confuses responsible government and the principle of separation of powers, raising constitutional issues. Therefore, the draft act clearly struggles to pass constitutional review.
4. The "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee" sets a three-year term. In addition to creating two specially appointed officials—the chairperson and vice chairperson—it demands the creation of officials ranging from grades 10 to 11, including a secretary-general, advisors, section chiefs, unit chiefs, and specialists, and even permits the establishment of a personnel office and the hiring of employees, all without considering retirement and pension issues after three years. Such legislation completely usurps the personnel administration powers of the Examination Yuan and the Executive Yuan and clearly constitutes an overreach of power.
5. Furthermore, while Article 2 of the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee" fails to clearly define the scope and procedures for the committee's "investigation and deliberation," Article 13 stipulates that the committee may require administrative and judicial organs, prosecutors' offices, and bar associations to provide information, dispatch personnel to appear and explain, state opinions, or provide other necessary assistance, and may also hold hearings. Consequently, if the committee's investigations touch upon specific cases under trial or investigation, it risks infringing upon judicial independence and the non-disclosure of investigations.

The foregoing demonstrates the inadequacies of the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee." Indeed, as evidenced by controversies surrounding organic acts for organizations like the TIC and the NCC, a Legislative Yuan that inflates and expands its own power without self-awareness is hardly a blessing for the country or society.

The JRF agrees with and supports the enthusiasm and views on judicial reform held by the proposing legislators, and firmly believes that widely incorporating the opinions of ordinary citizens from outside the legal community is vital for judicial reform. While the Judicial Yuan should indeed step out of its institutional egoism and eliminate its blind spots, ill-considered, rash reforms—or even populist approaches—will only lead to disaster. Eight years after the conclusions of the 1988 [sic: 1999] National Judicial Reform Conference, re-examination may be necessary; however, rather than re-deliberating through a monstrous organization, it would be far better to swiftly enact the Judges Act, which enjoyed a high degree of consensus among the original conclusions, and reform personnel through the Judges Act. We believe this will bring a brand-new atmosphere to the judiciary.

Therefore, the JRF calls upon the ruling and opposition parties to deeply and repeatedly reflect upon the "Draft Act for the Establishment of the Judicial System Reform Review Committee"!