Establishing a New Paradigm for the Exercise of the Legislative Consent Power: The Appointment of the Prosecutor-General as the Litmus Test

Last edited: 2026-08-30

Anti-Corruption Action Alliance

Pursuant to Paragraph 7, Article 66 of the newly amended Court Organization Act revised on January 13, the Prosecutor-General of the Supreme Prosecutors Office shall be nominated by the President and appointed with the approval of the Legislative Yuan. As the President has already nominated the new candidate for Prosecutor-General in late February—namely, incumbent Taiwan High Prosecutors Office Chief Prosecutor Hsieh Wen-ting as the first Prosecutor-General under the newly revised law—today marks the commencement of the Legislative Yuan's process for exercising its consent power regarding the Prosecutor-General. A joint session of the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes, Internal Administration, and Ethnic Affairs Committees is reviewing the Prosecutor-General-designate to serve as a reference for the plenary session's vote on the consent power.

Because the appointment of this first Prosecutor-General is a foundational institutional undertaking, it bears significantly on the quality of future operations. Therefore, the Anti-Corruption Action Alliance previously devised a three-stage monitoring and observation plan.

In the first stage, prior to the President's nomination, the Coalition proposed negative and positive qualifications for the Prosecutor-General candidate on February 7, demanding that the President nominate a candidate who met these requirements. In the second stage, following the President's nomination, the Coalition held a press conference on March 3 to examine whether the Prosecutor-General-designate met the public's expectations based on the aforementioned qualifications.

Regarding the current third stage, wherein the legislature exercises its consent power, the focal points of monitoring are: 1. that the Legislative Yuan stands firmly from the perspective of national and public interests when exercising its consent power for the appointment of the Prosecutor-General, exercising strict oversight in accordance with the law without smuggling in any case-specific lobbying taking advantage of the review process; and 2. that the bad habit of the Prosecutor-General-designate soliciting votes is eradicated, and improper conditional exchanges are strictly guarded against.

The statutory national status of the Prosecutor-General, apart from leading prosecutors in directing the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, involves the Special Investigation Division established under the Supreme Prosecutors Office, which is particularly empowered to investigate high-level officials and privileged figures and can sway the rise and fall of political forces across the ruling and opposition camps. Therefore, in order to ensure that competition among political forces has a fair arbitrator, apart from the requirement that the candidate for Prosecutor-General possesses traits of professionalism, integrity, and resilience under pressure, rigorous appointment procedures are also key to safeguarding their impartial exercise of duties.

We call upon the Legislative Yuan, during the review committee sessions for the Prosecutor-General, to have all reviewing committee members pose rigorous and detailed questions to the Prosecutor-General-designate based on the operational needs of the office. This includes inquiries into the nominee's professional background, perception and philosophy regarding the powers of the Prosecutor-General, prospective administrative actions, and concrete concepts for the operation of the Special Investigation Division. The questioning should stem from the functional qualifications of the Prosecutor-General, free from the personal and partisan interests of the members, and must actively prevent any exploitation of the review power to coerce the nominee into conditional exchanges. The Prosecutor-General-designate should likewise utilize this opportunity to fully demonstrate personal character, academic and professional competence, and philosophy, enabling the entire public to understand their identity and build trust in their execution of duties. However, the supplementary materials currently submitted by the Prosecutor-General-designate through the Office of the President to the Legislative Yuan for review are limited; relying solely on these materials makes it difficult to assess whether the nominee fulfills the conditions for the first Prosecutor-General under the new system. We therefore expect committee members to conduct in-depth questioning targeting key issues during the review, and that the Prosecutor-General-designate will provide more comprehensive information—particularly concerning their philosophy for leading the prosecutorial system, major cases handled throughout their professional career, and legal treatises—for all sectors to study and judge, thereby establishing a sound interactive model between legislators and the examinee when the legislature exercises its consent power.

Finally, during the vote on the approval in the plenary session of the Legislative Yuan, various party caucuses should respect the rational judgments of individual members rather than launching party mobilization based on political stances to constrain members' choices, thereby preventing professional review from being distorted by political positions. Only in this way can the rational oversight quality of a respectable legislature be established, preventing it from sinking into the vicious factional struggles of a local council.

The Coalition will cooperate with the Legislative Yuan's exercise of the consent power for the Prosecutor-General by dispatching representatives throughout the entire process to the Legislative Yuan to observe and record the performance of the reviewing committee members and the Prosecutor-General, as well as the exercise of the consent power vote in the plenary session. We expect the legislature to use the exercise of the consent power for the appointment of the Prosecutor-General as a litmus test to lay down an exemplary model for hearing-based reviews.

This article is an AI-generated translation of the original Chinese text. In the event of any discrepancy, the Chinese version shall prevail.

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