Do Not Become a "Stumbling Block" to Reform

The draft amendments to the prosecutor provisions of the Court Organization Act entered their second round of party-to-party consultations in the Legislative Yuan the day before yesterday. At the start of the new year, ruling and opposition caucuses reached a consensus on the legislative consent appointment of the Prosecutor-General—the most critical element concerning the neutrality of prosecutorial powers in the current second-reading version. With only a few minor details remaining to be coordinated, the likelihood of reaching an agreement has increased significantly, which is gratifying. This is an important breakthrough in establishing a fair criminal oversight mechanism. We wish to express our high regard for the caucus representatives who worked to facilitate these negotiations, as well as for the Prosecutor-General, who demonstrated exemplary character through their resignation some time ago, which indirectly made the passage of this provision possible.

However, there are also regrettable divergences in this process. Just as the ruling and opposition caucuses have demonstrated mutual trust and sincerity, the Ministry of Justice, driven by institutional self-interest, has put forward inappropriate proposed amendments regarding provisions such as the Special Investigation Division and the review of chief prosecutors within the Prosecutor Qualification and Examination Committee. They have maintained an intransigent stance, thereby obstructing the sincerity of the party caucuses and preventing the smooth completion of negotiations. The Ministry of Justice should be held responsible for this stagnation in the negotiation process.

Regarding the Special Investigation Division, the Anti-Corruption Action Alliance has previously stated that it is intended to strengthen the investigative capacity of a Prosecutor-General who operates under conditions of neutrality, thereby enabling effective oversight of privileged elites. However, the Ministry of Justice's version would make it non-permanent, rendering the result identical to the current system. An amendment in name only is no amendment at all. The incumbent Prosecutor-General already has the authority to form special investigation units for individual cases; why then is legislation necessary? Future appointees to the position of Prosecutor-General will inevitably vary in strength and capability, but prosecutorial powers must never be weak when confronting privileged elites involved in organized crime and corruption. Bridging this gap requires a permanent case-handling agency to form a professional law enforcement center with a complete judicial character. Once sound operations become habitual, they will generate an internal binding ethical force that maintains institutional strength, and even establish a value benchmark within the prosecutorial system, fostering a culture of courageous and neutral law enforcement. Consequently, the operation of prosecutorial powers will not fluctuate drastically depending on the strength or weakness of the Prosecutor-General. The national conditions of the Republic of China are similar to those of South Korea, sharing a history of authoritarianism and a post-democratization political ecology marked by political infighting and a lack of mutual trust between the ruling and opposition parties. Yet, precisely because they were able to maintain a Central Investigation Department under the Supreme Prosecutors' Office, they were able to exercise oversight functions to investigate privileged elites, including a former president and confidants of the current president. Even when the president made public statements intended to purge them, the ruling party suffered a crushing defeat in legislative elections and was forced to respect the institution's function. It is precisely because of this public credibility of the rule of law that South Korea's national strength is flourishing today. Therefore, we believe that the proposal by the Ministry of Justice stems from institutional self-interest, lacks a macro-perspective, and should not serve as the basis for national institutional planning.

Secondly, regarding the institutionalization of the Prosecutor Qualification and Examination Committee to review the promotion and transfer of all prosecutors, including chief prosecutors, this is intended to consolidate internal democratization within the prosecutorial system and subject the personnel authority of the Minister of Justice to oversight. However, the Ministry of Justice's version removes the appointment and transfer cases of chief prosecutors—who control the primary resources for handling cases—from the Prosecutor Qualification and Examination Committee, requiring the committee only to provide a multiple of candidates for the Minister of Justice to select and sign off on. On one hand, since the transfer of chief prosecutors is of grave significance, failing to regulate it under the Ministry of Justice's version—leaving transfers entirely to the discretion of the Minister of Justice—will completely undermine and nullify the legislative intent of preventing administrative interference, which is highly inappropriate. The current flaw, wherein chief prosecutors cater to the wishes of superiors and lack an independent will to enforce the law, would remain unresolved. On the other hand, since appropriate candidates for chief prosecutors may not necessarily exist in multiples, requiring a multiple of candidates risks scraping together unqualified individuals to fill the quota. Furthermore, granting the Prosecutor Qualification and Examination Committee the power to nominate a multiple of candidates contradicts the essence of the committee members, who are responsible for serving as gatekeepers for candidates; instead, possessing excessive power easily gives rise to malpractice. In view of the crisis of distrust in prosecutorial powers brought about by past systems, the Ministry of Justice should cast aside its self-interested mindset and comprehensively contemplate national institutions with open-minded impartiality. The Minister himself is a former prosecutor and should all the more strive to uphold the foundation of democracy and neutrality within the prosecutorial system, having the courage to subject the Minister of Justice's personnel authority over chief prosecutors to oversight. This is the only attitude that demonstrates responsibility toward history.

The Anti-Corruption Action Alliance sincerely hopes that all parties across the political spectrum, including the Ministry of Justice and personnel within the prosecutorial system, will stand at this critical historical juncture, make choices with wisdom and foresight, and swiftly complete the enactment of the legislation for reforming the prosecutor system—the pillar supporting the anti-corruption mechanism! The people will surely applaud you!