Immediate Verdict Upon Oral Argument, Immediate Detention Upon Verdict

Former Legislative Yuan President Liu Sung-pan was sentenced to four years in prison by a final court judgment for breach of trust. Coincidentally, Liu departed for the United States prior to the sentencing and has not returned to date, sparking public speculation that he intends to remain abroad indefinitely, rendering the court's exit ban futile. Ever since Chu An-hsiung, Tseng Cheng-jen, and others successively fled to evade enforcement, the embarrassing predicament of "convicted yet unincarcerated" has occurred time and again. This inevitably raises concerns over the judiciary's ability to deliver justice. Without responsive reform measures, such cases will certainly not be the last.

Major criminal cases that attract widespread public attention are often protracted due to complex facts, and the trial efficiency of the courts has long been heavily criticized. Now that a guilty verdict has finally been finalized, it cannot be enforced—much like a cooked duck flying away. There is no greater humiliation to the judiciary than this. Although based on the "principle of presumption of innocence," the personal freedom of the accused should be safeguarded before the court finds the accused guilty, and the accused shall not be arbitrarily detained or subjected to travel restrictions unless necessary for securing enforcement. However, once the accused has been indicted and subsequently found guilty by the court in accordance with the law, the scope of application of the so-called principle of presumption of innocence should be restricted. In other words, when the accused is convicted by the court of first instance, even if the case is not final due to an appeal, it is fundamentally different from the investigation and indictment stages where no judgment has been rendered. The accused is now "bearing a conviction," and the likelihood of jumping bail and fleeing or refusing enforcement generally increases significantly. To secure future enforcement outcomes and weigh the scope of application of the presumption of innocence, the system should stipulate under certain conditions—such as when a first-instance judge finds the accused guilty—that the accused should, in principle, be immediately detained or restricted from leaving the country. For instance, in major criminal cases or cases of high public interest, where the accused is convicted by the first instance and is ineligible for a commutable fine or probation, the court shall simultaneously issue a ruling to detain or restrict the accused from leaving the country, barring other statutory conditions or grounds.

Since the new system of the Code of Criminal Procedure came into full effect on September 1 of last year, although most first-instance courts have achieved the requirements of centralized trials and oral arguments, only a very small number of cases involve judges rendering verdicts immediately after the conclusion of oral arguments. Moreover, even when another date is scheduled for sentencing, the law does not mandate the accused to appear in court to hear the verdict. Future institutional policies should move toward the direction of "immediate verdict upon oral argument." If it is impossible to deliberate and pronounce judgment immediately in court following the conclusion of oral arguments, the law should also be amended to mandate the presence of the accused at the time of sentencing. This would facilitate the court in issuing preventive measures such as detention or travel restrictions when the accused is found guilty and meets certain conditions, thereby achieving the mandatory effect of "immediate detention upon verdict."

※ Published in: Liberty Times