The Power of the Judicial Yuan and the Responsibility of the Legislative Yuan

During the cross-caucus consultations held recently by the Legislative Yuan regarding the "Draft Amendments to the Judicial Yuan Organization Act," opposition lawmakers failed to reach a consensus due to differing opinions, resulting in the failure to complete the legislative amendments by October 5, 2003, as mandated by Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 530. According to some opposition legislators, the Legislative Yuan has no obligation to comply with Interpretation No. 530 because the deadline set within the interpretation demonstrates the judiciary overriding the legislature. Furthermore, they argue that the requirement in the interpretation demanding a review and amendment of the organic acts of final appellate courts, such as the Judicial Yuan Organization Act, within two years constitutes a ruling ultra petita (beyond what was requested), making compliance unnecessary for the Legislative Yuan.

Must the Legislative Yuan obey the Grand Justices and complete the amendments to the Judicial Yuan Organization Act within two years in accordance with the intent of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 530? From the perspective of checks and balances among the three branches of government, there is indeed no reason for the judicial power to override the legislative power. However, since our legislative body (including the National Assembly) has long maintained the custom of respecting the Grand Justices' interpretations, this custom should be regarded as a constitutional convention and cannot be arbitrarily undermined by the legislature. Moreover, the legislators' deliberate "turning a blind eye" to Interpretation No. 530 not only easily gives the impression that the legislative branch is intentionally provoking the judicial branch, but even raises a broader question: if our nation allows lawmakers to selectively choose which Grand Justices' interpretations to obey, can the people similarly follow suit and freely choose whether or not to obey the laws enacted by lawmakers, so as to prevent "indirect democracy from overriding direct democracy"?! It is thus evident that the arguments raised by certain legislators simply do not hold water logically!

In addition, the claims by some opposition lawmakers that the Legislative Yuan does not need to comply with "rulings ultra petita" touch upon a fundamental issue of the Grand Justices' constitutional interpretation system. As is well known, under the design of current laws, the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan hold the power of abstract statutory review, unlike ordinary court judgments which in principle are effective only regarding specific cases. Under this circumstance, whether the legal principles or the concept of a "lawsuit" in ordinary litigation can be forcibly applied to the system of constitutional interpretation by the Grand Justices is highly controversial. Regrettably, instead of seriously examining why they enacted such laws in the first place and vested such powers in the Grand Justices, the Legislative Yuan—two years after the Grand Justices made their interpretations based on the rules of the game formulated by the legislators themselves—instead resorts to emotional, passive resistance to evade its responsibility to rationally review the institutional design! As the lawmakers point a finger at the Judicial Yuan and hurl abuses, have they ever considered that three fingers are pointing right back at them?

Furthermore, although certain opposition legislators claim that the failure to pass the relevant bills, such as the draft amendments to the Judicial Yuan Organization Act, within the timeframe stipulated by Interpretation No. 530 will not cause a constitutional crisis, the intent of Interpretation No. 530 raises serious doubts regarding the constitutionality of the current organization of final appellate courts, such as the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, and the Disciplinary Court of Judges. Moreover, what legal effect will the various rulings rendered by these final appellate courts after October 5 of this year have? Will they consequently be unconstitutional? This has sparked an uproar within the legal community. Which political party or lawmaker can take responsibility for such a result? And who should bear the consequences of a lack of stability in the legal order?

Most baffling of all is that during the 2000 presidential election, both Lien Chan (連戰) and James Soong (宋楚瑜) promised in their respective campaign platforms to abide by the conclusions of the 1999 National Judicial Reform Conference. Compared to recent actions by some Pan-Blue legislators, this is nothing short of placing Lien and Soong in an unrighteous position?! Things having reached this point, we can only make a painful appeal to the honorable legislators to recognize a simple fact: since the decision-making power regarding what powers the Judicial Yuan ought to possess lies primarily in your hands, please sit down and legislate as soon as possible!

※ Published in: Liberty Times