The Supreme Court is Overwhelmed with Backlogged Cases: How Can It Be Solved?

Press reports indicate that the Supreme Court's backlog of over 10,000 cases has hit a record high. In fact, this is no longer news; in recent years, waiting one to two or even three years for a third-instance appeal outcome has become the norm. The question is: why are there more cases piling up the harder people try to clear them? The author believes this is entirely the result of heading in the wrong direction.

The judicial authorities long ago noticed that third-instance appeals were increasing. Consequently, in criminal cases, the 1995 amendments barred appeals to the third instance for theft (Articles 320 and 321 of the Criminal Code), embezzlement (Article 335 and Paragraph 2 of Article 336), fraud (Articles 339 and 341), breach of trust (Article 342), intimidation (Article 346), and receiving stolen property (Paragraph 2 of Article 349). On the other hand, the financial threshold for civil appeals to the third instance has also been steadily raised in recent years from NT$300,000 to NT$1.5 million, hoping to "block" the tidal wave of third-instance appeals by raising the bar. The problem is that this is just like Gun building dikes to control floods—history has proven that the approach has failed!

So where does the problem lie? Today, there are two main reasons why too many second-instance cases are appealed to the third instance. First, parties are simply not convinced by second-instance judgments, so they appeal desperately. Second, the third instance repeatedly vacates and remands second-instance judgments, generating even more second-instance cases. Unless these two root causes are addressed, blindly raising thresholds only risks infringing upon people's right of access to court and invites public grievance to no avail.

First, regarding second-instance judgments failing to convince the public: in recent years, calls for judicial reform have been incessant, and judges' attitudes when hearing cases have improved considerably, with arbitrary scolding becoming rare. However, the quality of judgments still varies. Furthermore, while outside interference is rarely heard of, the integrity of some judges still fails to earn the public's trust. When quality cannot be comprehensively elevated and integrity is not fully trusted, how can parties be convinced not to appeal? In this regard, enabling unfit judges to leave office through the Judges Act—whether via a disciplinary court or a merit court—is truly a top priority. Unfortunately, this "Judges Act," which is crucial for weeding out unfit judges and clearing the air, has faced a long and distant road to being "scored as a goal" in the Legislative Yuan since the private-sector draft and official draft were respectively proposed in 1998 by the JRF, the Taipei Bar Association, the Taiwan Law Association, and the Judicial Yuan.

If unfit judges cannot be eliminated—especially unfit judges in the second instance—wouldn't trying to reduce second-instance appeals to the third instance be like climbing a tree to catch fish?

On the other hand, a large portion of third-instance appeal cases originate from boomerang cases where the third instance revokes the original judgment and remands it back to the second instance. According to statistics, about 40 percent of criminal cases appealed to the third instance are dismissed for failing to comply with formal requirements—in plain terms, the appeal reasons were written haphazardly. However, it is worth noting that of the remaining 60 percent, only 20 percent are dismissed because the appeal lacks merit, while the other 40 percent are vacated and remanded because the appeal has merit. Therefore, to exaggerate slightly, if one hires a lawyer to properly write out the reasons for appeal, there is a two-thirds chance the third instance will vacate and remand the case to become a new second-instance case; otherwise, there is at least a two-fifths chance. While these statistics can certainly be used to illustrate the poor quality of second-instance judgments, on the other hand, doesn't the third instance have areas that warrant self-examination? Frequently, a lawyer writes down a dozen points in the appeal reasons, and the Supreme Court points out a problem with just one or two points each time and remands the case. The second instance then investigates those one or two points, the case is appealed again, and the Supreme Court points out another one or two points. In this manner, cases must repeatedly bounce back and forth between the second and third instances. One must ask: while the Judicial Yuan implements the centralized trial system in the first and second instances, requiring parties to raise disputed points early—which, in severe cases, even leads to preclusion effects—why can't the Supreme Court point out questionable disputed points all at once (or at least explain whether the parties' appeal reasons can be adopted)? Furthermore, if the Supreme Court repeatedly believes that the fact-finding court has misidentified the facts, why not render a judgment directly pursuant to Subparagraph 1 of Article 479 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Article 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? If it is believed that the facts truly cannot be ascertained, then under the principle of the burden of proof, cases that should be ruled as acquittal or dismissal should simply be ruled as such. By merely repeating remands, can the fact-finding court realistically render a more correct judgment?

In summary, the author believes that unfit personnel must be replaced, and inappropriate judicial styles must be changed. If we do not pursue these solutions and instead quibble over restricting case appeals, dispatching a few more people to the third instance, or having each third-instance judge handle more cases, the public will have no choice but to continue lamenting why justice (?) is so agonizingly slow.

The author once heard a true story: a case bounced back and forth between the second and third instances for over a decade. An elderly defendant aged a year or two every time they went to the second instance for a hearing after a remand. Following a certain remand for retrial, the judge asked the defendant if they had any comments. The defendant replied, "Could you try your case a bit faster? Otherwise, the next time you summon me, the one arriving at court will be a coffin!" To this, the judge actually replied, "Then my judgment will be much easier to write" (since a defendant's death obviates the need for investigation under the law and requires a dismissal ruling). Must such stories continue to be enacted?

※ Published in: The Liberty Times