The Professionalism of Vote-Buying Investigations

As the election enters the final countdown, besides the candidates, the busiest people must be the prosecutors' vote-buying investigation task forces.

This is probably the most serious vote-buying crackdown in the history of the Republic of China. The reason, of course, is the role played by the rotation of ruling parties, which also confirms that democratic politics indeed requires party rotation. Only through the balance of terror characterized by "mutual supervision and checks and balances" can a relatively fresh political atmosphere be formed. However, nothing is ever perfect. While this vote-buying crackdown has been a grand and forceful affair, it has also provided an opportunity for society to witness another facet of problems within the prosecutorial system—the friction between professionalism and politics.

As is widely known, eradicating black gold is not only the most important policy demand of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at present, but also the clearest line of demarcation used to distinguish themselves from the corrupt Kuomintang (KMT) rulers of the past. Coupled with the vigorous and resolute enforcement by Minister of Justice Ch'en Ting-nan, vote-buying naturally became the policy objective that mobilized the greatest resources. Yet, the problem lies precisely here. According to the law, the role of a prosecutor is that of a "representative of the public interest of the state," possessing a dual identity of both judicial and administrative functions. On the one hand, facing policy directives from judicial administration, prosecutors must take into consideration the needs of the state's public interest; on the other hand, they must uphold the spirit of judicial independence and neutrality while paying attention to both the inculpatory and exculpatory interests of suspects, rather than wishfully investigating only in directions favorable for indictment while deliberately ignoring evidence favorable to the suspect. This difficult role is already extremely challenging in ordinary criminal cases, and it becomes even more stretched to the limit when facing vote-buying operations that constitute a core policy. On one hand, we see prosecutors bravely using judicial power to eradicate black gold, winning society's support and applause; on the other hand, we see the Ministry of Justice frequently issuing "policy objectives," pre-setting indictment quotas, repeatedly declaring that the vote-buying crackdown will not come back empty-handed and must yield "performance metrics," thereby treating vote-buying as a policy outcome rather than a judicial action. Consequently, the Ministry of Justice receives social support while simultaneously facing accusations of interfering with law enforcement.

To be frank, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to how to solve this problem, because such conflicts have always existed within the prosecutorial system itself. Aside from close and persistent supervision, there are no shortcuts. The only thing we can hope for is the personal integrity of individual prosecutors and whether they can uphold the spirit of exercising judicial power prudently and prioritizing professionalism. In other words, the ruler in a prosecutor's heart will determine the judicial landscape of Taiwanese society. What we can expect is an appeal to prosecutors that, while receiving hero-like praise and encouragement, they must never forget the steadfast commitment of being a representative of the state's "public interest." We hope that the ruler in their hearts is marked with the calibrations of judicial professionalism rather than the etchings of politics.

※ Published in: Taiwan Daily