Top-Heavy Budgets Neglect Judicial Reform Projects: A Comprehensive Review of the Judicial Yuan's Outlay Budget for the Central Government General Budget in Fiscal Year 1999
Last edited: 2026-07-24
Through the joint efforts of civil society and the official sector, the judicial budget for the eighty-eighth fiscal year (1999) was separated from the Executive Yuan for the first time and independently compiled by the Judicial Yuan. This was originally a cause for celebration, and both the ruling and opposition parties anticipated using "judicial budget independence" as a starting point to move toward genuine "judicial independence" and launch effective "judicial reform". However, looking at the current budget compilation, the Judicial Yuan has clearly imposed self-limitations, lacking an overall judicial reform plan. In particular, while some administrative plans highlight goals, they lack execution schedules to gradually realize these goals, or even fail to allocate matching budgets. This has led to serious doubts about the rationality of the budget compilation, raising suspicions as to whether it can truly be implemented as an "effective budget" for policy promotion.
Taking the Judicial Yuan's repeated emphasis on "reducing judges' workloads" as an example, no comprehensive evaluation from institutional and practical perspectives has been conducted to propose well-considered and concrete improvement plans. Before a consensus is reached and legislation is completed, the budget for legal officers (法務官) has been compiled without any corresponding improvements to the litigation system. Furthermore, crucial judicial assistants are hired on a contractual basis rather than being included in the official staffing structure. Even more concerning, while the Judicial Yuan repeatedly emphasizes "pyramiding" the litigation system to improve the quality of judgments, rationally utilize judicial resources, and strengthen the function of fact-finding, the allocation structure for staff positions—from general administrative expenses to judicial assistants—is top-heavy (or rather, an "inverted pyramid"). It is difficult to see how this can achieve the goals expected by the Judicial Yuan.
Following a general review of the judicial outlays budget, we set forth the following opinions, hoping that the Judicial Yuan will not fail the public entrustment, will step up its pace, and will demonstrate the benefits of judicial reform through the compilation and execution of the judicial budget.
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Top-Heavy Budget Compilation
The Judicial Yuan repeatedly emphasizes "strengthening the fact-finding function" of courts and promoting an efficient judiciary. However, judging from the structure of the budget compilation, it appears overly focused on the three-tier trial system, presenting a top-heavy phenomenon. The district courts, which bear the heaviest workload, receive no injections of resources. For instance, out of 113 newly purchased vehicles across 26 courts at all levels nationwide, the Supreme Court alone accounts for 21 vehicles (18.6%). The same problem appears in the quantity and budget for newly added personnel (see Appendix Table 1). Moreover, the existing personnel structure of the judiciary is already unreasonable: over 100 judges are equivalent to the Supreme Court level, with senior personnel concentrated entirely in the second and third instances, while the first instance is left with junior and inexperienced personnel. If the existing personnel structure is neither adjusted nor rationally allocated, this budget compilation runs entirely counter to the goal of strengthening the fact-finding function.
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Improper Staffing Compilation
The Judicial Yuan has repeatedly listed "reducing judges' workloads" as the primary focus of judicial reform. However, on one hand, we have never seen any overall planning or schedule from the Judicial Yuan for reducing judges' workloads—specifically, when judges' workloads will be reduced to a reasonable scope. On the other hand, looking at the budget compilation, we see unreasonable allocation methods.
- Additional allocation of 421 court clerks and record clerks. With the ongoing promotion of computerized transcriptions—emulating countries like the United States and Japan where recording work will be handled by specially trained recorders or stenographers in the future—clerks' workloads are bound to be substantially reduced. It is truly inappropriate to substantially increase the staffing of clerks and record clerks at this time.
- The addition of 280 judicial assistants theoretically seems capable of alleviating judges' workloads. However, without pushing for relevant legislation, the Judicial Yuan has temporarily added 280 personnel through "contractual" employment. This inevitably raises concerns over whether their sources, qualifications, selection, and quality can truly share burdens and relieve worries for judges. Furthermore, the compilation is similarly top-heavy: district courts, which bear the heaviest workload, are allocated none at all; all positions are concentrated in the Supreme Court, High Courts, and even the Administrative Court. How can this move resolve judges' workloads?
- The addition of 100 legal officer (法務官) positions is a stealthy maneuver designed to pull the wool over people's eyes. The budget was directly compiled without any legal basis or relevant regulations. The legal officer system concerns the judicial system and people's rights and interests, and has sparked many controversies to date. What exactly are the powers and qualifications of legal officers? What is their relationship with judicial assistants? Are they non-contentious judges? Can non-judicial qualifications serve to adjudicate non-contentious matters? Will people's rights and interests be impaired? These questions have not been carefully deliberated at all. Directly increasing staffing without clarifying related issues will not necessarily alleviate judges' workloads; instead, improper personnel arrangements will likely entangle matters further, waste public funds in vain, and fail to aid judicial reform.
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Rampant and Excessive Emerging Hardware Projects
Society holds high expectations for the Judicial Yuan's first year of independently compiling its budget. However, looking at the current compilation, the Judicial Yuan has failed to propose concrete, innovative administrative plans, still allocating a larger proportion to hardware budgets. This is truly quite disappointing. Regardless of the ongoing projects amounting to NT$1,199,901,000, new emerging projects for building construction alone have increased by NT$700,056,000 this year. Is such an increase rational? Many litigation system reforms have yet to be promoted; even the comprehensive computerization of transcripts, the full online publication of judgments, and the creation of judges' nameplates—which were resolutions attached by the Legislative Yuan last year—have not been budgeted for. Yet, heavy sums are poured into construction and hardware investments. Whether this is appropriate is open to public evaluation.
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Failure to Implement Judicial Reform Projects
Ever since the outcry for judicial reform reached a crescendo last year, the public has eagerly awaited the Judicial Yuan's sweeping reform projects. Especially under the strong cooperative promotion between the Judicial Yuan and civil society, judicial budget independence was finally incorporated into the Constitution. Yet, the Judicial Yuan remains entrenched in old habits, persistently failing to explicitly quantify reform timelines and progress for budget compilation, thus failing the public trust. As for the National Judicial Reform Conference previously promised by the Judicial Yuan, it is nowhere to be found. Faced with such a budget scale lacking reform determination and action and compiled merely out of routine, civil society cannot help but cry out loudly: Where on earth is the hope for judicial reform?!
Responses to Various Administrative Policies of the Judicial Yuan
I. Comprehensive Review of "The Judicial Yuan's Operational Performance in Fiscal Year 1997"
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Bills Sent to the Legislative Yuan for Deliberation Omit the Administrative Litigation Act and the Appeal Act (Item 2)
The budget compiles items related to the Administrative Court or administrative litigation, yet the legal bills submitted to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation omit the most important legal basis—the promotion of amendments to the Administrative Litigation Act and the Appeal Act. If the passage of these two acts is not actively promoted, won't the related budget items be left without a foundation, and won't the realization of the administrative relief system be placed beyond reach?
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Review of Final Civil and Criminal Judgments (Item 3)
Judgments found inappropriate after review can no longer be remedied, and even if corrections are made, they serve no practical benefit. Relevant measures for re-education, disciplinary action, and even the elimination of unsuited personnel should be actively established.
II. Comprehensive Review of "The Judicial Yuan's Administrative Plan for Fiscal Year 1999"
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Strengthen the Fact-Finding Function of First- and Second-Instance Courts, Uphold the Principle of the Third-Instance Court as a Court of Law, Improve Civil and Criminal Trial Performance, and Promote an Efficient Judiciary (Item 3)
- However, regarding the compilation of judicial assistants, it completely runs counter to this spirit. Among the 280 judicial assistants budgeted, 51 are allocated to the Supreme Court; 15 assistant judges to the Administrative Court; 103 to the High Court; 41 to the Taichung Branch of the High Court; 28 to the Tainan Branch of the High Court; 36 to the Kaohsiung Branch of the High Court; and 6 to the Hualien Branch of the High Court. District courts have zero allocations. How can fact-finding functions be strengthened when front-line district courts, which serve as fact-finders, are not allocated any?
- To uphold the court of law principle and strengthen fact-finding, the key lies in adjusting the existing personnel structure and litigation system, rather than merely supplementing new personnel. Currently, personnel counts are increased only for judicial assistants, without comprehensive coordination for reforming overall staffing, ranks, and personnel training. Seeking to strengthen fact-finding through this approach is akin to scaling a tree to catch fish.
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Appropriately Adjudicate Labor Disputes and Promote Labor Harmony (Item 11)
Urge Appropriate Adjudication of Intellectual Property Rights Cases to Protect the Rights and Interests of Intellectual Property Rights Holders (Item 12)- The planning directions of these two facilities are correct, and we view them with optimism.
- However, since no relevant budgets are compiled, the establishment of specialized courts demanded by civil society has not been implemented, nor have appropriate and sufficient relief measures been drawn up for vulnerable groups in labor dispute cases. We truly do not know how execution is possible.
- Regarding intellectual property rights cases, without supporting measures such as strengthening judges' professional capabilities and fully subsidizing appraisal fees, so-called "appropriate adjudication" is nothing more than empty talk.
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Properly Handle Juvenile Cases and Handle Juvenile Guidance Operations in Accordance with the Newly Amended Juvenile Cases Handling Act (Item 14)
Examining the relevant budget compilation, apart from hardware such as buildings, it only compiles items such as urine testing personnel, testing fees, and equipment fees. It fails to establish specialized personnel for juvenile probation officers and juvenile investigators in accordance with the newly amended Juvenile Cases Handling Act. We truly do not know how the Judicial Yuan can "properly handle juvenile cases" without such professional judicial personnel. Compared to judicial assistants who are massively compiled without a legal basis, isn't this intentional negligence, and how can cases be properly handled?
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Urge Appropriate Adjudication of Hoodlum Reformatory Education Cases, Social Order Maintenance Act Violation Cases, Traffic Cases, and Organized Crime Prevention Cases (Item 15)
There are no budget items on how to execute this administrative plan, nor is there any explanation of whether there were deficiencies in handling the aforementioned related cases last year. The practice in hoodlum cases of directly transferring suspects to Green Island has sparked immense social controversy, and the infringement upon human rights especially warrants attention; yet no explanations are provided, nor are concrete improvement plans proposed.
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Rationally Strive for Judicial Personnel Staffing to Alleviate Judges' Workloads (Item 21)
- While increasing judge staffing is indeed one way to alleviate judges' workloads, without overall planning and timelines for reducing litigation sources, improving litigation systems, adjusting personnel structures, and redistributing judicial human resources, continuously increasing judge staffing will ultimately be of no avail. This judicial budget lacks macroeconomic design, merely listing numbers of added judges without explaining the data on expected workload reductions; this is disappointing.
- The Judges Act—which concerns the training and selection of judges and judicial assistants—has not been listed as a priority bill. Instead, the staffing of "legal officers" is directly increased to expand personnel, which may lead to overlapping and redundant personnel allocations and functions in the future.
- Alleviating judges' workloads is a key focus of judicial reform, but the Judicial Yuan should promptly break away from the mindset of "satisfying hunger with painted cakes" and courageously propose "how-to" methods. First and foremost, it should start with improvements to the litigation system rather than slowly increasing staffing while failing to see when the problem can be solved. At the very least, the Judicial Yuan should explain when, at the current speed and method of staff increases, judges' workloads can be effectively alleviated, when judges' caseloads can reach reasonable levels, and when the quality of judgments can rise accordingly. Furthermore, reasonable staffing is only one aspect of workload relief. Relying solely on this, even with increased budget compilations, may not necessarily bring in fresh blood (due to consideration of examination candidate numbers and attrition of existing personnel), and thus it will ultimately be of no avail. Moreover, judicial assistants are compiled as contract personnel, which evidently has flaws in its legal basis. Qualifications, required quantities, and sources should be comprehensively considered under the Judges Act, and it is inappropriate to use contractual employment to circumvent existing personnel examination methods.
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Rectify Judicial Discipline, Curb Corruption, and Strictly Investigate Cases Damaging Judicial Reputation to Safeguard Good Discipline and Judicial Dignity (Item 23)
From the budget compilation, it is also impossible to see how the Judicial Yuan intends to execute this administrative plan. There is neither the appearance of specialized personnel and courts dedicated to execution nor the compilation of special project expenditures. Therefore, it leaves people guessing: under conditions of having neither personnel nor money, how on earth can the Judicial Yuan effectively execute judicial anti-corruption?
III. Comprehensive Review of the Judicial Yuan's "Compilation of FY 1999 Budget in Coordination with Major Judicial Administrative Plans"
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To Effectively Relieve Judges' Workloads, Increase Judge Staffing by 137, Add 100 Judicial Legal Officers and 280 Judicial Assistants, and Matchingly Increase Staffing for Clerks, Record Clerks, etc., by 421, Along with Related Staffing Adjustments Totaling NT$1,075,935,000 (Item 1)
- The Legal Officers Act has not yet passed its third reading, yet the judiciary has pre-emptively compiled a budget adopting contractual employment. The Judges Act has not yet passed, nor has it even been submitted for review; yet the budget is compiled while the ranks and appointment qualifications of judicial assistants lack any relevant legal basis.
- The so-called "matching" increase of over 400 court clerks and record clerks lacks any details on how it is "matched". In fact, if computerization of transcripts can be implemented in the future, a large number of professional computer recorders or stenographers should be added, and the staffing of clerks should be correspondingly reduced.
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Supplement Verification Vehicles, Increase Investigation Travel Expenses and Appraisal Fees, Representing an Increase of NT$146,498,000 Over the Previous Year (Item 4)
Shortages in verification vehicles and appraisal fees are important issues that ought to be heavily budgeted, but they should be budgeted under trial operations rather than arbitrarily expanded. Taking the Supreme Court as an example, it actually budgeted for 21 official sedans. According to common sense, the Supreme Court, as a court of law, does not need to use such a large number of verification vehicles. Therefore, this budget should be allocated to district courts or high courts rather than the Supreme Court.
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Add or Replace Office Equipment Representing an Increase of NT$167,554,000 Over the Previous Year, Among Which Eight Emerging Projects Total NT$700,056,000 (Item 5)
Emerging projects should comprehensively consider whether additions and expansions are rational. For example, the preparation of summary courts involves whether the existing forty-plus summary courts are producing effects; when there is no need to continue establishing new summary courts, careful consideration should indeed be given.
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In Accordance with the Provisions of the "Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act", Operations for Urine Testing Involve Adding 40 Contract Testing Personnel and Related Funds of NT$122,224,000 (Item 9)
Regarding the juvenile probation officers and juvenile investigators required by the newly amended Juvenile Cases Handling Act last year, no specialized personnel staffing is seen—only the strengthening of urine screening procedures? How on earth does the Judicial Yuan intend to implement the proper handling of juvenile cases?
IV. Comments and Explanations Regarding the Judicial Yuan's "Expected Administrative Performance for FY 1999"
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Actively Promote Various Judicial Reform Works and Establish a Judiciary for All the People (Item 2)
Ever since the Judicial Yuan promised to convene a national judicial reform conference last year, there has been no response. Following the large-scale march for justice organized by civil society last year, the judicial reform blueprint and judicial reform schedule demanded of the Judicial Yuan have also failed to materialize. We do not know how a "judiciary for all the people" is to be realized.
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Improve Judgment Quality and Enhance Public Trust in the Judiciary (Item 3)
The primary task lies in resolving the problem of judges being overburdened. When exactly will the Judicial Yuan complete a plan for reasonable caseloads? Can it propose a quantified schedule?
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Stabilize Colleagues' Work Morale and Reduce Talent Attrition (Item 5)
The way to reduce the turnover of judges is to improve the trial environment. Aside from judges' workloads repeatedly mentioned earlier, the Judicial Yuan has long delayed providing a comprehensive improvement schedule, merely proposing the additional construction of official dormitories and health checkups in the hope of "stabilizing" judicial personnel's work morale, which is bound to prove ineffective. It would be better to promptly and actively improve the litigation system and truly implement a "pyramiding" litigation structure, effectively alleviating the caseload burden on first-instance judges. This is the true and correct path to preventing talent attrition.
This article is an AI-generated translation of the original Chinese text. In the event of any discrepancy, the Chinese version shall prevail.