Is the Age of the Judicial Yuan President More Important Than Their Vision?

Recently, a legislator proposed an amendment to the Judicial Yuan Organization Act that would impose an age limit of sixty-five on the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, while requiring them to have served as Justices of the Constitutional Court for at least three years, sparking widespread controversy. To prevent the nomination of the President, Vice President, and Justices of the Judicial Yuan from becoming a tool for political maneuvering, we hereby express our stern opposition to this legislative proposal.

In fact, the legislator's proposal to limit the age of the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan or to require three years of prior service as a Justice lacks both justification and practical benefit. Regarding the imposition of an age limit, first, looking at domestic laws, no age limits are imposed on the President, Vice President, or the heads and deputy heads of the other four Yuan. Why then single out the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan for "special treatment"? This is baffling. Comparing relevant laws in other countries, aside from Germany and Japan which set a lower age limit of forty for judges on their highest courts, no legislative examples imposing an upper age limit can be found. Furthermore, the cultivation of legal professionals requires the tempering of time; even ordinary judges, despite special provisions for "preferential treatment," are not subject to a mandatory retirement age of sixty-five. Why should Grand Justices, whose status is so "lofty," be treated worse than ordinary judges? Moreover, there are countless truly revered legal scholars who continue to diligently pursue legal studies well past the age of sixty-five. Does such a restriction not negate their contributions to the legal community?

Turning to the qualification requirement that candidates for President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan must have served as Grand Justices for at least three years, first, according to Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution: "The Judicial Yuan shall have fifteen Grand Justices, one of whom shall serve as President, and... one as Vice President...", the Constitution only requires that the President and Vice President be Grand Justices, with no other restrictions, nor is there any authorization to add other qualification requirements by law. Under this premise, whether adding statutory restrictions not found in the Constitution complies with constitutional provisions is highly questionable. Furthermore, aside from fulfilling the responsibilities of a Grand Justice, the President and Vice President must also handle numerous judicial administrative affairs. Yet, "serving as a Grand Justice for three years or more" has little correlation with administrative capability. To use such an inappropriate professional requirement to exclude the selection of more competent and outstanding talents is to needlessly constrain the possibilities for nomination by the President.

As is well known, the most important task for the legal community at present is to accelerate the pace of judicial reform, allowing the public's earnest expectations for a renewed judiciary to be realized. In particular, as we enter a critical phase of judicial reform, we believe that the next President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, in addition to meeting the requirements explicitly set forth in the Constitution and laws, should possess the following qualifications: 1. The courage to uphold human rights, along with democratic literacy, constitutional vision, and professional competence. 2. A strong sense of mission to defend judicial independence, and the ability to effectively improve the quality of rulings and the judicial trial environment. 3. A strong vision for judicial reform, unafraid of criticism and unconcerned with personal gain or loss in implementing judicial reform. And 4. The ability to appoint people on their merits and possess outstanding leadership capabilities, with no other restrictions regarding age or seniority.

For a good leader, after all, the possession of outstanding leadership and the resolute determination to reform are far more important than the age printed on their ID card! As the supreme leaders of the judicial branch, the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan should naturally use the same principles as selection standards. Regrettably, in this legislative proposal to restrict the qualifications for the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan, not only do we fail to see any benchmark requirements for leadership, but it actually creates the possibility of excluding more qualified candidates from assuming these positions. Such an outcome would be a grave detriment to both the country and the people. How can the honorable legislators not exercise caution when reviewing the amendments to the Judicial Yuan Organization Act!