Grand Justice Nominees Must Withstand Dual Scrutiny from Both the Government and Civil Society

The judicial power has always served as the cornerstone of the nation's constitutional system, social fairness, and justice. Grand Justices in Taiwan have not only played pivotal roles in the democratization and constitutional development processes but have also made significant contributions to interpreting the Constitution to protect human rights. Moreover, the incumbent Grand Justices' terms are set to expire on October 2 of this year (2003), and the next batch of Grand Justices (including the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan) will be the first 'guardians of the Constitution' nominated and appointed in accordance with the new provisions of Article 5 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution. Recognizing this, the Judicial Reform Foundation, along with the Cheng Society, the Taiwan Law Society, the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, the Taiwan Bar Association, and the Taipei Bar Association, six organizations in total, initiated and planned the 'Alliance for Civilian Supervision of Judicial Yuan Grand Justice (including President and Vice President) Nominees' (hereinafter referred to as the Alliance for Civilian Supervision of Grand Justice Nominees) in mid-December of last year (2002). It is hoped that through the spontaneous and autonomous observational and supervisory power of civil society, the President and the Legislative Yuan will be urged to properly fulfill their duties of nomination, appointment, and review, and that the general public will be awakened to value the functions of the Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan, thereby popularizing constitutional ideals and human rights awareness.

Beginning in late April of this year, in order to objectively evaluate unqualified candidates for Grand Justice (including the President and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan), the Alliance for Civilian Supervision of Grand Justice Nominees specially formed an evaluation committee consisting of fifteen members. They conducted investigations, research, evaluations, and discussions one by one regarding the relevant backgrounds and data of each Grand Justice nominee. Finally, through a secret ballot requiring a majority of more than two-thirds of all fifteen members, Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo was evaluated as an unsuitable candidate for Grand Justice and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan.

According to the 'Evaluation Report on Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo as Unsuitable for Grand Justice and Vice President of the Judicial Yuan' (hereinafter referred to as the Evaluation Report) published by the Alliance for Civilian Supervision of Grand Justice Nominees on August 17 of this year, the main reason the Alliance evaluated Mr. Ch'eng as an unsuitable candidate was that 'during his tenure as Minister of Justice, Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo approved the execution of the death penalty with severe flaws, demonstrating his insufficient awareness of human rights protection.' Regarding this point, a detailed discussion can be elaborated from the investigation report issued by the Control Yuan on December 1, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Control Yuan Investigation Report) and the evaluation report written by the Alliance for Civilian Supervision of Grand Justice Nominees:

According to the Control Yuan Investigation Report, 'the approval procedures of the Ministry of Justice for the execution of death row inmates Chou Hsün-shan, Chuang Ch'ing-chih, Jonathan Maala Burgos, Liu Yen-lung, and T'ang Ming-hsiung "indeed had flaws."' Among them, the three individual cases of Chou Hsün-shan, Chuang Ch'ing-chih, and Philippine national Burgos occurred during the tenure of Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo as Minister of Justice. This clearly shows that Mr. Ch'eng's handling of the death penalty execution approval procedures during his tenure as Minister of Justice was indeed questionable. Taking the Chou Hsün-shan case as an example, the Control Yuan Investigation Report explicitly pointed out: 'On the very day defendant Chou Hsün-shan received the judgment document, the Supreme Prosecutors Office submitted the relevant case files to the Ministry of Justice, leaving the defendant's defense counsel almost no possibility of filing for an extraordinary appeal or retrial. The execution of the death penalty was drafted by the handler on October 14, passed through various levels of supervisors in the Ministry of Justice, and was approved the next day by the Minister (namely, Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo). Within the span of a single day, how could one expect and believe that the Minister of Justice and supervisors at all levels had meticulously and thoroughly read the judgment and relevant case files, and reviewed whether grounds for a retrial or extraordinary appeal existed?' (Note: The Chou case went through retrials up to the fifth remand, resulting in as many as fourteen volumes of case files and evidence.) In addition, the circumstances of the execution of the death penalty for Chuang Ch'ing-chih and Philippine national Burgos were virtually identical to the Chou Hsün-shan case. The Control Yuan Investigation Report also pointed out: 'The Ministry of Justice executed the death penalty with excessive rapidity,' leaving the families and defense counsel of the death row inmates 'almost no possibility of filing for an extraordinary appeal or retrial.' 'The legislative purpose of requiring the Ministry of Justice to authorize the execution of the death penalty by decree is to respect the right to life, ensuring that this capital punishment, which is irreversible or irreparable once executed, is carried out through the most rigorous and prudent mechanism.' However, during his tenure as Minister of Justice, Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo not only 'reduced the review procedure to a mere formality, but the rapidity of his review is difficult to absolve from the suspicion of being eager to carry out the execution, representing a major flaw in the protection of human rights.'

Regarding the above matters, the Alliance for Civilian Supervision of Grand Justice Nominees pointed out in its Evaluation Report: 'The execution of the death penalty involves the deprivation of the right to life and is a punishment that cannot be reversed once executed; it should naturally be handled with caution. In modern states governed by the rule of law, it is rarely heard of that within a single day after legal remedies are exhausted, the Minister of Justice rapidly approves the execution of the death penalty, or that the horrifying incident occurs where the death penalty is executed before the defense counsel has even received the final judicial judgment document. However, Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo, the then-Minister of Justice, exhibited numerous questionable aspects in the approval procedures for the execution of death row inmates Chou Hsün-shan, Chuang Ch'ing-chih, and Philippine national Burgos.' In particular, 'Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo's master's thesis in law back then took the abolition of the death penalty as its research subject. Yet, when holding the immense power over death penalty executions, Minister Ch'eng was so incautious, leaving the outside world deeply worried about whether his conviction in upholding academic theory and human rights is steadfast.' Furthermore, 'As known from the records of the aforementioned Control Yuan Investigation Report: in October 1998, knowing full well that his approval of the execution procedure for Chou Hsün-shan had already caused a public uproar among civilian human rights groups, Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo actually "pressed on" with an equally extremely rapid handling model, approving the death penalty execution cases of Philippine national Burgos and Chuang Ch'ing-chih respectively in November and December of the same year.' 'His careless attitude regarding the life and death of death row inmates is truly difficult to condone.'

Synthesizing the opinions of the official Control Yuan report and the evaluation report of civic associations, one cannot help but doubt whether Mr. Ch'eng Chung-mo, who has such serious lapses in his human rights record, is suitable to serve as a Grand Justice tasked with defending the fundamental rights of the people? If the candidates for Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan (including the President and Vice President) nominated by the President cannot withstand the dual scrutiny of the government and civil society regarding the ideal and implementation of human rights protection, how can we expect the relevant individuals to act as positive promoters in the development of our country's democracy, rule of law, and constitutional human rights in the future?