Judicial Day Has Passed, Where Is the Judicial Reform Timeline?

On October 19 last year, civil society launched the 'March for the Resurrection of Justice' protest, hoping to breathe new life into a judicial system plagued by deep-seated issues and demanding that judicial authorities present a reform timeline by Judicial Day at the latest to rebuild public confidence in the judiciary. However, three months later, we remain disappointed.

1. Building a Car Behind Closed Doors and Lacking Public Mandate

   First, over these three months, judicial authorities still have not learned to set judicial reform policies based on public demands. In the so-called timeline currently proposed, the process of incorporating public opinion is entirely absent. The previously promised National Judicial Conference quietly fizzled out, with no progress on preparatory work or alternative proposals. Following the protest, reform has truly become a matter of building a car behind closed doors, devoid of any substantive process for gathering broad public opinion. For instance, the strong public demand for judicial anti-corruption has yet to receive a direct response, resulting in a failure to establish even the most basic trust in the judiciary.

   The only response to public demand worth mentioning is the administrative measure requiring court presidents to regularly receive citizens. However, we dare not place high expectations on such a policy, because we believe judicial reform should focus on systemic transformation while avoiding case-specific interventions. The practice of court presidents meeting with citizens risks degrading into either legal lectures or complaint-airing sessions devoid of constructive policy. One can only say that while it expends significant manpower, it merely offers superficial relief for some public grievances without resolving the problems of the litigation system.

2. A Timeline Lacking Actionable Content

   The biggest blind spot in the timeline currently put forward by officials is that one cannot discern from it 'just how long it will take for the public to enjoy better trial quality, a reasonable litigation system, and competent judges?' We all understand that the project of judicial reform is immense and can never be achieved overnight. Precisely for this reason, what the public expects to see is an action plan laid out according to the urgency of judicial reform and the feasibility of implementation. Officials have failed to propose concrete policies on how to tread the path toward ideal justice, instead merely painting a vague and grandiose picture. For example, regarding the well-intentioned system of judicial evaluation, after prolonged advocacy by civil society, the Judicial Yuan finally agreed to conduct general evaluations of judges, but the implementation rules have still not been proposed.

   In fact, many judicial reforms are tasks that can be undertaken and even completed without waiting for legal amendments, such as establishing verbatim transcripts (computerization), conducting specialized investigations or setting up specialized court divisions for corrupt and malfeasant judicial personnel, establishing a judge evaluation system, abolishing the performance-rating system and chief-judge system, having the President of the Judicial Yuan and judicial officials withdraw from political parties, and publishing all judgments online. These measures do not require waiting for legal amendments or legislation, yet in the official judicial reform timeline they are either absent or delayed, which cannot but severely undermine confidence in the authorities' sincerity in promoting judicial reform.

3. Passing the Buck to the Legislature

   We understand that much of judicial reform is tied to statutory grounds, but we must honestly remind everyone that no institutional establishment can ever be automatically completed through legislation alone. How to communicate, propagate, educate, and promote during the process are the key factors in whether a system can truly be implemented. Frankly speaking, even legislation involves congressional lobbying and a scheduled timeline for completion and realization, rather than simply brushing it off by saying it has been 'submitted to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation.'

4. Lack of Comprehensive Planning for the Pyramid-Shaped Litigation System

   Seeing that officials also agree on establishing a pyramid-shaped litigation system, we are greatly encouraged and pleased that the judicial authorities share this consensus. However, such a systematic transformation is evidently a major undertaking that requires many peripheral supporting measures and comprehensive considerations to be successfully completed. Therefore, how long will it take? How will the transitional period be handled? These are all questions that must be answered.

   For example, although the official judicial reform blueprint mentions strengthening trials of fact, it does not explain how to retain competent judges in the court of first instance. How can the number of Supreme Court judges be reduced so that it can become a pyramid structure? To increase the number of judges, how can conditions be created to attract top talent into the judicial system? How can the current heavy caseload pressure be effectively resolved? If a centralized trial system is to be adopted, how will the coordination between prosecutorial investigation and judicial adjudication be resolved? Furthermore, is there a conflict with the current practice where candidate judges in their five-year candidacy period often directly handle cases, while experienced senior judges serve as chief judges and cannot strengthen trials of fact, alongside the practice of submitting trial records for review post-trial? Until these issues are presented comprehensively and the chronological order of implementation is explained, we truly cannot imagine how a pyramid-shaped litigation system can be realized!

5. The Position of the Judicial Yuan Remains Unchanged

   Finally, the fundamental issue truly affecting the judicial system—'transforming the Judicial Yuan into a judicial adjudication organ'—is not addressed at all. The peculiar phenomenon where judicial administration overrides judicial adjudication organs, resulting in administrative power exceeding judicial independence, is not reviewed, let alone the important, meaningful, yet simple task of having the President of the Judicial Yuan immediately withdraw from political parties.

   Although we still affirm that judicial authorities have proposed policies such as displaying judges' nameplates, making judgments publicly accessible online, establishing a judge evaluation system, and building a pyramid-shaped litigation system, we cannot help but feel disappointed in the face of such a timeline that has not broken away from official boilerplate. We sincerely hope the authorities understand that not only has civil society run out of patience enduring a substandard judiciary for too long, but judicial officials within the system have also successively launched various proposals and criticisms in hopes of accelerating the sluggish pace of official judicial reform; otherwise, a total collapse of Taiwan's judicial system is almost imminent. Therefore, we strongly hope that the judicial authorities will truly implement reforms and propose a concrete, feasible, visionary, and promising judicial reform timeline, rather than perfunctory bureaucratic posturing. The presentation of the current timeline not only makes us deeply doubtful whether the judicial authorities truly understand public opinion, but also seems to officially announce that true transformation in judicial reform must rely on even stronger pressure from civil society.