Establishing a Chief Judge Term Limit System Is Only the First Step of Reform; the Judicial Yuan Must Keep Up the Good Work!
Last edited: 2026-07-24
On April 21, the Judicial Yuan issued personnel orders deciding to relieve fifteen High Court judges of their concurrent positions as chief judges starting June 14. This news has generally drawn public recognition for President Weng Yueh-sheng's determination to promote judicial reform. Indeed, the establishment of a chief judge term limit system was already resolved during the National Judicial Reform Conference held in 1994. Although district courts implemented it last year, some High Court chief judges resorted to threats of suicide and argued that the term limit system was illegal and unconstitutional, preventing its enforcement until former President Shih left office. Today, the Judicial Yuan has bravely faced backlash to enforce the term limit requirements by denying reappointment to certain chief judges and explicitly identifying them as unsuited for the role. In a bureaucratic culture riddled with sycophancy, the Judicial Yuan certainly deserves praise this time around!
However, we must point out that while unsuitable chief judges can be relieved of their concurrent chief judge duties through a resolution by the Personnel Review Committee, what about unsuitable judges? We dare not claim that an unsuitable chief judge is necessarily an unsuitable judge, but are there currently no unsuitable judges in our country? Therefore, to elevate the quality of adjudication and enhance public trust in the judiciary, the solution goes far beyond merely replacing chief judges; it requires rooting out unsuitable judges altogether. At present, the Judicial Yuan's judicial evaluation is merely a formality. Meanwhile, the judge evaluation conducted by the Judicial Reform Foundation and the Taipei Bar Association was met with Chief Judge Yang Kuei-chih filing a private prosecution for defamation against two lawyers on the grounds that "nowhere in the world do lawyers evaluate judges." Therefore, we sincerely hope the Judicial Yuan will swiftly utilize all available methods—such as legislating the Judges Act—to supervise and evaluate judges and weed out those who are unsuitable. Only then will it truly be a blessing for all citizens.
In addition, regarding the improvement of the adjudicatory system, the best way to promote a collegiate system should be the adoption of a presiding judge system. This is not only advocated by the Judicial Reform Foundation in its Blueprint for Judicial Reform, but a recent survey conducted by the Association of Women Judges targeting over 500 judges and prosecutors also found that 59 percent of respondents favored abolishing the chief judge system. Therefore, despite President Weng's reported view that the training environment for judges sees many newly recruited lawyers lacking even social work experience, making chief judges necessary to guide and supervise less-experienced judges, we believe that this objection does not hold true at least in the High Court and the Supreme Court. Thus, the High Court and the Supreme Court should be able to abolish the chief judge system without controversy and adopt the presiding judge system instead. As for district courts, once future regulations require that judges be selected and appointed from among outstanding lawyers and prosecutors, or even if the current system is maintained while enforcing a five-year probationary period without handling cases, the chief judge system should likewise be gradually abolished.
Finally, regarding the backlash sparked by the chief judge term limit system, while those involved claim they are not clinging to power, we cannot ignore the fact that judges are generally heavily overworked. In comparison, chief judges carry a much lighter caseload; who could remain calm when forced to shoulder a caseload several to ten times heavier starting June 15? In this regard, we believe that promptly establishing a reasonable adjudicatory system is the fundamental solution! A so-called reasonable adjudicatory system is a pyramid-shaped litigation system, where senior and outstanding judges are assigned to the court of first instance so that the vast majority of cases do not need to be appealed, and the Supreme Court will no longer be the largest Supreme Court in the world. Only in this way can the workload be comprehensively alleviated without infringing upon the people's right of access to court! Yet doing this requires more than just replacing chief judges; it requires "demoting" second- and third-instance judges to the first instance. We wonder whether appellate judges have the determination to break through myths and work together toward this? Does the Judicial Yuan also have the determination to advance the goals set forth in its blue book—namely, "strengthening the function of fact-finding trials, making the first instance a robust fact-finding trial, and making the second instance a review trial" and "breaking the restrictions on the official ranks of judges in the first and second instances"? Therefore, the Judicial Yuan must keep up the good work!
※ Reprinted from Taiwan Daily, April 23, 1999
This article is an AI-generated translation of the original Chinese text. In the event of any discrepancy, the Chinese version shall prevail.