If the Supreme Court Cannot Uniformly Interpret the Law, What Is It Even For?

When a National Chung Cheng University professor was found to have falsely claimed research funding, the Ninth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court held in 2013 that: when a professor handles scientific research procurement affairs pursuant to the provisions of the Basic Science and Technology Act, the Government Procurement Act does not apply, and such acts do not constitute 'public affairs' in the exercise of public power; hence, the professor does not possess the status of an 'authorized public servant.' Whether the legal interpretation in this judgment is proper is certainly a matter for legal experts to correct, but the structural problems of the Supreme Court are once again highlighted in this case. Regrettably, Taiwan's legal culture has degenerated, with errors becoming entrenched over time, causing public opinion to miss the forest for the trees, shouting over individual cases without gaining a comprehensive bird's-eye view. How lamentable!

Regarding the judgment in this case, a spokesperson for the Supreme Court candidly admitted: 'The judgment of the Ninth Criminal Division can only bind the lower court in that specific case, and does not represent a uniform interpretation by the Supreme Court.' This nakedly exposes the tragedy of Taiwan's judiciary. If the judgments of the court of final appeal do not even possess the function of uniformly interpreting the law, then what is the Supreme Court even for? In other words, if this case had been tried by another panel of the Supreme Court, the conclusion might have been entirely different.

For example, the Fifth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court held in 2011 that: although the Government Procurement Act does not apply when a National Chiayi University professor handles scientific research procurement affairs pursuant to the Basic Science and Technology Act, the procurement personnel are engaging in public affairs by procuring with public funds, and the intervention of public power is profound; thus, they naturally possess the status of an 'authorized public servant.'

On the same issue, the Twelfth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court held in 2009 that: whether a Shu-Te University professor's fraudulent claim for subsidies from the Kaohsiung County Government concerned public affairs, and whether official powers were exercised, were both subject to doubt. The original instance court rashly concluded that the professor was an 'authorized public servant,' which could hardly be considered lawful. The lower court consequently altered its judgment, holding that the professor was not an 'authorized public servant.' However, upon appeal, the Eleventh Criminal Division of the Supreme Court held in 2010 that: given that Shu-Te University accepted commission from the county government and acted in accordance with the Government Procurement Act, can it be said that it does not exercise official powers? Was the professor engaged in public affairs concerning research project procurement? Was the professor a 'commissioned public servant'? The original instance court's finding that the professor was not an 'authorized public servant' was surely premature. The legal interpretations of the two successive remands were diametrically opposed, yet both were criticisms from the Supreme Court. Pray tell, which one counts as 'supreme'?

The lower court subsequently maintained its finding that the professor was not an 'authorized public servant.' Upon appeal, the Twelfth Criminal Division of the Supreme Court reiterated in 2011: when a professor receives government subsidies and is responsible for project procurement, can it be said that this does not constitute public affairs? Should the execution of commissioned affairs be regarded as a 'commissioned public servant'? The lower court's finding that the professor was not an 'authorized public servant' failed to thoroughly investigate and clarify the matter, and suffered from defects, leading to a third remand. Ultimately, the lower court concluded that the professor was an 'authorized public servant' and should be sentenced in accordance with the Corruption Punishment Act; however, because the professor returned the funds and the circumstances were truly pitiful, probation was granted.

Much like the earlier child sexual assault cases, where the Supreme Court stubbornly insisted on investigating whether there was an act 'against [the victim's] will,' only to subsequently witness the wrath of the White Rose movement blaze forth, prompting them to instantly cobble together an incomprehensible resolution to extract themselves from the predicament. In the present professor expense-claim case, faced with psychological warfare and appeals from academic giants such as the Minister of Education, the Chairman of the National Science Council, and the President of Academia Sinica, the Supreme Court immediately altered its longstanding interpretation.

However, because this case 'does not represent a uniform interpretation by the Supreme Court,' lower courts will still find themselves with nothing to follow in the future. The exact same wording can yield opposite conclusions—the skill of crafty clerks and scribes should not be underestimated! Yet, the fortunate get lucky breaks while the unfortunate get bitter pills; is this a court of law or a casino?

Why do these self-contradictory and divergent judgments from the Supreme Court emerge endlessly, and where does the root of the problem lie? Ultimately, it is because the Judicial Yuan, for the convenience of governance, has deliberately connived at the inflation of the Supreme Court's personnel and the indiscriminate conferral of prestigious titles.

Nearly twenty court divisions and an inflated bureaucratic organization of nearly a hundred judges, coupled with the sacred and inviolable doctrine of 'judicial independence,' have resulted in the bizarre deformity of 'each division blowing its own horn to its own tune.' Furthermore, judges' sycophantic desires for career advancement lead them to curry favor and compete to pander to those in power. On a tiny island of twenty-three million people, we have the highest proportion of judges of courts of final appeal in the entire world. Hollow out the courts of first instance, disorganize the courts of second instance, and bloat the courts of third instance—what good does this judicial ecosystem do for the national economy and people's livelihood, other than facilitating the manipulation of political machinations and satisfying vanity?

A few days ago, when judges of the Hualien District Court quarreled, the Judicial Yuan immediately cited 'the predicament of judicial power' as grounds to exile them to the southern frontier against their will; yet in the face of the bloated and lawless Supreme Court, the Judicial Yuan remains gleefully unfazed and turns a blind eye. Surely this cannot fail to be considered a 'predicament of judicial power'?

Faced with this chaos, the Judicial Yuan's reform countermeasure is instead to bestow promotions and create an 'En Banc Court' within the Supreme Court. It seems that 'Supreme' is not thrilling enough, and they must create a 'Super Supreme' to make it even more exciting.

However, judicial reform needs subtraction, not addition!