Where Lies the Human Rights of the "Psychiatrically Labelled"?

A 19-year-old youth surnamed Huang visited the suspect in the MRT homicide case. The very next day, based on false interview details spread by news reports, police and firefighters had a social worker summon him, arrested him, and sent him to a psychiatric hospital for compulsory admission before even notifying his family. Deeply aggrieved by this unlawful restriction of freedom and "forced psychiatric labeling," the client requested our assistance in petitioning for habeas corpus. After interviewing the client, obtaining his medical records, and consulting a professional physician to re-examine them, the Foundation concluded that the requirements for compulsory admission under the Mental Health Act were clearly not met, and thus filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf. During the court hearing, the psychiatric hospital also stated that the client's psychiatric symptoms were difficult to determine, that he could normally manage general daily life affairs, and that upon evaluation, there were no concerns of public danger. Considering that the client was a minor and that there was a need for placement after discharge, the court advised both parties to negotiate a suitable plan, resulting in a settlement.

According to news reports, quite a few legal authorities have expressed views that the new Habeas Corpus Act has not yet taken effect and the petition should have been dismissed in accordance with the law. The Foundation finds it truly difficult to agree. The right to petition for habeas corpus stipulated in the Habeas Corpus Act, as interpreted by Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 392, stems from the Anglo-American writ of habeas corpus. Whenever personal liberty is deprived by the police or administrative officials, the detained person has the right to request a hearing by a court, which is not limited to criminal arrests. Recently, Interpretations No. 708 and No. 710 have also reaffirmed and recognized that there should be an immediate and effective remedy system for the arrest and detention of non-criminal defendants, in order to comply with the intent of Article 8 of the Constitution protecting personal liberty and the principle of due process. The practical legal views cited by those legal authorities tend to adopt narrow interpretations because Article 8 of the old Habeas Corpus Act did not explicitly regulate the processing procedures for non-criminal arrests. This obviously contradicts the aforementioned constitutional and Grand Justices' interpretations. Out of ingrained habit, only a minority of courts adhering to the constitutional intent of human rights protection have dared to make different judgments.

On the other hand, Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been given legal force through its implementation act, clearly sets forth the same intent as Article 8, Paragraph 1 of our Constitution. Paragraph 4 of the same article further explicitly stipulates the right to habeas corpus: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful," which can independently serve as the legal basis for habeas corpus. Furthermore, according to General Comment No. 8 issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee regarding this article, it is expressly emphasized that "the important guarantee in paragraph 4, namely the right to control by a court of the legality of detention, applies to all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention." Past judicial practice evidently directly conflicts with the explicit provisions of domestic-enforced treaties. Administrative orders cannot even violate laws, let alone mere legal interpretations? It is indeed regrettable that relevant legal authorities still claim that the Habeas Corpus Act only applies to criminal defendants and continue to invoke unlawful practical views.

The rationale for the six-month advocacy period in Article 12 of the new Habeas Corpus Act is that "there is an urgent need for advocacy and preparation, and sufficient time should be allowed for practice to respond." This is merely to save face for legal practice. One must remember that judges have a duty to know the law, and courts must adjudicate in accordance with the law. When it comes to the crucial protection of human rights concerning personal liberty, where does an advocacy period come from? In addition, the Foundation petitioned for habeas corpus at the Shilin District Court, but after the presiding judge concluded the case, the President of the court actually accepted media interviews and expressed the opinion that "the new Habeas Corpus Act has not yet taken effect and the petition should have been dismissed in accordance with the law." This was even more astonishing. After all, whether the presiding judge handled this case appropriately should be left to the public to judge. As an administrative official, the court president should not publicly comment on the handling methods of judges within the court; otherwise, it is tantamount to infringing upon the guarantee of judicial independence for judges. Such actions by the court president are equivalent to implying that his subordinate—the presiding judge—handled the case improperly and "should not have issued a writ of habeas corpus at all." How will other judges in the court try cases in the future? The principle of judicial independence proclaimed by the Constitution aims to exclude tangible and intangible improper interference, influence, implication, or pressure from the judicial administrative power. In this case, the court president set the worst possible example.

In this case, society was permeated with fear regarding major criminal cases and the stigmatization of psychiatric patients. All of this relies on the courts to remain unaffected by social public opinion and to make impartial adjudications strictly based on legal provisions and actual circumstances. The Foundation expresses its deep gratitude to Judge Ch'en Chieh-an, the presiding judge of the Shilin District Court in this case, who, amidst an atmosphere where both the court's division chief and court president adopted opposite legal interpretations, still bravely issued a writ of habeas corpus based on the mission of human rights protection to bring the client to court. During the process, he carefully listened to the fully stated opinions of the hospital, the client, and the agent regarding the reasons, procedures, and substantive requirements of the compulsory admission, and was willing to timely raise questions and clarifications where doubts existed. Although he ultimately did not issue a ruling on the Mental Health Act issues involving the client and the lawfulness of this compulsory admission—thus giving up an important opportunity to clear the client's stigma and bring about a legal amendment, which is a regrettable shortfall—the judge's provision of a full, substantive, and effective remedy procedure to the client in this case still deserves our high affirmation.

The Constitution and laws are the charters of human rights, and the courts are the last line of defense for human rights protection. We hope that the courts can continuously demonstrate the determination and courage to protect human rights, and forever stand with the vulnerable people.