Ma's Judicial Reform Track Record is Appalling

President Ma's popularity has plummeted, with many of his 2008 campaign promises falling through and his 2012 'Golden Decade, National Vision' initiative now on life support. Marking his sixth anniversary in office, it is necessary to honestly review his platform—giving credit where due and criticism where warranted.

Attempting a Revival: President Ma's 2008 judicial reform promises were scattered across three areas: 'democratic reform,' 'clean governance policy,' and 'human rights policy.' They ranged from 'strictly prohibiting political interference in the judiciary (Item 135),' 'strengthening protections for judicial personnel so they have no worries ahead (Item 144),' 'prohibiting political wiretapping (Item 286),' to 'a regular judicial officer evaluation system featuring pluralism, professionalism, and public participation, along with the provision of translation personnel and court stenographers (Item 287),' among many others.

One year into his term, initiating the domestic incorporation of the two human rights covenants was, in all fairness, a remarkable achievement. Even if subsequent government compliance was somewhat reluctant, human rights policy ultimately got off to a good start. Other areas have been mediocre at best, with the most efficient and decisive move being the purchase of over 400 computer screens for interrogation rooms so that defendants can view and correct transcripts in real time. Indeed, when someone experiences pain firsthand, reform is pursued without hesitation.

Major Bills Driven by External Pressures

Faltering Momentum: The honeymoon period for politicians is short. Following Typhoon Morakot, the Ma administration's public support slipped, making the pace of reform increasingly arduous. Ironically, even though the ruling party held a parliamentary majority, the Ma administration still blamed institutional changes on legislative foot-dragging. In contrast, the Criminal Speedy Trial Act was passed in 2010 amid suspicions of ulterior motives, and the Judges Act—dormant for over 20 years—was forced through in the wake of collective judicial corruption, the resignation of the Judicial Yuan President, and the White Rose Movement. Instead of being anticipated, these major bills were completely absent from President Ma's agenda and list.

By this point, President Ma was showing signs of fatigue, unable to lead the judicial reform agenda and dragged along by events; lacking the will to actively reform, he was consumed by public backlash. Sadly, in the 2011 'Golden Decade' policy, judicial reform was glaringly lackluster, squeezed into a sub-category of 'clean government' and reduced to the notion that judicial reform simply means judges not taking bribes. There were three relatively concrete policies: promoting the 'observer-judge system,' establishing 'judicial protection centers,' and adopting 'restorative justice.'

Political Wiretapping Shatters Credibility

Exhausted Options: The 'judicial protection centers' were utterly incomprehensible and never seen; 'restorative justice' was well-intentioned, but fundamentally conflicted with the Ma administration's familiar mindset favoring heavy criminal penalties. Consequently, only the 'observer-judge system' remained as the main course. Who could fail to notice the Judicial Yuan's recent vigorous advocacy? It seems President Ma is left with no choice but to stake everything on this single card!

All in all, apart from the two human rights covenants, the track record of judicial reform is appalling. Especially after the Prosecutor-General wiretapping scandal broke, even the pledges of non-interference and no political wiretapping were shattered. History repeats itself. If the next president wishes to reform the judiciary, a sincere piece of advice is: know what you want, make up your mind, and start early!