The Primary Qualification for the New Prosecutor-General

Prosecutor-General Huang Shih-ming's term is set to expire in April. Regardless of whether he resigns early, public attention is gradually shifting toward potential candidates for his successor. Ever since the controversies stirred up by the Prosecutor-General and his Special Investigation Division (SID) early last September gradually draw to a close, the departure of the old and the arrival of the new is the natural order of things. However, we hope even more that the qualifications and self-expectations of the new Prosecutor-General will continuously "upgrade and evolve."

Both Ch'en Ts'ung-ming and Huang Shih-ming Served as "Negative Examples"

Huang's predecessor, Ch'en Ts'ung-ming, resigned after being impeached by the Control Yuan for dining with high-ranking political figures. Huang was petitioned for removal by the Prosecutor Evaluation Commission and indicted by the Taipei District Prosecutor's Office for reporting a judicial case directly to the President. He also narrowly avoided impeachment by the Control Yuan. Regardless of whether he is ultimately convicted, becoming the first Prosecutor-General in judicial history to be indicted means he has already lost all credibility.

In the early days, the core authority of the Prosecutor-General was limited to filing extraordinary appeals for cases with final judgments; direct intervention in individual cases was relatively rare. Later, with the establishment of the SID, the Prosecutor-General was empowered with the nation's elite personnel and resources to directly direct investigations, wielding a power so immense it was peerless. Combined with the shift to presidential nomination and parliamentary appointment, the attribute of a political appointee became even more pronounced. In short, without a certain level of mutual trust, interaction, and even ideological affinity with high-ranking political figures, it is difficult to secure presidential nomination and parliamentary appointment. Furthermore, the immense power enjoyed after being equipped with the SID naturally makes them a target eagerly courted by high-ranking political officials. Without considerable backbone and persistence—where the fish helps the water and the water helps the fish—a judicial leader waving the banner of justice will, intentionally or unintentionally upon taking office, at best fail to deter the SID from targeting political elites, and at worst degenerate into a hatchet man for political struggles.

Primary Condition: Cannot Cross Political Red Lines

The reasons for changing the Prosecutor-General to a presidential nomination confirmed by parliament, granting tenure protection, and equipping them with the SID were hopes that—by expanding the Prosecutor-General's powers, providing resources, and enhancing democratic legitimacy—the civil service could be clarified and the deep-seated ills of Taiwan's black-gold political system rectified. However, Ch'en Ts'ung-ming already revealed the mindset of a Prosecutor-General nominated by the President who finds it difficult to shake off the mentality that "the President is the boss." Huang Shih-ming more concretely demonstrated that a Prosecutor-General lacking legal due process concepts, self-deluding as the embodiment of justice, and prideful of personal integrity can use the "top-tier equipment" of the SID to trample the rule of law and infringe upon human rights to a staggering degree. Afterwards, relying on tenure protection and the lack of a removal mechanism, he could cling to his position to the extent that it shamed the entire prosecutorial system. Therefore, if the systemic contradictions cannot be resolved through legal amendments in the short term, the first demand of the new Prosecutor-General is not to cross the red line where the judiciary and politics ought to maintain distance. Specifically, this means "no contact, no discussion, and must report."

No Contact with High-Ranking Political Figures, No Discussion of Cases, and Reporting When Influenced

As the leader of the prosecutorial system, the Prosecutor-General must have a grand framework, a broad vision, and a magnanimous bearing to be qualified to lead the nation's prosecutors and serve as a role model. Being honest and uncorrupt, proactive in duty, and courageous in responsibility are merely basic conditions. As for high-ranking political figures, all forms of contact should be refused, even with the President who made the nomination. Naturally, it is even more impossible to proactively "report" or "discuss" individual cases, especially cases under investigation, which are strictly prohibited.

As for concerns raised regarding cases under handling—whether they constitute "petitions" or "lobbying/influence-peddling"—they sometimes exist along a vague borderline. Even if the Prosecutor-General feels pressure from high-ranking officials, it does not necessarily constitute improper lobbying; perhaps the handling of the case has become so unreasonable as to be intolerable. Conversely, even a casual remark to "handle the matter in accordance with the law" might not necessarily be free of lobbying. The key lies in the reporting mechanism: being able to report truthfully and accept scrutiny indicates that there is nothing shameful hidden within. When the Prosecutor-General stands open and aboveboard, they protect both the rule of law and themselves. Over time, political lobbying will only wither away.

If the nominee for Prosecutor-General dares not even make these concrete commitments, or if upon taking office it is proven once again that they fundamentally cannot fulfill them, then we should abolish the SID, restore the appointment of the Prosecutor-General to nomination by the Minister of Justice, and focus their duties exclusively on filing extraordinary appeals and unifying the legal interpretations of prosecutors. Such power would perhaps be quite enough.