An Evaluation of the Judgment in Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's Case

Overview

This case concerns a kidnapping and extortion incident that occurred in September 1995. The kidnapped construction entrepreneur, Y, was brutally murdered by the perpetrators, and one of the perpetrators was arrested by the police during the ransom collection process. Aside from the undisputed individuals X1, X, and X2, X's cousin Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang was also sentenced to death for alleged involvement in the crime. After five retrials, the case was finalized in April 2000. The Prosecutor-General of the Supreme Prosecutors Office subsequently filed extraordinary appeals on three separate occasions starting from 2001, all of which were dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Upon a detailed review of the case files, transcripts, written briefs, judgments, and other related materials, numerous questionable aspects emerge: the criminal investigation process was perfunctory, failing to preserve the victim's vehicle seizure record and the telephone communication records of the defendants in the investigative file; the judges relied merely upon the confessions of other co-defendants to sentence Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang to death in the absence of any other corroborative evidence, while completely failing to consider favorable evidence presented by Ch'en, such as his alibi. All of these factors placed Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang in jeopardy of having his life deprived at any moment.

The investigative methods employed by the police and prosecutors in this case, the judges' recognition of the evidentiary value of accomplices' confessions in determining facts, and the practice of using accomplices' confessions as corroborative evidence not only threaten to severely undermine the accuracy of criminal judgments but may also shake public confidence in the judiciary. The authors have no intention of challenging the authority of the courts through this evaluation; rather, they hope to examine the tip of the iceberg regarding systemic flaws through an individual case, thereby prompting reform and progress in criminal justice.

Facts Determined by the Court

1. Criminal Facts Determined by the Court

   The defendants in this case, X, X1, and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, were facing financial difficulties and urgently needed cash to resolve their predicament. Consequently, after X1 and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang fortuitously encountered Y, a wealthy real estate developer, they conceived the idea of kidnapping him for ransom. However, due to a shortage of manpower and lack of transportation, they invited X2 to join them.

   In mid-August 1995, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, X, X1, and X2 gathered at Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's rented residence in Kueishan Township, Taoyuan, to plan the crime. Because Y knew X1 and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, they decided to eliminate Y immediately after the kidnapping to avoid police pursuit. X, X2, and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang purchased a small long knife and handcuffs. Three bottles of sulfuric acid, a wide tan adhesive tape, and five pairs of transparent gloves were purchased by Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang.

   Around 5:00 a.m. on September 1, the four individuals departed from Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's rented residence and headed toward the vicinity of Y's residence. Around 7:00 a.m., X and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang used the small long knife to puncture the front-left tire of Y's car. Around 8:40 a.m., when Y attempted to drive and discovered that the front-left tire was flat, he opened the rear trunk to retrieve the spare tire for replacement. At that moment, X, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, and X2 swarmed forward. X held a knife to Y's neck, X2 handcuffed one of Y's hands, and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang assisted by pushing and pulling, forcing Y into the back seat of a stolen car driven by X1. They covered Y's eyes with adhesive tape, with X2 driving ahead to lead the way and provide lookout. X1 instructed Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang to get out of the car, return to the scene to wipe away fingerprints, and then return on his own to wait at the Kueishan rented residence. X1, X, and X2 immediately proceeded to the mountainous area of Hsichih.

   Around 10:00 a.m., X1 and the others arrived at the scheduled murder site and obtained the contact number of Y's father, Y1. X1 then murdered Y, threw the body into a pre-dug pit, poured sulfuric acid over it, and buried it. Afterward, X1 drove the stolen car to carry X and guide X2 down the mountain. Along the way, X1 first abandoned the stolen car at the entrance of Earls Hill (Pa-chüeh Shan-chuang), retrieved the mobile phone from the car, and boarded X2's car to return to Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's rented residence, where he called the betel nut stall operated by Ch'en's wife to summon Ch'en back to rendezvous.

   In the early hours of the following morning, X2 made consecutive calls to Y1's home demanding ransom, and thereafter continuously called Y1's home to extort money. Finally, on September 15 of the same year, both parties agreed on a ransom of 15 million NT dollars. On September 16, X1 boarded a plane to flee to Thailand, but continued to participate in the ransom collection process via telephone. On September 20, X and the others arranged a location to collect the ransom, at which point police officers lying in ambush arrested X. Upon learning of X's arrest, X2 and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang began to flee. X2 was arrested by the police on October 22 of the same year, while Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang turned himself in on June 24, 1996.

2. Reasons and Evidence Relied Upon by the Court to Determine Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's Participation in the Crime

   1. Regarding Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's motive for committing the crime, the judge relied on X2's police interrogation record dated October 22, 1995: "Because all four of us were short of money and in financial difficulties... Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang mentioned he had borrowed money from his in-laws and had loans to repay... We were all short of money, so we discussed kidnapping and extorting a ransom," thereby concluding that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang was in a less-than-smooth financial situation and thus took a desperate gamble.

   2. Regarding whether Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in the preliminary planning, the judge relied on X2's police interrogation record dated October 22, 1995: "In mid-August, the four of us, X1, X, and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang... held the first discussion to carry out a kidnapping at Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's residence," thereby concluding that Ch'en participated in the preliminary planning of the case.

   3. Regarding whether Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in the prior tailing and surveillance, judges across successive trials relied on X2's police interrogation record dated October 22, 1995: "Because we only knew the construction site where Y worked... X1 drove and took Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang to Y's construction site to look for Y. After confirming that Y was still working at the site, the four of us went twice more (once driving my car... and another time driving Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's car) to trail and tail Y to the vicinity of Y's home in Tataocheng. After confirming his vehicle and residence, we returned to Taoyuan." "Every time, all four of us participated together. The last time was on September 1, using two vehicles. One was driven by me, carrying my sedan with X, and the other was driven by X1, carrying Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang in the stolen car," thereby concluding that Ch'en participated in the prior surveillance.

   4. Regarding the portion where Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang purchased the criminal tools, this was based on X2's prosecutor interrogation record dated October 23, 1995: "... We bought the criminal tools completely... In addition, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang himself bought three bottles of sulfuric acid, one roll of tape, and five pairs of transparent gloves at a pharmacy in Kueishan," thereby concluding that Ch'en prepared the tools for the crime.

   5. Regarding participation in the kidnapping on September 1, the judge relied on X2's police interrogation record dated October 22, 1995: "Around 5:00 a.m. on September 1, we departed from Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's residence... After parking the car, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang and X got off first... and used a small samurai sword to puncture the front-left tire of Y's car... Y... discovered the front tire was flat... and prepared to change the tire. At this time, X2, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, and X rushed toward Y. X held Y's neck with the small samurai sword, I handcuffed Y's hands, and the three of us jointly and forcibly pushed Y into the stolen car driven by X1. After forcing him into the car, I handcuffed both of Y's hands. Then X1 drove, with Y being held in the middle of the back seat, and X and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang sitting on either side to watch over him... I returned to my car... After driving for a distance, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang got off near a gas station, returned to the kidnapping scene to check the situation, and was responsible for cleaning and wiping away any fingerprints we might have left on Y's car," thereby concluding that Ch'en participated in the September 1 kidnapping operation. Furthermore, regarding the alibi presented by Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang—which was based on a simulation conducted on the morning of October 11, 1996, showing that the time required to travel from the crime scene to Ch'en's residence was about one hour, and an on-site inspection conducted by officers of the Neihu Precinct of the Taipei City Police Department on the morning of October 16, 1996, showing that the travel time from the crime scene to Tzu-ch'iang West Road in Kueishan Township was only 45 minutes—the court concluded that the time for Ch'en to get off the car to wipe fingerprints and return to his Taoyuan residence or betel nut stall should have been before 10:00 a.m. on September 1, 1995, and therefore rejected Ch'en's alibi regarding his presence at the Taoyuan Post Office Branch 5 that same morning.

   6. Regarding whether Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in the division of spoils on the afternoon of September 1, the judge relied on X2's police interrogation record dated October 22, 1995: "... When going down the mountain, X1 drove the stolen car carrying X ahead, and I drove my own car following behind all the way to the foot of the mountain in Hsichih near Earls Hill, where we abandoned the stolen car. The three of us together rode in my car, driven by me, carrying the tools and other items, and left the mountainous area together to return to Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's residence in Taoyuan to rendezvous with Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang."

   7. Regarding whether Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang and Y were old acquaintances, this was based on the testimony of Z1, the older sister of co-defendant X, during the prosecutor's interrogation on November 8, 1995: "X1 is my older brother, X is my younger brother, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang is my cousin... Y is a friend of my boyfriend Z2." "I heard from Z2 that they should know each other through brokerage business," and the testimony of Z2, the cohabitant of the defendant X's sister Z1, during the prosecutor's interrogation on November 8, 1995: "X1 and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang seemed to have jointly formed a brokerage company six or seven years ago and rented a second-floor space opposite Songshan Railway Station from Y to use as an office," thereby concluding that Ch'en knew Y.

   8. Regarding the relationship between Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang and the other three defendants and the contact status during the crime period, the judge relied on the facts that X and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang were cousins, X2 and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang were business partners and friends, and Ch'en did not deny that after X1 returned to Taiwan from Thailand, he lived with Ch'en at the rented residence in Kueishan Township, Taoyuan County, to conclude that Ch'en had a close relationship with the other defendants, and thus accepted as true the statements of X2 and X regarding meetings held at Ch'en's rented residence. In addition, the judge also relied on the fact that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang paged defendant X2 as many as 11 times on September 8 to conclude that Ch'en and X2 had close communications.

Comments on Procedural Law
Professor Ho Lai-chieh

1. The Evidentiary Value of Accomplices' Confessions

   1. Illegal Investigative Methods

      Criminal investigation practice in our country has always heavily emphasized "confessions," treating them almost as the "king of evidence." Consequently, if a confession is not extracted directly from the defendant's own mouth admitting to the criminal facts, the probative force of all other evidence seems to be cast into doubt. This overemphasis on "confessions" in handling cases may be the primary reason why illegal investigative methods such as torture cannot be eradicated in domestic investigation practice. Furthermore, this investigative mindset of prioritizing "confessions" manifests itself even more aggressively when investigating crimes involving joint principals.
      Compared to crimes committed by a single individual, multi-party joint crimes possess unique characteristics. For instance, although co-perpetrators may share common interests in a crime, these interests are not necessarily identical. Moreover, because multi-party crimes usually require more meticulous planning, outsiders (including investigators, of course) often find it difficult to uncover the truth unless a perpetrator "spills the beans" (confesses). These characteristics lead investigators to rely even more heavily and place greater value on criminals' confessions. Through a single confession, not only can the entire criminal structure of the accomplices be investigated more easily, but confessions from others can also be extracted (what I colloquially term "cultivating confessions with confessions"). For example, investigators might tell Defendant A that another defendant, Defendant B, has made a full disclosure of the criminal facts and claimed that the crime was primarily instigated by A. Upon hearing this, A naturally refuses to take the fall alone and consequently provides a different "version" of the crime, shifting the blame back onto B. Because this investigative method is "all reward and no risk" for investigators, legal practitioners naturally employ it with great enthusiasm.

      However, the legality of using the "contradictions" between co-perpetrators to extract confessions (an investigative method I colloquially refer to as the "dog-eat-dog" approach, as investigators' mindset is precisely to make co-perpetrators "bite each other" to reveal the crime) is highly questionable. Basically, if investigators have indeed obtained a statement from one co-perpetrator implicating others in the joint crime, showing that statement to the implicated person to clarify the truth and give them an opportunity to rebut is not illegal; such an investigative method serves the same function and purpose as the confrontation of co-defendants stipulated in Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, if investigators use fraudulent tactics to trick a defendant into confessing—such as claiming Defendant A has confessed and implicated Defendant B when A never did so, causing B to confess immediately upon hearing it, or where A's confession only briefly touches upon B, but investigators embellish and falsely represent the contents of A's confession to B in order to extract a confession from B—such investigative methods are illegal (Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
      Practical operations seem to lack deep reflection on the potential abuses generated by this "dog-eat-dog" investigative method. After all, in a constitutional state's criminal proceedings, defendants should not be reduced to mere objects—dogs; defendants ought to be subjects of the proceedings. Yet, because this investigative method is immensely effective for "solving cases," investigative agencies employ it repeatedly, and the law even explicitly acknowledges the evidentiary value of accomplices' confessions (Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Root and branch, the culprit may be the investigative mindset that places excessive weight on confessions. However, a defendant confessing to their own crime versus a defendant confessing to someone else's crime exhibits vast divergences from the perspectives of criminal psychology, criminal interrogation science, and criminal procedural law, and they should not be treated equivalently. Although utilizing the contradictions among co-perpetrators to discover the truth is not inherently illegal, state investigation and trial organs must not blindly indulge in such non-entirely-lawful investigative means as "dog-eat-dog" and "cultivating confessions with confessions." Instead, they should primarily rely on scientific physical evidence and use physical evidence to guide the direction of the investigation, which better aligns with the requirements of modern constitutional criminal proceedings.

      The aforementioned illegal investigative methods cannot be discerned from the investigation transcripts of this case, and the investigation process lacked recordings, videos, or other materials capable of verifying whether such illegalities occurred. Therefore, it is impossible to conclusively determine whether the police obtained the confessions of co-defendants X and X2 through such illegal grounds. Nevertheless, this case similarly reveals another layer of "magic" regarding accomplices' confessions. Both defendants X and X2 confessed to the police, yet the contents of their respective confessions clearly differed (the former implicated Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang but not X1, while the latter implicated both). The police could certainly use these two "versions" of the crime as a reference to determine how to proceed further with the investigation. Ultimately, however, the court deduced other "versions" (often a "comprehensive version") from the versions provided by the co-defendants to serve as the final "court-determined version" for conviction, sweeping up all co-perpetrators in one fell swoop. Judging from the criminal facts of the four individuals including Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang in this case, not only did the two confessing individuals (X and X2) each present their own "versions" of the crime, but through the judgments across five retrials, yet another set of "revised versions" appeared. Although the final judgment seemingly adopted the "version" of co-defendant X2 as the court's ultimate "court-determined version," it still remained a result derived through deduction to create that "comprehensive version." Because state investigation and trial organs could not obtain any direct physical evidence from the confessions of X and X2 that clearly proved Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's involvement in the kidnapping, extortion, and murder, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's conviction as a joint principal in the kidnapping, extortion, and murder was merely a result derived by deducing from various "versions." Relying on such back-and-forth deductions to piece together a third "comprehensive version" to convict Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang is a judgment that naturally fails to convince people.

   2. "Another's Confession" is Not a "Confession"

      As mentioned above, defendants frequently implicate other co-perpetrators alongside their own criminal facts in interrogation practice. A defendant confessing to their own crime constitutes a "confession" under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is unquestionable. However, whether statements implicating others in crime also count as "confessions" under the Code of Criminal Procedure is not without question. To distinguish the two, I will colloquially refer to the latter as "another's confession" (ta-pai), because the perpetrator's alleged involvement is "implicated by another," and the perpetrator did not personally "confess" to their own crime.
      Compared to a simple, standalone defendant's "confession" (confessing to one's own crime), the credibility of "another's confession" is clearly lower. This is human nature: individuals facing involvement in a case will flee or minimize their own role wherever possible, shifting the blame as much as possible onto others they drag down with them (in this case, co-defendant X's initial confession did not implicate X1, and subsequent events proved that to protect his older brother X1's criminal acts, X shifted all the crimes committed by X1 onto Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang). Additionally, defendants may harbor grudges and exploit the opportunity to implicate individuals they have long wanted to retaliate against, causing them to suffer unmerited involvement as co-perpetrators. In any event, such "another's confession" inherently possesses a considerable number of untrustworthy factors and must therefore be handled with extreme caution.

      Our practical jurisprudence does not consider such "another's confession" to be any different from a simple "confession." Consequently, judicial practice expands the interpretation of the concept of "defendant" in Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure to include "co-defendants," meaning that an accomplice's "another's confession" can also serve as the basis for a guilty verdict against the implicated defendant. If based on realistic factors such as criminal investigation and combating crime, such an expanded interpretation is hardly surprising.
      Regarding this expansive interpretation by the courts, scholars launched severe criticisms when reviewing the Su Chien-ho case, arguing that "another's confession" cannot be legally fictionalized as a "confession" belonging to the implicated co-defendant. This view is well-founded and worthy of endorsement. Confronted with such criticism, judicial practice and legislators responded by amending the law to explicitly place "accomplices' confessions" and "defendants' confessions" side by side in the current Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, attempting thereby to shake off this controversy. Nonetheless, even with such legal amendments, the controversies potentially triggered by "another's confession" remain unresolved; after all, the "accomplice's confession" here remains an "another's confession" implicating someone else's crime, not a personal confession. Procedurally, the two must be treated and handled separately.

   3. "Another's Confession" Must Be Handled as Testimony

      Basically, when a defendant "confesses" to their own crime while incidentally mentioning the crimes of other accomplices, the defendant's statements must still be strictly distinguished into two parts: a "confession" and "another's confession." Statements regarding one's own crime constitute a "confession," while statements regarding others' crimes constitute "another's confession." A "confession" should be handled according to the provisions governing confessions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereas "another's confession" should be handled through the evidentiary method of witness testimony. After all, through the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, errors in "another's confession" are more likely to be uncovered. Naturally, other more definitive, direct physical evidence must also serve as the basis for a guilty verdict to minimize erroneous judgments that may arise from using "another's confession." In German legal scholarship, some even argue that statements by accomplices who share a criminal connection should not be treated as "confessions," nor as witness testimonies, and therefore such statements cannot serve as evidence. However, such an approach would certainly not be endorsed by judicial practice (nor does German judicial practice endorse the concept of substantial co-defendants); after all, multi-party joint crimes possess inherent secrecy, and to discover crimes, judicial practice will decidedly not abandon the utility of accomplices' statements.
      In short, regardless of whether statements implicating others as accomplices are called "confessions" or "another's confession," judges must use other direct evidence or evidentiary methods as corroboration, exercise extreme caution, and scrutinize the correctness of the "another's confession" repeatedly through every possible means. After all, neither "confessions" nor "another's confessions" are "Liquid Paper"! They cannot be used to cover up erroneous factual determinations.

2. The Impact of Insufficient Corroborative Evidence in Ch'en's Case ~ Professor Huang Chao-yi

   1. Requirements for Corroborative Evidence Under the Legal System

      Because a confession is the defendant's own statement regarding their actions, it undeniable possesses decisive probative value as long as the confession exhibits sufficient credibility. Therefore, if an obtained confession turns out to be false or involuntary, and a subsequent judgment relies on that confession, it will paradoxically lead to miscarriages of justice.

      To prevent miscarriages of justice, legal systems and practical operations have derived rules such as "rules of determination" or "rules of caution" based on the accumulated experience of various cases. Elevating these rules uniformly to legally mandatory or guaranteed principles results in what is known as the "corroborative rule" (fu-ch'iang fa-tse). In other words, to establish a defendant's guilt, aside from a confession, there must be evidence other than the confession (corroborative evidence) to corroborate it before facts can be so determined. The purpose of requiring a confession to be reinforced by corroborative evidence is to indirectly prevent the extraction of confessions by duress and to avoid placing excessive weight on confessions in factual determination, thereby genuinely preventing miscarriages of justice.

      Specifically, Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "the confession of a defendant or an accomplice shall not serve as the sole basis for a guilty verdict; other necessary evidence must still be investigated to determine whether it accords with the facts." The "confession of a defendant" referred to herein includes confessions made in open court, confessions made outside of open court, or both. In other words, regardless of whether it is a confession made in open court or outside of open court, corroborative evidence must exist. Viewed from the perspective of preventing the danger of forced confessions, confessions in open court carry no risk of coercion, and even without corroborative evidence, it is relatively unproblematic. However, viewed from the perspective of preventing an over-reliance on confessions, confessions in open court are no different from confessions outside of open court. To prevent the phenomenon of placing excessive weight on confessions, it should logically be maintained that confessions—whether inside or outside open court—must be reinforced by corroborative evidence.

   2. Substantive Content of Corroborative Evidence

      The determination of criminal facts requires corroborative evidence in addition to a confession. Regarding how a confession is to be corroborated, the content of corroborative evidence can be discussed from three perspectives: 1. the object and scope of corroboration; 2. the degree of corroboration; and 3. the qualification of corroborative evidence.

      1. Object and Scope of Corroboration

         1. Object of Corroboration

            Criminal facts can be roughly divided by their nature and content into three parts: A. the objective aspect of the crime (such as external facts like acts, objects, and results); B. the subjective aspect of the crime (such as the defendant's internal state of mind like intent, negligence, awareness, and purpose); and C. the personal aspect of the crime (the fact that the perpetrator and the defendant are the same person). Legal scholarship holds several different views regarding which parts of criminal facts require corroborative evidence. Specifically: a. some view that corroborative evidence is required for all, or at least important parts of, the objective aspect of the crime (holding the majority view); b. some view that corroborative evidence is required not only for the objective aspect of the crime but also for the personal aspect of the crime; c. some view that confessions made outside of open court require corroborative evidence (same as a.), whereas for confessions made in open court, it suffices as long as there is corroborative evidence concerning a portion of the objective facts of the crime sufficient to guarantee the truthfulness of the confession.

            From the aforementioned three views, it is generally considered that the subjective aspect of the crime does not require corroborative evidence. This is because the subjective aspect of the crime takes the defendant's internal state of mind as its object of inquiry, and it is normal that no evidence other than a confession exists. Therefore, if one repeatedly demands corroborative evidence in the proof of the subjective aspect of the crime, it would instead be criticized as excessive demanding. Conversely, however, in the absence of any other relevant corroborative evidence, one must not forcibly deduce the perpetrator's subjective aspect (awareness or planning) merely on the basis of contradictory or ambiguous confessions.

            In the relevant circumstances of this case, co-defendants X2 and X once confessed that "Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in the preliminary planning." However, if one consults X's interrogation record dated August 19, 1996, regarding whether Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in the planning, X stated "I don't know." Furthermore, consulting X's interrogation record dated August 30, 1996, he stated again "I told him (referring to Ch'en) we were going to collect a debt; my older brother asked him to go." Based on X's contradictory confessions, it is evidently impossible to determine whether Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang had prior knowledge of the case (lack of awareness). Moreover, since X had flatly denied planning the crime at Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's place, and X2 also stated he did not know it was a kidnapping for ransom, it can be even further determined that they did not plan the crime at Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's rented residence. Ch'en's renting of the place had no direct relationship with whether the crime was planned; in other words, the fact of renting a residence cannot serve as corroborative evidence of planning, and naturally the fact of renting cannot be used as a basis to conclude that Ch'en participated in or had knowledge of the planning of this case.

            Regarding the proof of identity—whether the perpetrator and the defendant are the same person—difficulties in evidence collection may also arise, making it impossible to strictly demand corroborative evidence (according to the majority of scholars). Addressing this argument, there is also the view that from the perspective of "revealing secrets" (solving cases), if investigative agencies make a defendant confess using facts known to themselves, and subsequently the investigative agencies cannot negate the fact that the defendant's confession was extracted by duress, the defendant's confession cannot be said to be an involuntary "revelation of secrets." Under such circumstances, aside from the defendant's voluntary confession, corroborative evidence must also exist to prove the fact that the perpetrator is the defendant (identity). Conversely, however, when crimes are verified through investigation of matters previously unknown to investigators, as long as relevant evidence exists to show that the perpetrator is the defendant, corroborative evidence is unnecessary.

            In this case, the perpetrator Ch'en consistently denied the criminal allegations and presented alibis, such as going to the post office to withdraw money around 10:50 a.m. on the morning of the incident and dining at the beauty parlor operated by his mother that same afternoon. Nevertheless, the investigative agencies synthesized the confession contents already known to co-defendants X2 and X to target Ch'en as being involved in the crime as well. In other words, in the absence of other strong corroborating evidence, relying merely on the "confessions of accomplices" such as X2 and X to deduce that Ch'en was one of the defendants appears somewhat far-fetched in its factual determination and violates the proof of the defendant's identity.

         2. Corroboration of the Objective Aspect of the Crime

            Regarding proof of the objective aspect of the crime, the majority of scholars believe that corroborative evidence other than a confession is required. Therefore, it is held that the scope of corroboration is primarily centered on the objective aspect of the crime (the corpus delicti)—meaning that as long as corroborative evidence exists for the objective aspect (or main parts) of the criminal facts, it suffices (the formal theory). In other words, proponents of the formal theory hold that criminal facts require corroborative evidence, specifically regarding the "corpus delicti" portion. As for the meaning of "corpus delicti," there are three categories: A. the fact of infringement upon objective legal interests (such as a corpse); B. the fact of legal interests infringed upon by a certain person's act (such as a corpse from homicide); and C. the fact of legal interests infringed upon by the defendant's act (such as a corpse killed by the defendant).

            Proponents of the formal theory generally believe that corroborative evidence for the corpus delicti need only reach the content of B. Conversely, proponents of the substantive theory argue that evidence corroborating a defendant's confession does not necessarily need to corroborate all confessions related to the elements of the crime; it suffices as long as it is sufficient to guarantee the truthfulness of facts related to the confession. Therefore, according to the substantive theory, for instance, regarding the crime of knowingly purchasing stolen goods, as long as there is the defendant's confession and the victim's theft report record, the fact of purchasing the "goods" presents no problem even without corroborative evidence. In other words, regarding the objective aspect of the crime, the crime of purchasing stolen goods contains two facts: A. the fact of purchasing the "goods"; and B. the fact that the goods are stolen goods. The victim's report can serve as evidence to prove that the goods are stolen goods, but it has no evidentiary value regarding the fact of purchasing the stolen goods. Therefore, proponents emphasizing the corpus delicti theory (formal theory) argue that both the fact of purchasing the "goods" (A) and the fact that the goods are stolen goods (B) should entirely require corroborative evidence; however, proponents of the substantive theory argue that the fact of purchasing the "goods" does not require corroborative evidence.

            The pursuits of both the formal theory and the substantive theory can be said to be consistent to a certain degree, as neither goes beyond demanding proof of the truthfulness of the facts confessed. However, the corroboration required by the substantive theory belongs only to a portion of the criminal facts. Therefore, if one deduces that all criminal facts are true based on this substantive theory view, there is a logical danger of overgeneralization. Based on this point, to ensure that the truth of the facts is not doubted, the view of the formal theory appears more viable. However, if one excessively emphasizes that all objective facts of a confession must have corroborative evidence, the determination of criminal facts may become difficult or even impossible to establish. Addressing how to handle disputes in specific cases, the view of the substantive theory has its reference value.

            Examining the fact of joint murder claimed by X2 and X in this case, X2 once confessed during police interrogation that "the three bottles of sulfuric acid, one roll of wide yellow tape, and five pairs of transparent gloves were all purchased by Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang (bought at a pharmacy in Kueishan Township)." However, later on, in the first instance, second instance, and successive retrials, both X2 and X repeatedly stated that "they did not know who purchased the sulfuric acid, gloves, and tape, and only knew they were brought by X1." This portion fails to confirm that the perpetrator Ch'en purchased tools related to the murder.

            Furthermore, X2 explicitly testified that during the police interrogation, he was abetted by the police, who told him, "Since Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang lives there, just say it was Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang." From this content, it can be seen that X2's confession during police interrogation regarding the purchase of items was induced by the police and was untrue.

            Moreover, the court found that during the process of tailing Y, X1 and the other three purchased two round-point shovels at a hardware store in Hsichih Township and brought them together to the aforementioned mountain depression, digging a pit 60 cm deep, 90 cm wide, and 140 cm long to be used for burying the body. During this period, X, X2, and Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang went to the military goods store "Ti-i-chia Hang" in Taipei to purchase a small long knife and handcuffs. However, because the shovels, small long knife, and handcuffs have not been found to date, they cannot be used as corroborative evidence to corroborate the preparation for committing the crime.

            X and X2 also confessed that "on the day of the incident, after escorting Y, after driving for a minute or two, X1 honked the horn to signal X2 to stop together, instructed Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang to get out of the car, return to the scene to wipe away fingerprints, and then return on his own to wait at the Kueishan rented residence... Around 10:00 a.m., X1 and the others arrived at the scheduled murder site. All three put on gloves, X1 took the small long knife and other criminal tools, and X and X2 were responsible for escorting Y into the mountain depression. X2 used tape to tightly bind Y's mouth, nose, and both feet, and the three began interrogating Y for Y1's contact number. After obtaining Y1's number, X1 murdered Y, took the items on his body, threw the body into the pre-dug pit, poured sulfuric acid, and buried it. Afterward, the three placed the empty sulfuric acid bottles, tape, gloves, and small long knife into a plastic bag, and respectively took the shovels, plastic bag, and other items to walk out of the mountain depression together." It is evidently clear that the perpetrator Ch'en did not participate in executing the murder.

            Based on the above, even if the view of the substantive theory is adopted, there is still a lack of corroborative evidence sufficient to guarantee the truthfulness of the facts confessed by X and X2 that Ch'en participated in matters related to the murder. In other words, regarding the murder facts, including all contents such as planning or execution, there is no corroborative evidence sufficient to show that Ch'en was involved in the murder. On the other hand, if the view of the formal theory is followed, the insufficiency of corroborative evidence in this case becomes even more apparent. However, for a major case like Ch'en's, it is reasonably more appropriate to adopt the view of the formal theory. This is because in determining whether one participated in the murder facts, in the absence of relevant physical corroborative evidence, adjudicating solely on the basis of accomplices' confessions appears somewhat far-fetched in its interpretation.

            In addition, after the incident occurred, the perpetrator Ch'en never made a single ransom call. Regarding this, those who confessed to participating in the crime claimed that because Ch'en was acquainted with the victim's family, he was easily recognizable, and therefore all ransom calls were made by X and X2. However, upon investigation, the victim's father and wife stated that they did not know Ch'en, making it obvious that the claim that he did not make calls out of fear of recognition is untenable. As for whether the fact that Ch'en rented a car to provide transportation for the ransom during the extortion process by X and X2 can serve as corroborative evidence that Ch'en indeed participated in the extortion, this is subject to dispute. This is because during the execution of the extortion in this case, Ch'en rented the car under his own name, and did so more than once. According to general rules of experience, Ch'en's car-rental behavior should obviously be no different from ordinary car-rental behavior; otherwise, how could he expose his own flaws by renting a car and leaving behind records that allowed police personnel to easily trace the crime? Therefore, in the absence of other favorable physical evidence or favorable corroborating evidence, jumping to the conclusion that Ch'en's car rental behavior had a close relationship with the extortion lacks persuasiveness.

      2. Degree of Corroboration

         Regarding the requirements for the degree of corroboration, such as the quantity and probative force (evidentiary value) of corroborative evidence, there are two distinct views. One is the "absolute view," which holds that the corroborative evidence alone is sufficient to form a certain degree of conviction and probative force; the other is the "relative view," which holds that as long as the mutual relationship between the corroborative evidence and the confession reaches the degree of proving the facts, it suffices. Viewed from the perspective that a confession requires corroborative evidence, corroborative evidence naturally must be separable from the confession. Therefore, the corroborative evidence itself absolutely needs to possess a certain degree of conviction and probative force; otherwise, it will lose its function as corroborative evidence. Based on this argument, the required degree of corroboration is closer to the "absolute view."

         However, when coordinated with the aforementioned view of the substantive theory, it can be found that regarding the probative force of corroborative evidence, the requirement placed upon it does not necessarily have to reach a certain degree of probative force. In other words, under the circumstance where the corroborative evidence and the confession complement each other, the corroborative evidence only needs to possess probative force sufficient to determine the criminal facts. Therefore, the degree required here is closer to the "relative view" (such as Supreme Court Ruling 74-Tai-Fu-10, Supreme Court Judgment 88-Tai-Shang-3918).

         From the provision of Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—"The confession of a defendant shall not serve as the sole basis for a guilty verdict; other necessary evidence must still be investigated to determine whether it accords with the facts"—the degree required of corroborative evidence cannot be judged. However, under judicial practice, the provision of Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is interpreted to mean that "the requirement for corroborative evidence is merely that it is sufficient to reinforce the probative force of the confession, and it is not required that the corroborative evidence possess absolute probative force," fundamentally holding the "relative view." The attitude adopted in Ch'en's case does not differ from general judicial practice, relying on the statements of co-defendants X and X2 to determine that the perpetrator Ch'en was one of the joint principals. That is to say, apart from the confessions of X and X2, there were no other concrete proofs, witness testimonies, or other corroborative evidence in this case sufficient to prove that Ch'en was involved in the criminal facts of this case. Furthermore, apart from consistently denying the crime from the beginning, the perpetrator Ch'en had an alibi for the time when the victim was murdered, and Ch'en never made any ransom calls. One wonders how his involvement could possibly be established.

      3. Qualification of Corroborative Evidence

         1. Types of Qualified Corroborative Evidence

            The so-called "qualification of corroborative evidence" refers to what kinds of evidence may serve as corroborative evidence for a confession. Basically, because corroborative evidence is substantial evidence used to determine criminal facts, it must possess admissibility. Furthermore, from the intent of the corroborative rule, substantive corroborative evidence cannot serve as corroborative evidence unless it is evidence independent of the confession. Therefore, unless it is a statement made by the defendant that does not possess the substantive content of a confession (such as threatening letters, account books, etc.), it cannot become corroborative evidence; otherwise, the defendant's own statements cannot in principle serve as corroborative evidence. In other words, such statements capable of serving as corroborative evidence were created before being suspected, and the created items are purely records unrelated to the investigation. Under the premise of having no direct relationship with the confession, they are exceptionally recognized as possessing the qualification of corroborative evidence; otherwise, a defendant's confession cannot be listed as corroborative evidence. Moreover, even if it is a statement by a third party, if it is substantially recognized as nothing more than a repetition of the contents of the defendant's confession, that third party's statement cannot become corroborative evidence either.

            Aside from excluding certain evidence that cannot serve as corroborative evidence, as long as it meets the corroborative requirements demanded by law—regardless of whether it is testimonial evidence, physical evidence, or documentary evidence, and regardless of whether it is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence—it can become corroborative evidence.

         2. Accomplices' Confessions and Corroborative Evidence

            Viewed through the overall regulatory framework, logical interpretation, and textual interpretation of our Code of Criminal Procedure, since Article 156 places "defendant's confession" and "accomplice's confession" side by side, it is logically reasonable that the corroborative rule should also apply to an accomplice's confession.

            Especially since accomplices frequently frame others or shift responsibility onto others to make false statements in order to evade or mitigate their own criminal liability, sufficient corroborative evidence must naturally be sought to ensure the credibility of an accomplice's confession. At the same time, when an accomplice makes unfavorable statements against other accomplices, such unfavorable mutual statements should generally be restricted only to matters deemed highly consistent before mutual unfavorable evidence is permitted. In other words, it is impermissible to lightly allow an accomplice's confession to serve as corroborative evidence or to mutually corroborate one another.

            On the other hand, directly using an accomplice's confession as corroborative evidence to establish a defendant's guilt after the defendant has already confessed may pose interpretive problems. This is because an accomplice's statement cannot be said to be identical to the defendant's own confession; hence, even if corroborative evidence is required for an accomplice's confession, statements independent of the accomplice's confession, if not restricted and excluded, could still be interpreted as capable of serving as corroborative evidence. In other words, an accomplice's confession frequently generates the danger of framing others and shifting responsibility, and using an accomplice's confession as corroborative evidence produces the exact same situation. Basically, an accomplice's confession does not equate to the defendant's own confession. When a defendant confesses, an accomplice's confession must not be used as corroborative evidence to establish the defendant's crime. However, once a defendant has confessed, unless the content of that confession is proven to have problems with truthfulness and no contradictory phenomenon exists (such as the presence of corroborative evidence outside the confession), the danger of erroneous judgment caused by framing and shifting responsibility is naturally minimized. Therefore, only under this circumstance is it unnecessary to interpret all accomplice's confessions independent of the defendant's confession as entirely ineligible to serve as corroborative evidence.

            In addition, whether confessions made by two or more accomplices other than the defendant can directly serve as incriminating evidence or corroborative evidence against a defendant who denies the criminal facts is also one of the problems in handling accomplices' confessions. Viewed from the perspective that an accomplice's confession does not require corroborative evidence, the guilt of a defendant denying the criminal facts can be established through the confessions of two or more accomplices. Furthermore, views that include an accomplice's confession within the defendant's own confession maintain that when confessions from two or more accomplices exist and these confessions possess mutual corroborative effects, they can be used to establish the guilt of a defendant denying the criminal facts. Moreover, there is the view that to cater to the implied intentions of investigators, although one cannot say there is no danger of dragging others into the whirlpool of crime, the judgment of such danger belongs to the realm of the court's free evaluation of evidence and is not sufficient to say that accomplices' confessions cannot mutually serve as corroborative evidence. However, it must be noted that if importance is attached to the danger inherent in accomplices' confessions dragging others into the whirlpool of crime, even if the contents of confessions from two or more accomplices are consistent, in the absence of corroborative evidence concerning the connection between the defendant and the perpetrator, such confessions naturally must not be used as evidence to establish the defendant's guilt. Especially when the defendant denies the criminal facts and no evidence other than the confession exists, such an interpretation should even less be made.

            Accordingly, in cases involving relationships among multiple accomplices, to prevent accomplices from transferring responsibility to the defendant and creating the danger of consistent statements among multiple accomplices and the danger of scapegoating, the statements of multiple accomplices must not, in principle, be used as mutual corroborative evidence to establish the defendant's guilt (the view adopted in our judicial practice—that confessions or other self-incriminating statements of two accomplices who do not have a co-defendant relationship with the defendant may mutually serve as corroborative evidence—is subject to review, as seen in the practical view of Supreme Court Judgment 88-Tai-Shang-380). In such circumstances, even if the defendant does not confess or denies the crime, they will still be judged guilty due to the mutual corroboration of other accomplices' confessions.

            The doubt present in Ch'en's case lies precisely here: maintaining his denial of the crime from the beginning, he was abruptly and predominantly judged guilty based on the confessions of other defendants X and X2 in the absence of any other concrete evidence. That is to say, the main basis for whether the perpetrator Ch'en was involved was established through the mutual corroboration of the confessions of X and X2, completely ignoring the defendant's own defense and distorting the original meaning of the corroborative rule. In other words, regarding whether the perpetrator Ch'en was involved, the respective confessions made by X and X2 lacked any other concrete corroborative evidence, rendering the confessions themselves problematic. Yet the court used these two problematic accomplices' confessions to mutually corroborate each other to establish another person's involvement, which can be described as violating the jurisprudential requirements of the corroborative rule, constituting a major procedural illegality, and even violating the procedural guarantees demanded by the Constitution.

   3. Summary

      Regarding the application of accomplices' confessions, there are undeniably quite a few complex determination issues. In judicial practice, if the importance of confessions by accomplices or co-defendants is repeatedly emphasized, and such confessions are massively used or cited as the primary basis for factual determination; or if such evidence is repeatedly used to prove the confessing party (defendant) or the denying party, or serves as corroborative evidence, or is used to mutually corroborate each other—the result may formally seem to solve the matter (finalizing the case). However, practically speaking, the direction of this judicial operational mode not only risks reverting to the past era of overemphasizing confessions and treating confessions as the king of evidence, but also risks causing even more miscarriages of justice or wrongful imprisonments due to the overemphasis and abuse of confessions.

On the Possibility of Charging Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang with Conspiracy as a Joint Principal
Professor Li Mao-sheng

1. Introduction

   The criminal facts of Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's case are divided into four parts: first, conspiracy; second, kidnapping; third, murder; and fourth, extortion. Regarding Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's criminal acts, reviewing the evidence used by the court to determine facts, aside from the (contradictory) confessions of the co-defendants, there are probably only two items possessing the value of non-testimonial evidence. One is that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang once sheltered X1, one of the co-defendants, at his own rented residence; the other is that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang once rented a car, and that car was used in the extortion crime.

   As stated in the factual determination section of this evaluation report, removing the co-defendants' confessions, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in the execution of the kidnapping, murder, and extortion. If the court could strictly abide by the rules of evidence, it should be impossible to conclude that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang bears the responsibility of a joint principal in the execution of kidnapping and extortion resulting in murder based solely on the confessions of co-defendants. However, since the court relied on the confessions of the co-defendants and the corroborative evidence that "Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang sheltered X1, who had no residence after returning from Thailand, before and during the commission of the crime," to establish the existence of a "conspiracy" between Ch'en and the other accomplices, coupled with the fact that Ch'en indeed rented a car and that car was used in the execution of extortion—even though the car rental behavior was not an execution act, it can still be considered an aiding act—current practical jurisprudence would seemingly still conclude that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang should bear the responsibility of a conspiratorial joint principal for the criminal facts of kidnapping and extortion resulting in murder.

   However, this evaluation report maintains that even though current practical jurisprudence would seem to establish Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's responsibility as a conspiratorial joint principal, the concept of a conspiratorial joint principal is highly ambiguous, and its grasp in current practice appears somewhat undisciplined, failing to accord with contemporary theoretical currents in criminal law. Therefore, the following discussion will first examine the development of the theory of conspiratorial joint principals to attempt to find a theoretical positioning conforming to modern currents in criminal law, and then examine the facts determined by the court within this positioned theory to arrive at a more reasonable determination of crime and punishment.

2. Development of the Concept of Conspiratorial Joint Principals in Japan

   The concept of conspiratorial joint principals means that persons who jointly participate in criminal planning (conspiracy) may still be held liable as joint principals even if they do not actually share in the objective constituent elements of the act afterward. Because statutory joint principals refer to persons who jointly execute criminal acts, although a conspiratorial joint principal remains a type of joint principal, it is in fact an exception—a concept that expands the scope for establishing true (executory) joint principals.

   The concept of conspiratorial joint principals originated from judicial judgments in the mid-Meiji period in Japan, initially limited in application to intellectual crimes such as fraud and extortion. This situation continued unchanged even after the enforcement of the current Criminal Code. From the late Taisho period, the courts began expanding the scope of application, gradually applying the concept of conspiratorial joint principals to violent crimes such as arson and murder.

   By the early Showa period, Kusano Hyōichirō, a scholar-turned-judge at the time, began attempting to theoretically rationalize the concept of conspiratorial joint principals and proposed the so-called theory of the joint-will entity (kyōdō ishi shutai setsu). This theory was adopted by the Great Court of Judicature on the eve of World War II, shaping a paradigm judgment of practical jurisprudence. Following that judgment, legal practitioners began expanding the theoretically grounded concept of conspiratorial joint principals to general crimes such as theft and robbery. By the end of World War II, this concept had been applied to all types of crimes.

   In the post-war era, academic circles began to erupt with astonishing creativity. Apart from the negative theory—which questioned the "rationality of imposing joint principal liability on a conspirator who engaged in no formal executory acts whatsoever" from the perspective of formal executory joint principal theory—most academic theories adopted the perspective of substantive executory joint principal theory and tended to affirm the existence of the concept of conspiratorial joint principals. However, these affirmative theories did not endorse the earlier theory of the joint-will entity; instead, they utilized normative and evaluative substantive perspectives to attempt to expand the scope of "executory acts," striving to allow "persons who formally engaged in no executory acts" to be substantively evaluated as "persons who engaged in analogous executory acts," thereby incorporating the exception of the conspiratorial joint principal theory back into the rule.

   There are certain social factual foundations for why practitioners adopted the concept of conspiratorial joint principals. To oppose the concept of conspiratorial joint principals without observing these factual foundations—citing reasons such as judicial legislation being improper, violating the principle of legality, or practitioners blindly submitting to superior court decisions without self-reflection—truly carries little substantive significance. Just as when Tomoo Tōdō served as a professor at the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law, he adopted the negative theory, yet upon becoming a Supreme Court justice, he changed his view and began acknowledging the concept of conspiratorial joint principals. If one views such a situation merely as someone changing their initial stance upon attaining official office, the force of the critique will remain limited to critique and will be of no help to reality. In fact, when practitioners face bizarre and varied criminal facts, coupled with the pressure of applying criminal law to uphold the public's law-abiding awareness, this shift in perspective is understandable. A more pragmatic approach should be to confront the practical operation of the existing concept of conspiratorial joint principals and utilize the power of criminal law theory as much as possible to limit its scope of application to a tolerable degree.

   In this sense, the following will first briefly introduce various theories of the affirmative view, and then select the theory with the least contradictions to observe the changes in Japanese judicial practice.

   The theory of the joint-will entity created a fictional (executory) actor subject and then required every individual incorporated into this actor subject based on conspiracy to bear group liability. This clearly violates the requirements of modern individual responsibility doctrine and is no longer directly adopted by any theorist today. The theories that first replaced the theory of the joint-will entity were the quasi-indirect principal theory and the control-of-the-act theory. The commonality of these two theories is that a co-principal who does not continuously perform executory acts treats other co-principals who actually perform executory acts as tools or possesses superior control over them, thereby realizing their own crime through that executory act.

   While these two theories firmly adhered to the requirements of formal executory joint principal theory (control acts and utilization acts are not formal executory acts), they substantively expanded the range of the reach of executory acts, allowing conspirators who formally performed no executory acts to be treated as joint principals for punishment, provided that control acts and utilization acts could be further typified. Indeed, this is an excellent theory. However, these two theories can only explain controlling conspiratorial joint principal phenomena and cannot explain cooperative conspiratorial joint principal phenomena (conspiracies among multiple individuals of equal status).

   To address this deficiency, new theories arose. This new theory has many names; some call it the inclusive joint principal theory, while others call it the executory-act benchmark theory (quasi-executory joint principal theory), demonstrating that its theoretical content is not yet unified. However, proponents of this new theory universally adopted a true, substantive executory joint principal theory, considering the conspiratorial act to be a substantive, evaluative executory act (or quasi-executory act), and this conspiratorial act serves as the objective basis for punishing those participating in the conspiracy (replacing the previous formal executory act division requirement).

   In fact, traces of this mindset existed long before the rise of the new theory. Aside from the Nerima incident judgment discussed later, even in the views of Haruo Nishihara, the final generation of proponents of the joint-will entity theory, one can see an emphasis on concrete conspiratorial acts. Nishihara argued that conspiracy is not merely a subjective meeting of criminal minds or planning, but an objective requirement—an "objective fact capable of establishing culpability" for a (conspiratorial) joint principal. However, Nishihara still maintained that only a fictional psychological community is the actor subject of formal executory acts, whereas participating conspirators become responsible subjects because of objective conspiratorial acts. This separation of the actor and the responsible subject made it difficult for general theorists to accept, thereby ignoring the righteousness of his views on conspiratorial acts.

   Although this new theory confuses executory acts with preparatory acts and advances the timing of the commencement of attempt, causing an actual expansion of punishment, the punishment of preparatory acts requires special provisions and does not require formal executory acts following the preparatory acts. Conversely, in cases of conspiratorial joint principals, if no formal executory act subsequently develops, there is no punishment at all; in reality, the two will not be confused in concrete cases. Furthermore, if an executory act is defined as "an act objectively possessing typified danger (of generating criminal results)," and the commencement of attempt is defined as "observing backward from the concrete criminal result that has occurred or is predicted to occur, the point in time where concrete danger of occurrence can be determined in the causal flow," then one is an objective act and the other is a concrete point in time, and the two can be discussed separately. As to the timing of commencement, there is fundamentally no absolute requirement for a criminal executory act to exist. The reason why it is thought that treating conspiracy as an executory act leads to an advanced timing of commencement is because tradition holds that the commencement of attempt is the point in time when executory acts begin. In truth, there is no necessity to cling to this traditional view.

   Under this newest theory, two problems remain. First, how to typify conspiratorial acts through typified danger, and second, how to determine the possible responsibility-sharing amount (more accurately, the form of participation) for persons participating in the conspiracy.

   The first problem involves the differing dangers of various crime types, which must rely on the accumulation of precedents to clarify issues. However, regarding common elements, a conspiratorial act should include objective elements such as subjective meeting of criminal minds as well as decisions on time, place, and division of acts. The latter is easier to understand, but the former is rather ambiguous. However, skipping delicate argumentation, it can seemingly be explained as the interactive psychological state among co-conspirators, rather than merely cognitive awareness of the other party's existence or the content of their assertions. Here we can see the continuity of academic theories; that is, the joint-will entity theory, quasi-indirect principal theory, and control-of-the-act theory are nothing more than terms explaining this interactive psychological state (or degree of influence). From this point, under the framework of the latest theory, regarding the subjective elements of the basis of punishment, can we still avoid making a choice among the theories that have debated endlessly without resolution, and irresponsibly claim a "compromise of various theories"? Not necessarily.

   Although the meeting of criminal minds is called a subjective element here, it does not refer to the internal "psychological facts" in the minds of individual conspirators, but rather to the "psychological influential power" existing among conspirators that can be objectively measured (or inferred) using scientific experiential rules—that is, the objectively observable degree of psychological interactive influence. This is not the subjective element in general so-called constituent element facts, but an objective element. Since it is said to be an objective degree of influence, this is not a matter of choice, but a matter of determination. In some cases, a group consciousness is formed; in others, one party controls the other; and of course, there are also cases of mutual psychological dependency. Through the act of participating in the conspiracy, the actor makes their own existence contribute to a certain extent to the occurrence of the result (instigation theory), and this contribution naturally differs in degree. When psychological dependency reaches the level of mutual constraint by group consciousness, or where one person can psychologically constrain others, it is naturally possible to establish a (joint) principal; conversely, if the degree of mutual psychological dependency is not high, consideration should be given at this point as to whether they are merely narrow accomplices. From another angle, this is nothing more than psychological causality within accomplice causality, directly involving the second problem mentioned above.

   The second problem is the theory of distinguishing between (narrow) accomplices and principals—namely, whether persons participating in a conspiracy are joint principals or merely narrow accomplices such as instigators or aiders. The problem becomes even more pronounced when persons participating in a conspiracy subsequently engage in other non-formal executory acts while other conspirators perform formal executory acts. Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's car-rental behavior in this case is a case in point.

   In the past, when subjective principal theory flourished, as long as an actor was determined to be committing a crime with their own criminal intent, they were considered a principal, while the rest were aiders and abettors (acting for another's crime). Moreover, the meeting of criminal minds in a conspiracy was viewed as proof that the participant was engaging in the conspiracy with the intent of committing their own crime. At this point, as long as one participated in the conspiracy, regardless of how the participant's actual role division was in the content of the conspiracy—even if one cuts apart the conspiratorial act and the formal executory act, and at the stage of the formal executory act, the actor only engaged in acts other than executory acts—the existence of such other acts would merely serve as objective evidence consolidating the actor's status as a conspiratorial joint principal, and naturally would not cause the actor to suddenly drop from the status of a conspiratorial joint principal to an aider.

   Today, subjective principal theory has fallen into a minority view in academic circles, and the objective principal theory that replaced it has substantive objective theory as its mainstream. Therefore, the distinction between a principal and a narrow accomplice must be judged based on the causal degree of danger the actor poses to the constituent element-fulfilling fact (result). Although the influence of this academic shift on practical jurisprudence does not yet seem fully manifested, the practical world has at least accepted the shift in academic views and adopted a subjective-objective mixed view when determining principal nature.

   This shift causes persons participating in a conspiracy not only to do so based on "intent to commit one's own crime," but also to respectively establish joint principals or mere narrow accomplices based on differences in objective participatory act patterns and the like. Although this point also involves the problem of typifying conspiratorial acts, setting aside for the moment the question of whether a certain act belongs to a conspiratorial act within a substantive executory act, premised on the establishment of a conspiratorial act, one should further discuss the problem of typifying the conspiratorial acts of various participants—that is, whether they are conspiratorial joint principals or merely instigators and aiders.

   The negative view under formal executory joint principal theory has the function of clearly distinguishing joint principals, instigation, and aid, and this point cannot be completely replaced by any of the affirmative views. However, among the causalities of joint principals, psychological causality and physical causality cannot be neglected. The focus of physical causality lies in the division of formal executory acts. Indeed, when multiple persons are in a situation of conspiratorial joint principals, physical causality is very difficult to determine; nevertheless, psychological causality still exists, and the negative view, which excessively emphasizes physical causality, inevitably invites the criticism of slighting psychological causality.

   Conversely, if physical causality in conspiratorial joint principals is difficult to determine and therefore one focuses solely on psychological causality, some troubles will also arise. Especially in situations where subjective principal theory, meeting of minds, and psychological causality are mixed together, the problem becomes even more profound. Sometimes, solely relying on internal subjective elements belonging to the actor—such as "desire to commit one's own crime," "recognition of conspiracy under the awareness of oneself as a joint principal," and "mutual recognition"—will directly determine that a participant in a conspiracy is a conspiratorial joint principal. At this point, if the actor's physical causality in the conspiracy relationship is not high (e.g., passive participation or minor roles), even if the actor subsequently engages only in minor aiding acts when other accomplices perform formal executory acts, such aiding acts will not lessen the actor's degree of participation, nor will they thereby transform the actor into a mere aider.

   The above summarizes academic opinions regarding the theory of conspiratorial joint principals to date. Because theories inherently possess an abstract nature, regarding the final issue—namely, the criteria for excluding certain participants from joint principals through the judgment of psychological and physical causality within a conspiracy relationship—academic circles can only propose abstract criteria. Such criteria, derived after a series of arguments, conclude that the realization of the crime is indispensable, or that there is an important causal contribution to the constituent element-fulfilling fact, or the importance of assigned tasks during the realization of the constituent elements. Ultimately, they cannot be directly applied to concrete cases. This must rely on the accumulation of practical judgments.

   The aforementioned joint criminal divisions judgment of the Japanese Great Court of Judicature in 1936 already demonstrated the interaction between academic and practical circles. That judgment held that a conspiratorial joint principal relationship refers to multiple persons supporting and relying on each other like one body, thereby jointly realizing their respective criminal intents. Judging from this definition, that judgment appears to adopt the joint-will entity theory, while the distinction criterion between joint principals and narrow accomplices adopts subjective principal theory.

   The aforementioned judgment represents the culmination of practical jurisprudence regarding the theory of conspiratorial joint principals before World War II. After World War II, academic doctrines contended like a hundred flowers blooming in a Warring States period, and practical jurisprudence also began to become "impure" (meaning not settling upon a single standard). The most obvious should be the Nerima incident judgment of 1958. That judgment held that conspiratorial joint principals mean that two or more persons become one body under a joint will, mutually utilizing each other's acts, and engaging in planning whose content is "putting their respective intents into execution," thereby executing the crime. Aside from retaining the shadow of the joint-will entity theory, this judgment in fact adopted the view of the quasi-indirect principal theory; however, regarding the distinction criterion between joint principals and narrow accomplices, it maintained the standpoint of subjective principal theory.

   However, the impact of the Nerima incident judgment on subsequent judgments lies definitely not in its eclectic image carrying subjectivist criminal law connotations, but in its perspective on the fact of "conspiracy." Points within the judgment revealed the following shift in views: the judgment held that conspiracy is not merely a simple meeting of minds or recognition of joint criminal conduct (subjective element), but an objective requirement comparable to the "division of executory acts" of executory joint principals—that is, a "fact capable of establishing culpability" requiring strict proof (proof conducted through admissible evidence via lawful evidence investigation procedures). In an era when substantive executory act theory had not yet emerged, this could even be called a "judgment guiding academic trends."

   Regrettably, although the Nerima incident judgment regarded the conspiratorial act as a fact requiring strict proof, it simultaneously held that there is no need to concretely prove and indicate the date, place, detailed content, and role division of each participant in the conspiracy one by one. Consequently, what remained to be proved was merely the so-called "subjective elements of conspiracy" (not the aforementioned psychological causality), such as the meeting of criminal minds and recognition of one's principal intent. No wonder theorists argue that the requirement of strict proof for conspiratorial acts in judicial procedures is frequently slighted in practice, especially when conspiracy is treated merely as a subjective element for crime establishment (meeting of minds). Confessions by defendants and co-defendants very easily become evidence proving the existence of this subjective element. If it is further believed that accomplices' confessions can mutually serve as corroborative evidence, it becomes almost impossible to prevent the tendency in practice to heavily rely on confessions when determining crimes and punishments.

   Strangely enough, the Matsukawa incident grand bench judgment of the following year marked a decisive turning point. In the Matsukawa incident, a majority of Supreme Court justices, influenced by the Nerima incident judgment, doubted the existence of primary contact and planning acts among crime participants under the requirement of strict proof, and consequently handed down a verdict of complete acquittal. During the trial, a minority of justices argued that even without the existence of a liaison planning meeting, as long as any meeting of minds could be inferred through other planning and executory acts, such a subjective fact alone would suffice to establish a conspiratorial joint principal. However, this "subjective planning theory" was not accepted by the majority who adopted the "objective planning theory," and this decision indirectly severed the umbilical cord of "conspiracy (act) = meeting of minds," influencing subsequent judgment trends.

   Under the premise that "there should be the existence of a planning act that objectively withstands the test of strict proof," the Japanese practical world began attempting to establish objective standards for determining the content of planning (determining the degree of importance regarding accomplice causality). By the Asaka garrison Self-Defense Force member murder incident judgment of 1977, the determination regarding the content of conspiracy had developed certain general standards. While that judgment maintained a mixed view of the joint-will entity theory, quasi-indirect principal theory, and subjective principal theory regarding intent determination (at the culpability judgment stage), it adopted—regarding the "importance of the role played during the crime execution process" (at the constituent element assessment stage)—a comprehensive judgment based on: (1) who decided the crime plan in the consultation; (2) task distribution among participants during crime execution; (3) interest relationships during crime execution; (4) psychological constraint upon the actors of executory acts; and (5) close interpersonal relationships proving the intent to realize the crime. Setting aside the error of confusing culpability elements with constituent element requirements, writing about it solely on the ground that it had already proposed objective judgment criteria similar to determining whether psychological and physical causality existed is worthy of high praise, and can even be said to be a precursor to the aforementioned latest theory.

   Thenceforth until today, Japanese judicial practice has continually attempted to specifically determine whether conspirators possess (conspiratorial joint) principal nature through the adjudication of accomplice causality. Some precedents have been questioned by theorists. For example:

   1. (1) During a brawl between opposing groups, a defendant who was a member of one group, despite not actually participating in the executory acts, remained at the scene as a spectator (Tokyo High Court Judgment, Showa 55.1.30, Hanrei Jihō No. 416, p. 173).
   2. (2) A person who merely agreed to the mastermind's proposal and accompanied the principal offender in an act of murder (Nagoya District Court Judgment, Heisei 1.6.28, Hanrei Jihō No. 1132, p. 36).

   However, more precedents have received positive affirmative evaluations. The important lower court judgment contents denying principal nature are as follows:

   1. (1) Although informed of the crime plan, the person did not participate in preliminary planning nor site reconnaissance, received a very small amount of stolen money, and held only a subordinate position in the overall crime (Chiba District Court Matsudo Branch Judgment, Showa 55.11.20, Hanrei Jihō No. 1015, p. 143).
   2. (2) Although purchasing smuggling firearms for the defendant abroad, this was merely assistance within lawful scope abroad; the person was utterly unconcerned with whether the firearms were successfully smuggled or to whom they were sold domestically, and lacked close interpersonal relationships with the principal (Tokyo District Court Judgment, Showa 57.7.28, Hanrei Jihō No. 1073, p. 159).
   3. (3) Although knowing the defendant intended fraud, and having suggested sales and deception methods, the person never inquired about the target, methods, and time of deception desired by the principal, nor intervened in the executory acts, and neither received any subsequent reports nor accepted any money from the fraud proceeds (Tokyo High Court Judgment, Showa 57.12.12, Hanrei Jihō No. 1085, p. 150).
   4. (4) Although brokering a buyer for stolen test questions and intervening in the sales act, the person never received concrete explanation regarding the theft method, had no prior discussion or planning, and lacked the intimate interpersonal relationship that would make one feel psychological constraint toward the principal (Sapporo High Court Judgment, Showa 60.3.20, Hanrei Jihō No. 1169, p. 157).

   Although these facts were not necessarily all determined through strict proof procedures, and subjective principal theory also retains its inherent influence—both of which generate a tendency to lean toward the confessions of defendants or co-defendants—nevertheless, these judgments all emphasize accomplice causality implied by planning content or non-executory acts during the crime execution process, serving as stepping stones from "judging based on subjective facts" to "judging based on objective facts."

3. Current Status of the Concept of Conspiratorial Joint Principals in Our Country and Practical Jurisprudence in Ch'en's Case Judgment

   The page limits and time constraints allotted to the author are exceptionally strict, and the volume of the preceding discussion has approached the limit. However, compared to the aforementioned developments in Japanese academic and practical circles, our country's situation is not only much weaker but also accompanied by relatively complete expositions by Professor Ch'en Tzu-p'ir, so it can presumably be addressed through brief supplementation.

   Similar to Japan, the application of the concept of conspiratorial joint principals in our country also originated from practical necessity. From the first year of the Republic until the enforcement of the old Criminal Code, practical jurisprudence mostly affirmed the concept of conspiratorial joint principals. As long as there was conspiracy, collusion, or premeditation (with unclear meaning) coupled with subsequent division of spoils (acts other than executory acts), it was usually determined to be a (conspiratorial) joint principal. By the era of the old Criminal Code, because major crimes had provisions for accomplices in collusion (conspiratorial joint principals), judicial practice tended toward the negative view.

   However, this period was very short. After the enforcement of the current Criminal Code, practical jurisprudence immediately changed its view and began broadly acknowledging conspiratorial joint principals. The peak of this period should be Grand Justices' Interpretation No. 109 of 1965. That interpretation affirmed the possibility of establishing a conspiratorial joint principal by taking "meeting of criminal minds with the intent to commit one's own crime" as the subjective element and "prior collusion" as the objective element. Although various views in its reasoning were riddled with contradictions and failed to explicitly state whether the basis of punishment was the joint-will entity theory or another, because it was an Interpretation by the Grand Justices, it became the "legal" basis in our country for punishing conspiratorial joint principals. Subsequent judgments and precedents directly affirmed the existence of conspiratorial joint principals based on Interpretation No. 109 without explaining the basis of punishment. As for how the meeting of criminal minds and conspiratorial acts should be determined, it was left unmentioned, until very recently when a few judgments required the scope of jointly planned crimes to be written in the factual column and the basis to be explained in the reasoning column because the actual perpetrator executing the crime exceeded the scope of the conspired crime plan, creating an error.

   This does not mean that the court demands strict proof regarding the existence of conspiracy, the content of conspiracy, and the causality with the result. In fact, long before Interpretation No. 109, there was an opportunity that could have allowed the court to adopt a stricter attitude toward determining the fact of conspiracy, but that opportunity was fleeting.

   In 1942, there was Judicial Interpretation Yuan-Tzu No. 2404 of the 31st Year of the Republic (1942), which interpreted the phrase "execute" in Article 28 of the Criminal Code as encompassing concepts such as conspiracy and preparation, and conspiracy is precisely an act "executed" by criminals; only in circumstances where it has a direct relationship to the result can a conspiratorial joint principal be established. Setting aside the criticisms of this view by various theorists, had this interpretation received attention in the practical world, conspiratorial acts might have been viewed as acts akin to executory acts, requiring strict proof, and the physical and psychological causality between such acts and the result would also have become focal points during trial. Unfortunately, Interpretation No. 2404 proved to be nothing more than a passing flash in the pan.

   In summary, today our country's practical jurisprudence not only focuses solely on the (dispensable) subjective element of "committing one's own crime = meeting of criminal minds," but also disdains theories such as the joint-will entity, indirect principals, and control of acts capable of distinguishing the objective degree of psychological causality. Its tendency to arbitrarily determine conspiratorial joint principals by prioritizing confessions will likely persist for some time.

   Compared to the above practical tendency, academic theories in our country are more progressive. However, not only is this progress limited, but there is also no opportunity to connect with practice, leaving the two running parallel like lines.

   In academic circles, starting from the early 1930s, scholars such as Chao Ch'en and Yü Ch'eng-hsi opposed the concept of conspiratorial joint principals. By the mid-1960s, scholars such as Chou Yeh-p'ing and Yang Ta-ch'i maintained the views of early scholars, firmly asserting that regardless of such concepts in practice, they should not be recognized in legal theory. However, starting from the 1980s, academic views began shifting toward the affirmative view. From a situation of unanimous opposition to the concept of conspiratorial joint principals in the past, it has developed to the point where only a few theorists firmly oppose it, and most scholars adopt an attitude of acknowledging practical trends while narrowing their application.

   For example, Su Chun-hsiung adopted the control-of-the-act theory, and Lin Shan-t'ien, although not using the term conspiratorial joint principal, should likewise be considered as adopting the control-of-the-act theory according to his semantics. However, these theorists did not further discuss subsequent developments.

   More interestingly, Tsai Tun-ming believed that the elements establishing a conspiratorial joint principal include, in addition to the subjective element of "joint intent," an objective element. This objective element is not merely the existence of a planning act as claimed by general theorists, but must objectively possess mental participation (controlling effect) as a constituent element-like act (substantive constituent element act). Meanwhile, Ch'en Tzu-p'ing diverged from our country's prevailing view by adopting the (revised) indirect principal theory, leaning more toward mutual utilization relationships among actors in content, while also mentioning psychological factors among conspirators. Both scholars have already noted that a conspiratorial act functioning as a (similar) executory act should possess objective psychological causality in addition to joint intent, and this objective psychological causality should be demonstrated through relationships among participants, such as control relationships or mutual utilization relationships. However, it is truly impossible to confirm from their papers whether both scholars also paid attention to the physical causality of conspiratorial acts. Correspondingly, Huang Jung-chien pierced straight to the key point, arguing that as long as causality can be affirmed, conspirators cannot be prevented from being viewed as joint principals. This vague utterance instead created infinite room for imagination.

   Setting aside this point, if the aforementioned emphasis on psychological causality is combined with the distinction criteria between (joint) principals and (narrow) accomplices, academic circles present a state where subjective and objective elements are mixed (both requirements fulfilled). Once the so-called "psychological" causality is viewed as a subjective element, it is highly likely to be absorbed by joint intent, resulting in a subjectivist bias. In practice, when determining subjective elements, because of the difficulty of proof, it frequently tends to rely on the confessions of defendants or co-defendants. The combination of the two creates the greatest shortcoming of our country's practical world.

   In Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's case, regarding the portion on conspiracy, under an extremely strong subjective principal theory, the result is that practice specially emphasizes the actor's "mastermind consciousness." This led judges to unconsciously begin emphasizing Ch'en's "meeting of criminal minds to commit his own crime" and deeming it the subjective element of conspiracy—meaning that as long as Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in the conspiracy with the intent of committing his own crime, he could be determined to be a (conspiratorial) joint principal. This is precisely why the judges in Ch'en's case unhesitatingly utilized the co-defendants' confessions in the absence of any other corroborative evidence to arbitrarily determine Ch'en's identity as a mastermind (judges continually emphasized the motive for the crime, such as debts). As for other matters—such as whether the factual act of conspiracy existed, what its content was, and whether it possessed important (physical or psychological) causality with the result—they were actually incidental, perfunctory arguments in the court's judgment, and naturally required no strict proof.

   The judgment text stated that one of the masterminds cohabited at Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's rented residence, that Ch'en joined other accomplices in scouting the victim's daily routine, that he participated in previously digging the burial pit, and that he purchased tools for kidnapping and murder. All of these pointed to the actual existence of a conspiratorial act and generated indispensable causality for the occurrence of the result. However, in terms of objective evidence, even assuming the objective circumstances of cohabiting and renting a car existed, these objective circumstances could not prove that Ch'en participated in the conspiracy of the crime, nor that Ch'en's status within that conspiracy reached an important and indispensable degree. The acts of cohabitating and renting a car could not be directly linked to other co-defendants' confessions regarding the conspiratorial act, because countless possibilities of interpretation filled the gap.

   Just as when the accused presented phone call connection records for certain days, the court unhesitatingly interpreted the evidence presented by the defendant as proving a close relationship (regarding the criminal act) between the accused and other co-defendants, so too could the court—without knowing the contents of the phone calls—determine the content of the calls, and naturally could also arbitrarily interpret the meaning of cohabiting and renting a car.

   Subjectively and arbitrarily determining Ch'en's "mastermind consciousness," then treating the objective facts of cohabitations and car rental as corroborative evidence, subjectively presuming the existence and detailed content of the conspiracy, and thereby presuming strong causality: all errors stem from the "arbitrary determination of subjectivist principal criminal intent."

4. Summary

   Conspiracy is a normative, evaluative executory act. Logically, it should possess typified physical and psychological causality generating results, all of which are objective facts requiring strict proof (including the existence of the act itself and its content). Psychological causality is a causal relationship impossible in ordinary sole principals, but this does not cause physical causality within a (conspiratorial) accomplice relationship to lose its importance or its status requiring strict proof. Excessively advocating subjective principal theory, emphasizing the "intent to commit one's own crime," then infinitely subjectivizing the objective degree of psychological causality that ought to be established through the joint-will entity, quasi-indirect principal relationship, or similar control-of-the-act theories, and finally slighting the determination of all objective physical causality—this is the greatest defect in our country when judging the establishment of conspiratorial joint principals.

   According to current practical habits, Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang may indeed be a conspiratorial joint principal in kidnapping and extortion resulting in murder. For although it cannot be proven that Ch'en executed formal executory acts, regarding the conspiratorial act, there exist the co-defendants' confessions as well as the objectively existing facts of cohabitation and car rental. Therefore, without self-reflection, Ch'en should indeed be sentenced to death.

   However, whether in theory or in practical jurisprudence, our country's actual situation has probably only reached the level of Japan around the 1930s to 1960s. Copying foreign things without diligence or care results in a chimeric current status. The degree of protection afforded to the people of Taiwan by law and the judiciary is truly worrisome.

   Conversely, looking at Japan's situation, it developed the concept of conspiratorial joint principals from the needs of actual cases, and then, influenced by academic circles, developed judgment standards limiting the scope of application of conspiratorial joint principals from actual judgments. This proves that Japanese judges are not only diligent, but they also think. It appears that the focus of our country's judicial reform process should not be the introduction of systems like cross-examination, but rather the reform of legal education and an increase in opportunities for judges to pursue self-study.

Conclusion

Looking across the judgment of Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's case, it can be seen that the court's determination that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang committed the criminal facts of jointly kidnapping for ransom and murdering the victim was fundamentally based primarily on the confessions of the two co-defendants X2 and X, using the confessions of these two accomplices to mutually corroborate each other to constitute the evidentiary foundation (including admissibility and probative force) of the facts determined by the judgment. From the formal perspective of the judgment, such mutual corroboration of "accomplices' confessions" seems not to contravene current practical jurisprudence and trends. However, carefully analyzing the confessions of co-defendants X2 and X in this case reveals that regarding the portions confessing to matters disadvantageous to themselves, they already lacked definitive corroborative evidence (such as the process of prior planning, tools for kidnapping and murder, etc.). Even less need be said about what concrete evidence existed to corroborate the truthfulness of these confessions regarding Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's involvement. Worse still, the confessions of X2 and X themselves contained flaws of internal contradiction and inconsistency (including confessions disadvantageous to themselves and regarding Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's involvement). Under the comprehensive determination where the court used the flawed confessions of these two accomplices to mutually reinforce each other, rejecting Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's defense denying the crime and directly determining Ch'en to be one of the accomplices based on the contents of the accomplices' confessions not only conflicts with the jurisprudential logic of the "corroborative evidence rule"—which uses evidence other than the defendant's confession to guarantee the truthfulness of the confession's content—but the mental conviction generated under the deduction and reasoning of flawed accomplice confessions is logically even harder to approach the truth.

In fact, the doubts regarding whether an accomplice's confession possesses the qualification of corroborative evidence and evidentiary value, and whether they can mutually corroborate each other, are not unique insights exclusive to this judgment evaluation report. In judicial practice, Supreme Court Precedent 74-Tai-Fu-10 holds: "Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that even if a defendant has confessed, other necessary evidence must still be investigated to determine whether it accords with facts. The legislative purpose intends to guarantee the truthfulness of the confession through corroborative evidence; that is, by the existence of corroborative evidence, to limit the evidentiary value of the confession. Corroborative evidence refers to evidence other than the confession itself sufficient to prove that the criminal facts confessed possess a considerable degree of truthfulness. Although it is unnecessary for all facts to be corroborated, it is required that through the mutual utilization of the corroborative evidence and the confession, the criminal facts obtain firm conviction before it can be deemed sufficient." Furthermore, Supreme Court Judgment 87-Tai-Shang-2580 points out even further: "... The confession of a defendant shall not serve as the sole basis for a guilty verdict; other necessary evidence must still be investigated to determine whether it accords with facts. The legislative purpose intends to guarantee the truthfulness of the confession through corroborative evidence—that is, by the existence of corroborative evidence, to limit the evidentiary value of the confession and prevent the danger of overemphasizing confessions and generating erroneous judgments. Using a defendant's confession to prove their own crime carries this danger; using it to prove the crimes of other accomplices not only carries the same danger of falsity in evidentiary collection, but confessions of accomplices inevitably carry the danger of framing others to make false statements. Therefore, when utilizing an accomplice's confession as evidence of another accomplice's crime, how its evidentiary value stands is, according to the principle of free evaluation of evidence, naturally within the scope of the court's free judgment. However, unfavorable statements by co-defendants, while admissible as evidence of other co-defendants' crimes, must be free of flaws and, when investigated from other aspects, accord with facts before they may be adopted to determine other co-defendants' criminal facts. If no investigation is conducted and judgment relies exclusively on such statements to determine other co-defendants' criminal facts, it manifestly violates the provision of Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, under the current Code of Criminal Procedure, the probative force of a defendant's confession, or unfavorable statements by co-defendants, cannot be freely judged by the court at will under the principle of free evaluation of evidence, but is subject to considerable limitations, retaining the flavor of legal theory of evidence—meaning that other necessary corroborative evidence must still exist to supplement the probative force of the confession before it may be adopted as material for conviction."

Moreover, during the trial process, from the reasoning of the Supreme Court's remands for retrial, it can be discovered that the court was not entirely oblivious to the aforementioned problem of corroborating accomplices' confessions. For instance, the holding of Supreme Court Judgment 86-Tai-Shang-4832, which remanded the case for the first retrial, pointed out: "Appellant Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang consistently denied the crime, while the original judgment relied on unfavorable statements by co-defendants X and X2 as its basis. However, regarding the determined facts—that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang had an urgent need for funds to relieve financial distress due to gambling investigations related to operating an arcade; that the four gathered at Ch'en's place to plan the crime; that Ch'en was acquainted with Y through real estate brokerage; and that Ch'en purchased sulfuric acid, tape, and gloves from a pharmacy in Kueishan Township, Taoyuan County—either they failed to conduct detailed investigations to corroborate that the aforementioned confessions were true, or they failed to re-summon Y's wife, Y2, to verify whether Ch'en and Y knew each other regarding the statement by Y's father, Y1, that he did not know Ch'en (p. 105 of the indictment record); or they failed to detail the evidentiary basis regarding whether the sulfuric acid and other items successively described by X2 and X were indeed purchased by Ch'en. All of these can hardly be said to have guaranteed the truthfulness of the co-defendants' unfavorable statements through corroborative evidence, constituting illegalities of incomplete evidence investigation and lacking adequate reasoning. Since this relates to the number of accomplices, participating criminal acts, and other matters, the original judgment rushed to judgment without thorough investigation, exhibiting a suspicion of hastiness..." Similarly, the holding of Supreme Court Judgment 87-Tai-Shang-156 for the second remand stated: "Furthermore, although X2 and X still stated during the trial that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang participated in committing the crime, they both denied that they had previously planned to murder the kidnapped person at Ch'en's residence. This concerns whether they had a joint criminal intent to murder, and the original judgment failed to state the reasons for its mental conviction, both constituting a lack of reasoning." This shows that the Supreme Court was not entirely without doubt regarding the truthfulness of the confessions of the two accomplices X2 and X, and therefore demanded raising the quality and quantity of corroborative evidence, reminding lower courts not to rely merely on mutual confessions among multiple accomplices for mutual corroboration. Therefore, regarding the aforementioned views of Supreme Court judgments, they have firmly adhered to the jurisprudence of the corroborative evidence rule, excluding accomplices' confessions from corroborative evidence to prevent evidence determining crime from degenerating into "testimonial" evidence, or worse, merely subjective statements of co-defendants without any objective concrete proofs.

However, through the investigations and trials of successive remands, the portions pointed out by the Supreme Court judgments could never be clarified with active, concrete corroborative evidence to prove and guarantee the truthfulness of co-defendants X2 and X's confessions. Yet the judgments in each retrial continued to mechanically copy and transcribe the confessions of the two accomplices X1 and X2 compiled from previous trials and the first instance to serve as the reasoning for a guilty verdict. Finally, after the fifth retrial, the Supreme Court abandoned its initial insistence on corroborative evidence and stopped remanding the case for retrial, allowing this death penalty judgment in this case to become final, which is truly regrettable and incomprehensible. Rather than viewing this as an oversight by the court, it is better to call it the result driven by the traditional practical mindset prioritizing "confessions." Thus, a defendant's confession is often dubbed the "king of evidence." During the investigation process, if a defendant's confession is obtained without obvious contradictions and generally matches the investigative direction of the investigators, it is often the timing for announcing the solution of the case. As for subsequent investigation and evidence collection work, it frequently degenerates into a formality, and the truth of the facts is often impossible to re-explore or reconstruct because timely evidence collection was not performed when the incident occurred. Therefore, after years of trials by police, prosecutors, and various court instances in this case, when encountering difficulties in investigating the corroborative evidence pointed out by the Supreme Court, the court—facing the unfavorable confessions against Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang made by other accomplices—was unable to dispel its suspicions toward Ch'en. Even in the absence of other corroborative evidence, it had no choice but to determine Ch'en guilty based on the accomplices' confessions, which seemingly became the inevitable systematic result of the current practical system prioritizing confessions. Yet, whether the final judgment determination resulting from this can yield a "firm conviction" that Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang is guilty and should be sentenced to death, based on the evidence in the case file, is a possibility that cannot be excluded from being negative. Moreover, this is an irreversible death penalty judgment, akin to wagering Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's life on whether an accomplice's confession is true—a price that a just judicial system cannot afford to bear. If the evidentiary value of accomplices' confessions is not clarified, similar judgment scenarios will continue to arise in the future, which is precisely one of the reasons why this judgment evaluation was conducted.

In summary, it can be seen that regarding the use of accomplices' confessions, their evidentiary value must be restricted, and admissibility must be acquired through objective corroborative evidence to avoid generating situations where crime determination is based solely on someone else's subjective statements. Facing current controversies regarding accomplices' confessions, while practical circles and legislators placed "accomplices' confessions" and "defendant's confessions" side by side in Article 156, Paragraph 2 of the current Code of Criminal Procedure during amendments to establish the legal basis that accomplices' confessions also require corroborative evidence, the types and scope of corroborative evidence for defendants or accomplices remain unaddressed. Questions such as whether confessions between a defendant and an accomplice, or between accomplices, can mutually corroborate each other, and what degree of strength is required of the corroborative evidence to corroborate the content of a confession—whether it must corroborate all, main, or partial contents of the confession, and whether strict proof is required—cannot be resolved by the provisions of current legal amendments. One can only hope that practical circles will form concrete, appropriate, and uniform interpretations and application standards on the aforementioned issues, grounded in the legislative intent and the contemplation of foreign legislative trends seeking to restrict the evidentiary value of confessions. Otherwise, controversies will be unavoidable, and highly controversial judgments similar to Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang's case will be generated once again, undermining public trust in the judiciary and the realization of justice.