Should Corrupt Judges Not Be Paroled?

Recent media reports revealed that Hu Ching-pin, a judge sentenced to 4 years and 6 months in prison for corruption, was surprisingly able to serve his sentence in an outlying prison, enjoying preferential treatment unavailable to ordinary inmates, and was even granted parole. In response, Legislator Huang Kuo-chang demanded a clear explanation from the Ministry of Justice, but has yet to receive a reply.

What exactly are the issues surrounding Hu Ching-pin's transfer to an outlying prison and his parole?

Life in outlying prisons is relatively free, and inmates convicted of corruption are indeed more likely to apply to serve their sentences there. However, the reason is not necessarily privilege, but rather that prisons are less concerned that such white-collar criminals will take the opportunity to escape and reoffend. Taking the Pate Outlying Prison where Hu Ching-pin was held as an example, out of roughly 300 inmates in 2017, one-fifth were imprisoned under the Anti-Corruption Act. This is not a "good phenomenon" because: the function of outlying prisons is to allow inmates serving long sentences to gradually adapt to self-disciplined living in a semi-open environment; at the same time, through "outlying work"—meaning working outside—they gradually reintegrate into society economically. Therefore, such treatment akin to outlying prisons should be accessible to all inmates in need, rather than a privilege enjoyed by a few. Furthermore, the work assigned should genuinely help with post-release employment.

Regarding parole, Hu Ching-pin was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months and was granted parole after serving 438 days. This becomes understandable when factoring in his days spent in detention. Hu Ching-pin had previously been detained for one year and was later released on medical parole due to colorectal cancer. According to the law, parole may be applied for after serving half of the sentence, and parole can be granted if the criteria are met. Hu Ching-pin had indeed served half of his sentence and was eligible to apply for parole. Currently, however, we cannot see the parole review materials, making it impossible to assess how his parole review was conducted substantively.

Viewed on the surface, Hu Ching-pin's parole may have complied with procedures. As for whether there was "special treatment" regarding his parole, proving it would be difficult even if it existed. The problem lies in the fact that individual handling officers in parole reviews inherently hold significant room for making recommendations, and the review process lacks transparency. Therefore, it is reasonable for the public to be concerned that someone was exercising privilege.

In other words, if we are considering how to make parole reviews systematically more immune to the influence of lobbying, what should be done?

The reason handling officers wield such significant influence over the approval or rejection of parole is that prisons lack individualized treatment plans tailored to different inmates, along with documented records of the implementation of such plans. Consequently, there is an over-reliance on the judgment of handling officers. If such plans existed, the Parole Review Board could simply evaluate the implementation of the treatment plan; if an inmate's behavior has been exemplary and proactive, approval would naturally follow, and this process would also be open to public evaluation.

Ideally, the National Guoshi Conference on Judicial Reform suggested adopting a hearing model for parole. In principle, inmates could obtain all their records while in prison and personally convince the independent reviewers at the parole hearing, while the prison could also submit opinions for the reviewers' reference. However, adopting a hearing model means too many cases cannot be reviewed at once, whereas our country's Parole Review Board reviews at least dozens of cases at a time! To shift to a hearing model, preparatory steps must be taken first: 1. Reduce the number of people entering prison to inherently avoid having too many cases to review. 2. Implement individualized treatment plans and accurately document their execution.

Finally, returning to the initial concern: how could the corrupt judge Hu Ching-pin be released so quickly!? In fact, the severe sentence he truly received concerns the bribery portion, for which he was sentenced to 16 years and which has not yet been finalized. He was merely sent to prison first for the conviction of unexplained wealth. Moreover, the public should first concern themselves with whether there were unreasonable delays in the trial process for the judge's corruption. Additionally, attention should be paid to how the system should be adjusted to prevent corruption and avoid another Hu Ching-pin.

※ This article was published in the Apple Daily on Jan. 20, 2018