Overhauling the Evaluation System to Tell the Good from the Bad: Press Conference on the Release of the Draft Amendments to the Judges Act Evaluation Chapters

The recent sexual harassment case involving a judge has once again severely undermined public trust in the judiciary. More than six years since its implementation in 2012, the Judges Act has reached a critical juncture for a comprehensive review and amendment. In accordance with the resolutions of the National Judicial Reform Conference, JRF has completed a draft amendment to the evaluation and other chapters of the Judges Act and held a press conference today (March 26) to release the contents of the draft. Legislators Yu Mei-yu and Huang Kuo-chang, who have long advocated for the Judges Act, were also invited to attend the press conference to jointly strengthen the evaluation mechanism and restore public trust in the judiciary.

Key highlights of the draft amendments are summarized below:

• Evaluation Committee to Handle Both Individual and Comprehensive Evaluations

  Under the current Judges Act, comprehensive reviews of judges and prosecutors are handled by the Judicial Yuan and the Ministry of Justice, with results kept confidential. If problematic conducts are found, they should be referred for individual evaluations. However, among the two comprehensive reviews conducted thus far, "not a single" judge or prosecutor has been referred for individual evaluation and investigation. Furthermore, because the results are not made public, the outside world has no way to examine them; thus, comprehensive reviews lack any discriminatory power and exist in name only.

  The draft amendment stipulates that comprehensive evaluations shall be conducted by the "Evaluation Committee," and the results shall be made public. Those found problematic shall be directly subjected to individual evaluations by the Evaluation Committee. The Evaluation Committee may also proactively initiate individual evaluations to truly fulfill the function of supervising judges and prosecutors.

• Direct Request for Evaluation by Citizens

  Under the current Judges Act, citizens cannot directly request an evaluation; requests can only be filed by courts, prosecutors' offices, or civil organizations. However, according to statistics from the Judicial Yuan, it accepted 7,277 citizen petitions in 2016 and 6,489 in 2017. Yet, in 2016, requests were made to evaluate only 2 judges, and 0 in 2017. The Ministry of Justice did not even publish the number of petitions, but in 2016, a request was made to evaluate only 1 prosecutor, and 0 in 2017. The number of resolutions made by the 3rd Judges and Prosecutors Evaluation Committees hit an all-time low since the implementation of the individual evaluation system. Over the past 6 years, only one judge has been dismissed from office and transferred to a non-judicial position, and only one prosecutor has been dismissed and disqualified from holding public office. Public grievances regarding the judiciary have been severely silenced. Therefore, the draft is amended to allow case parties to directly request evaluations.

• Non-Legal Background Majority in the Evaluation Committee and Dedicated Personnel to Handle Evaluation Affairs

  The ineffectiveness of evaluations, as evident from the preceding statistics, is partly due to inappropriate standards set by the Evaluation Committee. Taking cases handled by JRF as an example, a prosecutor surnamed Ch'en opined that because the victim did not bite off the assailant's penis, it was consensual rather than forced oral sex—a textbook example of the "ideal victim myth." The Prosecutors Evaluation Committee even deduced on its own that the defendant "must have felt secure enough to place his genitals in the victim's mouth without fear of being injured by sharp teeth" because he trusted the victim, demonstrating a severe lack of gender awareness.

  The draft is amended to establish a selection committee to ensure that impartial members of society without a legal background constitute a majority on the Evaluation Committee, and to establish a gender ratio where members of either gender shall not be less than one-third. This avoids legal chauvinism and allows for diverse perspectives. Additionally, full-time evaluation commissioners and dedicated personnel will be appointed to handle evaluation affairs, establishing a case-filtering mechanism to prevent frivolous requests.

• Extension of the Evaluation Statute of Limitations and Participation in Investigation Procedures

  According to the current Judges Act, the statute of limitations for prosecutor evaluations is two years. Citizens are often exhausted by trials and lack the time to report unfitness in prosecutors; by the time trial proceedings conclude, the statute of limitations has often expired, making it impossible to request an evaluation. This overly short limitation period is the primary reason for the low volume of prosecutor evaluation cases. The draft amends the statute of limitations for prosecutor evaluations to three years from the date the judgment becomes final.

  In addition, the current Evaluation Committee repeatedly ignores the feelings of parties, relying solely on courtroom recordings and transcripts to judge courtroom demeanor, without inquiring into the parties' actual experiences and feelings in court. It fails to empathize with the improper treatment people encounter in the judicial system from the perspective of the parties. The draft strengthens the parties' right to participate in evaluation procedures. Except for justified reasons, the Evaluation Committee shall investigate facts and evidence requested by the parties and grant them the right to express opinions and inspect documents during the proceedings, allowing the Committee to more comprehensively listen to public dissatisfaction with the judiciary.

• Evaluation Committee Directly Refer Cases to the Disciplinary Court to Avoid Redundancy

  Under the current system, when the Evaluation Committee deems disciplinary action necessary, it must first refer the case to the Control Yuan for review and cannot directly submit it to the Disciplinary Court for trial. However, the Control Yuan and the Evaluation Committee exercise their respective powers independently and are not subordinate to each other. The current process is redundant; therefore, the draft is amended so that when the Evaluation Committee deems disciplinary action necessary, it can directly refer the case to the Disciplinary Court without prior review by the Control Yuan.

• Inclusion of Lay Judges in the Disciplinary Court and Addition of Disciplinary Types

  The case of Judge Ch'en Hung-pin highlighted the importance of external perspectives in judicial reform. If the Evaluation Committee and the Disciplinary Court fail to abandon departmentalism and attempt to think from different angles, more judgments lacking gender awareness may occur, or unfit judges and prosecutors may be treated with undue leniency. Therefore, the draft introduces the lay judge system into the Disciplinary Court, enabling the Court to more comprehensively exercise its supervisory function. Furthermore, in addition to dismissal, removal from office, removal from judicial duties with transfer to other positions, fines, and reprimands, the disciplinary types now include suspension with mandatory education or "other dispositions," diversifying punishments to be applied timely and achieving disciplinary effects.

• Mutatis Mutandis Application of the Prosecutor Evaluation System

  In the absence of dedicated legislation for prosecutors at present, the prosecutor evaluation system must mutatis mutandis apply the provisions governing judges. Therefore, except for special provisions regarding the statute of limitations, the draft applies the aforementioned amendment directions mutatis mutandis to the prosecutor evaluation system.

  The evaluation system for judges and prosecutors is a touchstone for whether the judicial system can confront its errors, correct them, subsequently weed out unfit judges and prosecutors, and set an example of a fair judiciary for all citizens. We hope that through this amendment to the evaluation chapters of the Judges Act, an evaluation mechanism capable of rewarding the competent and eliminating the incompetent can be established to reverse the negative image of the judiciary and respond to the public's urgent expectations for judicial reform.

Attachments

1. Key Focuses of the Amendments to the Judges Act
2. Draft Judges Act

Key Focuses of the Amendments to the Judges Act

Key Amendment Focus	Current Issues	Amendment Content
1. Evaluation Committee to Handle Individual and Comprehensive Evaluations	The Judicial Yuan and the Ministry of Justice are responsible for comprehensive reviews of judges and prosecutors, and results are not made public. Only "two" comprehensive evaluations have been conducted to date. The number of cases referred for individual evaluation is "zero," lacking discriminatory power, failing to reward the good and weed out the bad, unable to reflect actual conditions, and existing in name only.	The "Evaluation Committee" handles comprehensive evaluations and individual evaluations (Article 30). Comprehensive evaluation results shall be made public (Article 31, Paragraph 1). Those found problematic shall be directly subjected to individual evaluation by the Evaluation Committee (Article 31, Paragraph 2). The Evaluation Committee may proactively initiate individual evaluations (Article 35, Paragraph 5).
2. Direct Request for Evaluation by Citizens	Public grievances silenced: The Judicial Yuan accepted 7,277 citizen petitions in 2016 and 6,489 in 2017. Yet, requests were made to evaluate only 2 judges in 2016 and 0 in 2017. The Ministry of Justice did not even publish the number of petitions, but in 2016, a request was made to evaluate only 1 prosecutor, and 0 in 2017. Over the past 6 years, only one judge has been dismissed from office and transferred to a non-judicial position, and only one prosecutor has been dismissed and disqualified from holding public office. Case: Presiding Judge Kuo of the High Court, when hearing a sexual assault case, disregarded the social worker's advice and questioned the victim regarding her address and household registration details in front of the defendant. The court ignored the social worker's petition. JRF accepted the case and requested an evaluation, but the Judges Evaluation Committee resolved that the request was unfounded and referred the matter to the judicial supervisor to urge attention.	Case parties and others may directly request evaluations without going through organizations (Article 35, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1). Establishment of full-time evaluation commissioners and dedicated personnel to handle evaluation affairs (Article 33, Paragraph 3; Article 41, Paragraph 6), establishing a case-filtering mechanism to prevent frivolous requests.
3. Non-Legal Background Majority in the Evaluation Committee and Dedicated Personnel to Handle Evaluation Affairs	The Evaluation Committee's standards are inappropriate and overly rigorous, failing to weed out unfit personnel. Case: Prosecutor Ch'en opined that because the victim did not bite off the assailant's penis, it was consensual rather than forced oral sex. The Prosecutors Evaluation Committee even deduced on its own that the defendant "must have felt secure enough to place his genitals in the victim's mouth without fear of being injured by sharp teeth," representing a textbook example of the "ideal victim myth" and a severe lack of gender awareness.	Evaluation members without a legal background are selected by a selection committee composed of impartial members of society and constitute a majority, avoiding legal chauvinism and allowing diverse perspectives (Article 34, Paragraphs 1 and 2). Members of either gender shall not be less than one-third (Article 33, Paragraph 2). Establishment of full-time evaluation commissioners and dedicated personnel to handle evaluation affairs (Article 33, Paragraph 3; Article 41, Paragraph 6).
4. Extension of the Evaluation Statute of Limitations and Participation in Investigation Procedures	The two-year statute of limitations for prosecutor evaluations is too short; cases often conclude after the limitation period has expired, making it difficult for citizens to request evaluations. For cases concerning "courtroom demeanor," which relate to facial expressions, volume, and tone of voice, the Evaluation Committee is unwilling to listen to the explanations and feelings of the parties, relying solely on recordings and transcripts to make judgments. For instance, allegations of rolling eyes in court cannot be judged without video footage.	The statute of limitations for prosecutor evaluations is extended to three years from the date the judgment becomes final (Article 89, Paragraph 8, Proviso). Codification of the right to procedural participation during evaluations, allowing both parties to express opinions in the proceedings (Article 41-1).
5. Evaluation Committee Directly Refer Cases to the Disciplinary Court to Avoid Redundancy	When the Evaluation Committee deems disciplinary action necessary, the case must still be reviewed by the Control Yuan, creating procedural redundancy.	The Control Yuan and the Evaluation Committee exercise their respective powers independently and are not subordinate to each other. The Evaluation Committee may directly submit cases deemed to require disciplinary action to the Disciplinary Court (dual-track system) (Article 39, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1).
6. Inclusion of Lay Judges in the Disciplinary Court and Addition of Disciplinary Types	The composition of the Disciplinary Court is overly homogenous, drawing criticisms of protecting one's own. Case: Judge Ch'en Hung-pin repeatedly sexually harassed his female assistant. Following a retrial by the Disciplinary Court, his dismissal was commuted to a fine, sparking criticisms of protecting judicial peers. Case: Judge Tseng Yü-ming repeatedly lost emotional control and behaved inappropriately during court sessions. Despite receiving reprimands without improvement, the Judges Evaluation Committee recommended his dismissal, yet the Disciplinary Court handed down a lenient sentence of a salary forfeiture for 10 months.	Implement the lay judge system in the Disciplinary Court to break the existing compositional structure (Article 48). In addition to dismissal, removal from office, removal from judicial duties with transfer to other positions, fines, and reprimands, disciplinary types now include suspension with mandatory education or "other dispositions" to achieve disciplinary effects (Article 50).

Attendees

Yu Mei-yu / Legislator
Huang Kuo-chang / Legislator
Lin Yung-sung / Chairperson, Judicial Reform Foundation
Huang Hsu-t'ien / Convenor, Judges Act Amendment Committee, Judicial Reform Foundation
Ch'en Yü-fan / CEO, Judicial Reform Foundation

Press Contact

Judicial Reform Foundation / CEO Ch'en Yü-fan