Do Not Let Prosecutors Run the Country

Prosecutor-General Huang Shih-ming personally reported case files and subsequent investigative plans that were still under investigation to President Ma, and was subsequently indicted for the offense of breach of confidentiality. In response, various conspiracy theories have emerged, such as the Prosecutor-General being the President's hitman or the indictment being a self-preservation tactic to cut losses. Why not use this opportunity to examine what is wrong with prosecutors' investigative culture and how we can seek solutions?

Ever since the Qing Dynasty promulgated the "Act Governing the Organization of the Da理 Yuan Trials" and introduced the prosecutor system, more than a century has passed. While some individuals have advocated for abolishing prosecutorial powers on the grounds that prosecutors should not proactively prosecute crimes, in reality, prosecutors have actively prosecuted crimes for the vast majority of this time.

What most citizens worry about, conversely, is that prosecutors can initiate investigations on their own initiative while wielding powerful compulsory powers. If improperly controlled, they risk becoming wild horses running amok. Especially since prosecutors frequently handle cases involving politicians, once they become a ruling authority's tool of governance, society will face unbearable turmoil.

This time, the Special Investigation Division's wiretapping regarding the Legislative Speaker's alleged involvement in judicial lobbying triggered the so-called "September Political Struggle." It is no wonder many worried that "the Prosecutor-General is President Ma's hitman." However, this clearly stems from a lack of understanding of the historical development of Taiwan's prosecutorial system and the current investigative culture and problems within the prosecutorial apparatus.

Greater Attention Should Be Paid to Procedural Justice

During the era of the Kuomintang's authoritarian rule, the policy of "party-state judicial transformation" was rigorously enforced: the President of the Judicial Yuan was a member of the Kuomintang Central Standing Committee, many chief prosecutors at various levels were members of the Central Committee, and the longest-serving Prosecutor-General in history was indeed a former Kuomintang party functionary. However, following the lifting of martial law, the development of political democratization, and judicial and prosecutorial reform movements in the 1980s such as "Return Our Right to Self-Government" and "Democratization of the Prosecutorial Personnel System," the courts and the prosecutorial apparatus have gradually returned to the regular track of the rule of law, fulfilling their constitutionally assigned roles of judicial independence and prosecutorial neutrality. Otherwise, if prosecutors remain the tools of those in power or if investigative agencies are inherently biased toward the blue camp, how can one explain that during the DPP administration, both Ma Ying-jeou's special-expense case and Wu Shu-chen's state-affairs fund case were indicted—especially since these were not isolated incidents?

Yet, returning to the neutral role of prosecutors is merely the first step toward the normalization of prosecutorial power. Public expectations for prosecutors also include "striving for substantive truth and justice." Therefore, prosecutors must not pursue substantive justice in a one-sided manner; rather, they must care even more about procedural justice. After all, prosecutors possess formidable powers, and the slightest carelessness will inevitably damage the reputations and freedoms of innocent people.

Regrettably, for a long time, most prosecutors have cared only about substantive justice, using any means necessary to achieve their ends, while lacking constitutional awareness. Taking the recent wiretapping of the legislature as an example, despite clearly involving constitutional issues such as the protection of the right to privacy, parliamentary self-discipline, and the separation of powers, Prosecutor-General Huang actually relied on regulations unilaterally promulgated by the Ministry of Justice as the basis for investigating administrative misconduct and reporting directly to the President. Such a zealous and legalistic mindset not only harms many innocent people, but also frequently results in the detention and indictment of numerous political and business elites and politicians from both the ruling and opposition camps, only for them to be acquitted by the courts in the end. Furthermore, anyone wishing to become a presidential candidate must first undergo baptism by prosecutorial power—no wonder there is the mockery of "prosecutors running the country!"

Bringing the Prosecutorial Apparatus Back to Regular Tracks

Back then, prosecutors indicted the Director-General of the Investigation Bureau, finally changing the situation where intelligence chiefs only knew how to serve the ruling authorities, completing the final piece of the rule-of-law puzzle in which courts, prosecutors, police, and investigative agencies are loyal solely to the state and the people.

Today, the Taipei District Prosecutors Office has indicted the leader of all prosecutors. It is hoped that all prosecutorial, police, and investigative personnel will deeply remember that procedural justice is the supreme commandment for legal professionals handling cases. At the same time, it is expected that this rogue element of prosecutorial power can finally be brought back within the regular tracks of constitutional order, leaving prosecutors running the country confined to historical memory!