We Do Not Want a "Judges Act for Dinosaur Judges"

January 11 is Judicial Day. Delayed for over twenty years, the enactment of the Judges Act—so anticipated by society—happened to pass its first reading in the Legislative Yuan right on the eve of Judicial Day. Without any unexpected developments, the Legislative Yuan should be able to complete the legislation in the next session. However, if we follow the first-reading provisions currently dominated and passed by the Kuomintang (KMT), there is fear that not only will it be impossible to weed out incompetent "dinosaur judges," but it will actually nurture, spawn, and protect even more dinosaur judges.

Denying Parties the Right to Complain

Take, for example, the much-anticipated mechanism for weeding out incompetent judges—namely, the judicial evaluation mechanism. Not only has the Judicial Yuan shown no avoidance of conflict of interest by insisting on housing the evaluation mechanism within the Judicial Yuan itself, but it has also rejected public demands, refusing to let representatives of professional communities such as judges, prosecutors, and lawyers be elected by their respective communities. Instead, it has vested the President of the Judicial Yuan, the Ministry of Justice, and Taiwan Bar Association with the power to appoint their own representatives. The KMT also decided regarding the selection method for the six scholars and socially impartial figures among the evaluation members: two each to be appointed by the Legislative Yuan, the Control Yuan, and the Judicial Yuan. Anyone with a discerning eye can see that such an arrangement is tantamount to the President—who controls the parliamentary majority and the nomination power for the heads of the Control and Judicial Yuan—monopolizing the appointment power for all six scholars and socially impartial figures, which completely violates the political principle of checks and balances and separation of powers.

Even more absurdly, the first-reading provisions actually overthrew the consensus reached between the Judicial Yuan and civil society over many years, completely disallowing parties to judicial cases from lodging complaints against judges presiding over their cases, thereby castrating the right of judicial victims to directly cry out against injustice. Furthermore, the Judicial Yuan also insists that interpretations of applicable laws shall not constitute grounds for judicial evaluation. In other words, if there truly are dinosaur judges, nothing can be done about them.

In addition, although the Judicial Yuan accepted the public's suggestion for regular evaluations of all judges, it only agreed to conduct them once every five years, and rather than being handled by a Judges Evaluation Committee with external evaluation members, it is arranged by the Judicial Yuan itself, and the evaluation results will not be made public. Furthermore, the judges of the Disciplinary Court—who make the final decision on judicial disciplinary results—are entirely composed of judges.

From this, it can be seen that the judicial evaluation system passed at the first reading by the Legislative Yuan is no different from the current practice of citizens directly reporting judges to the Control Yuan, and there is fear that it may even be a step backward. The public outcry for comprehensive judicial evaluations has been channeled into the Judicial Yuan's backroom operations, completely losing its meaning as supervision, and directly violating President Ma's promise made during his presidential campaign in the "New Century Human Rights Declaration" to "weed out judicial officers who abuse power and neglect their duties through a regular evaluation system that is pluralistic, professional, and involves public participation."

Retaining the Judge Examination Out of Convenience

The evaluation system for weeding out judges has already been distorted beyond recognition, leaving dinosaur judges without a shred of fear. What is even more serious is that regarding the selection of what kind of people shall serve as judges—commonly known as the judicial entry system—there is also no determination or sincerity for reform, because the Judicial Yuan still insists on refusing to abolish the judge examination. That examinations fail to select the most suitable candidates to serve as judges and preside over trials has long been a social consensus, yet the Judicial Yuan, coveting convenience, is unwilling to give up this pacifier. As a result, potential dinosaur judges will continue to be endlessly reproduced generation after generation through the judge examination.

Other reform priorities related to the Judges Act include: whether the Personnel Review Committee of the Judicial Yuan—which handles important personnel matters such as the promotion of judicial officers and the selection of heads—should introduce external members to promote transparent operations and avoid the ills of bureaucratic protectionism and inbreeding; and the long-standing chronic ailment where judicial training is led by the Ministry of Justice rather than the Judicial Yuan, allowing the executive branch to "train" the judicial branch. Every single one of these issues is a crucial key to the future success or failure of the Judges Act, yet they were all struck down during the Legislative Yuan's first-reading process and failed to gain favor.

Everyone says they do not want dinosaur judges, but if we go by the currently passed first-reading version of the Judges Act, we might as well announce to the general public to give up hope early on! The countdown to the third reading of the bill has begun; let us pool the strength of the entire citizenry and shout loudly: "We do not want dinosaur judges, and we certainly do not want a dinosaur Judges Act!"