Op-Ed | The New Evaluation System Is Underperforming-How Much Longer Will the Judicial Yuan Keep Observing?

At a September 2 press conference, the Judicial Reform Foundation pointed out that, among 307 judge- and prosecutor-evaluation cases completed during the first year of the amended system, not a single petition filed directly by a member of the public was found well-founded. Compared with either the prior system or the United Kingdom's judicial-conduct complaint mechanism, the result was deeply disappointing.

Yet the Judicial Yuan's public response to these concerns did not suggest any urgent need for corrective measures. It stressed that the result was "not zero" and "not a step backward," pointing to one well-founded petition. But that petition had been filed by the Taoyuan District Court. It does not change the fact that the number of well-founded petitions filed directly by members of the public was zero.

Does the Evaluation System Listen to the Public?

Why did performance appear to decline after the law was amended to allow people to file evaluation petitions directly? The Judicial Yuan is right that courtroom demeanor has visibly improved compared with the past. But during the same year, the Judge Evaluation Committee received 300 complaints-far more than the JRF historically received from the public. We therefore need to ask not only whether things are better than before, but whether the evaluation system actually listens to what people are reporting.

Unlike litigation, in which a person asserts private rights, the individual-evaluation system is closer to a reporting mechanism pursued entirely in the public interest. Even if a judge or prosecutor is ultimately disciplined, the petitioner's original case does not change. A member of the public may spend time and even pay an attorney to prepare an evaluation petition and receive no personal benefit at all. It is, quite literally, public-interest work.

Seen in that light, petitioners are not simply "picking on" judicial personnel for personal gain. They are trying to prevent officials whose conduct is inappropriate from harming others. Nor does an evaluation committee make the final disciplinary decision. Even if it finds a petition well-founded, the matter must still proceed to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Judiciary for final adjudication.

After One Year Under the Amended Law, Well-Founded Public Petitions Fall to Zero

The evaluation system has never been about the committee "helping" people vindicate their personal rights. The relationship runs the other way: members of the public come forward to help the committee-and the state-identify professional misconduct by judges and prosecutors.

That public-interest character is reflected in the committee's power to investigate misconduct beyond what a petitioner has specifically alleged; it is not constrained by a strict "no complaint, no action" principle. The committee also evaluates not merely an isolated act, but the broader "overall personality profile" or pattern reflected in the judicial officer's misconduct.

The problem is that the current evaluation committees operate too much like adjudicative bodies conducting paper review: they tend to place the burden of proving misconduct on members of the public who lack investigative resources, and may even expect them to prepare polished, carefully structured legal submissions on their own. The result is the figure noted at the outset: after one year and 307 completed cases under the amended system, the number of well-founded petitions filed directly by members of the public was zero.

If the Committees See Themselves as Judges, the Evaluation System Risks Becoming Window Dressing

The danger is that, unless the committees recognize their responsibility to investigate more actively and examine a judicial officer's historical pattern of conduct, they may continue to see themselves as neutral adjudicators imposing heavy procedural and evidentiary demands on ordinary people who are acting for the public interest. In that event, the evaluation system may become little more than window dressing.

Yet the Judicial Yuan's response said only that "continued observation and effort are still needed," without identifying a concrete direction for review or reform. Taiwan's judiciary is certainly making progress. But is implementation of the new evaluation system really free of defects? How much does the Judicial Yuan actually understand about the committees' day-to-day operation? Has it conducted a rigorous analysis and review? Regrettably, the response suggests an institution unwilling to engage in meaningful self-examination, identify problems, improve the system, or communicate seriously with civil society.

How much longer will the Judicial Yuan continue to observe? If another year passes and the results remain unchanged, will it simply observe for yet another year?

※ This article was published on September 10, 2021 in ETtoday