Op-Ed | Public Claims for State Compensation and Judicial Independence Are Not a Zero-Sum Game

*This op-ed was subsequently republished on ETtoday Forum

The Executive Yuan's recently announced draft amendments to the State Compensation Law have sparked debate. The controversy centers on two questions: when may people seek state compensation if their rights are infringed by a judge or prosecutor, and will judges and prosecutors become less willing to act decisively for fear that compensation claims may follow?

For the overwhelming majority of judges and prosecutors who conscientiously perform their duties-and routinely work overtime under enormous caseloads-it is difficult to imagine a case going so badly that state compensation would arise. Unfortunately, the serious misconduct of a very small number of unfit judicial officers can damage the reputation of the profession as a whole and distort public perceptions of the judiciary.

The problem is that Article 13 of the current State Compensation Law imposes extremely strict requirements. Even when a small number of judges or prosecutors clearly engage in unlawful conduct that infringes people's rights-and even when a court later confirms that misconduct-the injured person may still be unable to obtain state compensation. That gap deepens public misunderstanding of the judiciary. Under the current system, an unfit judicial officer may face personal discipline, but the institution itself bears little responsibility to improve its systems or prevent recurrence. As a result, institutions have too little incentive to identify problems early and press unfit judicial officers to change.

Although no case involving the official conduct of a judge or prosecutor has yet resulted in state-compensation liability under Article 13, there have been cases in which prosecutors seriously violated identification procedures, disregarded due process and the presumption of innocence, and wrongfully prosecuted an innocent person. The Control Yuan's Impeachment Case No. 3 of 2021 even stated that "the compensation review committee was somewhat shocked that the prosecutor still insisted on including [the suspect] in the indictment despite believing there was little basis for criminal suspicion." The wrongfully convicted person ultimately received NT$595,000 in criminal compensation; the prosecutor's agency required the prosecutor to reimburse NT$330,000; and the Control Yuan unanimously approved impeachment that year.

There have also been cases in which the Court of the Judiciary found that a judge or prosecutor had committed misconduct infringing people's rights, yet the injured person could not seek state compensation because of Article 13 of the State Compensation Law. For example, Judicial Yuan Court of the Judiciary Judgment No. 2 (2016) found that the disciplined judge had berated and insulted a defendant in court, threatened the defendant with detention, and made improper remarks showing disrespect for defense counsel and undermining counsel's dignity. Absent the restriction in Article 13 of the State Compensation Law, the facts could have supported a state-compensation claim.

Similarly, Judicial Yuan Court of the Judiciary Judgment No. 5 (2018) found that, during nearly five years in office, the disciplined judge had delayed 45 cases without justification, including 17 summary cases involving no complex facts. The Court of the Judiciary concluded that the judge's passive approach to case handling was serious and impaired litigants' right to a full, effective, and fair trial. Those circumstances could likewise satisfy the general requirements for state compensation. Internationally, the European Court of Human Rights also recognizes a right to an effective remedy where proceedings exceed a reasonable time.

What the public finds difficult to understand is this: if two people suffer the same unlawful infringement through the official conduct of a public servant, why should the state escape compensation simply because the public servant happens to be a judge or prosecutor?

Allowing an injured person to seek compensation from the state and allowing the state to seek recourse from an individual judicial officer are not opposing ideas. To protect the ability of frontline judges and prosecutors to find facts and apply the law independently according to their professional judgment-without creating "defensive justice" driven by self-protection-the law can impose appropriately demanding conditions on the state's later exercise of recourse against the individual officer. Under either the current or a future system, judges and prosecutors need not be placed on the front line to face compensation claims directly. For the public, however, a reasonable framework for accountability and compensation can promote healthier dialogue with the judiciary and strengthen trust in it.