Constitutional Court Amicus Curiae Brief | Status Act for Indigenous Peoples Case

Constitutional Court Amicus Curiae Brief | Status Act for Indigenous Peoples Case

Last edited: 2026-08-30

Lin Chün-Ju (Lowking Lin), Ko Che-Yu (Yuri Yuko)

An unequal legal regime for names has already erased the diversity of traditional Indigenous naming systems. Taiwan's naming law assumes a Han Chinese surname-lineage model, and in a culture where taking the Han father's surname remains the norm, Indigenous women already face substantial barriers to returning to traditional naming systems or having their children take the mother's surname. Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples compounds that inequality by tying legal Indigenous status to surname or a traditional Indigenous name, placing their children at a double disadvantage. Because marriages between Indigenous women and non-Indigenous men are particularly common, the rule can also affect continuity of Indigenous identity across generations.

-Excerpt from the Amicus Curiae Brief-

At 10:30 a.m. on January 17, the Constitutional Court will hold the first oral argument of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act era in the long-disputed case concerning the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples. On January 12, the Court granted the Judicial Reform Foundation permission to participate as amicus curiae, and the JRF formally filed its amicus brief on January 13.

Issues Presented

Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples provides that a child born to an Indigenous and a non-Indigenous parent acquires Indigenous status only if the child takes the surname of the Indigenous parent or a traditional Indigenous name. The requirement is commonly described as tying Indigenous status to surname.
In Constitutional Interpretation Case No. 107-Hsien-Erh-347, for example, the petitioner's mother is Truku and the father is not Indigenous. The parents agreed that the child would take the father's surname and applied to register the child with Truku Indigenous status. The household registration office denied the application under this provision, preventing the petitioner from obtaining legal Indigenous status.

Under the issues framed by the Constitutional Court, what constitutional rights does this requirement restrict? What is the basis for those restrictions, and are they constitutional?

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This article is an AI-generated translation of the original Chinese text. In the event of any discrepancy, the Chinese version shall prevail.

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