JRF Statement Supporting the Abolition of the Death Penalty | "Bidding Farewell to the Death Penalty: The Government Must Assume Responsibility for Crime Prevention and Protecting Crime Victims"

Today, the 12 Justices of the Constitutional Court held oral arguments on the constitutionality of the death penalty system. The proceedings involved 16 counsel for the petitioners, four representatives from the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Prosecutor's Office, two representatives from expert appraisal agencies, and six experts.

In response, the Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF), drawing from perspectives such as due process, the prohibition of arbitrariness, and the protection of human dignity, argues for the abolition of the death penalty and has submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, concerning the primary case of Wang Hsin-fu (王信福) and the joint case of Chiou Ho-shun (邱和順)—both of which are miscarriage-of-justice death penalty cases currently receiving assistance from our organization—their death sentences are likewise unconstitutional. To foster broader social dialogue, the reasons for our advocacy to abolish the death penalty are stated as follows:

1. According to domestic and international empirical statistics, the death penalty has no deterrent effect on crime

One of the primary arguments in support of the death penalty is that the existence of a capital punishment system deters crime. However, empirical data from countries around the world as well as from our own nation demonstrate that the death penalty has no effective role in deterring crime.

Conditions Worldwide

For instance, in the United States between 1990 and 2020, the average rate of homicides in states that abolished the death penalty actually showed a downward trend. Moreover, in countries such as South Africa (1995), Poland (1997), Estonia (1998), and Latvia (2012), murder rates declined during the first 10 years following the abolition of the death penalty, demonstrating that abolition did not lead to an increase in serious crimes. The constitutional courts of Albania, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Canada, and South Africa have all declared the death penalty unconstitutional, noting in their reasoning that no evidence shows the death penalty possesses a definitive deterrent effect or achieves its intended punitive purpose.

Scholars John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers also compared the execution rates and historical homicide rates of execution and non-execution states within the United States and Canada, evaluating the relationship between execution rates and homicide rates in data dating back to 1934. In their research report, The Death Penalty: No Evidence of Deterrence, they pointed out that the estimated results of most empirical studies concerning the deterrent effect of crime by the death penalty are unreliable. Because the execution rate of the death penalty in the United States is low, statistical samples are scarce, and annual crime rates fluctuate significantly, it is extremely difficult to isolate the impact of other factors from existing statistical data to independently assess whether the death penalty generates a deterrent effect. Overall, current empirical evidence cannot lead to a definitive conclusion regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty.

Conditions in Our Country

Since our country has not yet abolished the death penalty, an analysis can be conducted by referencing the status of death penalty executions in Taiwan. Between 2000 and 2023—a span of 23 years—a total of 84 people were executed, with the number showing a year-by-year downward trend. However, according to public data from the National Police Agency of the Ministry of the Interior, the incidence of major public-safety crimes (intentional homicide, kidnapping, forced sexual intercourse, and robbery) also declined significantly over the same period (with drops ranging from 89% to 96%). During a four-year span from 2006 to 2009, Taiwan did not carry out a single execution, and Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng (May 2008 – March 2010) even explicitly expressed her abolitionist stance and refused to carry out executions; yet throughout these four years, the incidence rates of the aforementioned major public-safety crimes all exhibited a downward trend.

Judging from domestic and international empirical results, there is currently no persuasive empirical research clearly indicating that the death penalty has a deterrent effect on crime. The United Nations Secretary-General also pointed out in 2019: "There is no evidence that the death penalty deters crime, as the reinstatement of capital punishment is inconsistent with the objective of reducing crime."

2. The moral view that criminals "deserve to die" is not the legal reason to support the death penalty system

Public opinion polls conducted over the years regarding the retention or abolition of the death penalty consistently show that approximately 80% to 90% of the public opposes abolition. Among these, the most crucial reason supporting the death penalty is the belief that "justice" cannot be "restored" for "extremely serious criminals" unless they are subjected to the "most severe punishment"; viewed from the arguments supporting capital punishment, the death penalty system does not merely retain an option, but rather establishes the necessity of capital punishment through the assertion that "extreme criminals must be put to death." In this regard, whether the death penalty deters crime is not the point; rather, the goal is to convey "the strongest condemnation" to offenders and the general public through "the most severe punishment."

To put it further, the rationality and significance of the death penalty system lie in its function as a method of "strongest condemnation" that justifies "any means necessary"; thus, its symbolic significance is irreplaceable. From this perspective, the death penalty system is a moral judgment that stops at nothing, possesses extreme significance, and disregards the principle of proportionality or other objectives. This extremism is also manifested in the sentiment that "it is taken for granted that murdering a police officer or a child must result in a death sentence, without any question whatsoever," and even extends to launching excessive criticisms and security threats against abolitionists.

Under a liberal democratic constitutional order, one must certainly respect the moral judgment that "serious crimes must be punished by death." However, this extreme moral judgment does not become "moderate" or "ordinary" simply because it accords with the views of the majority, nor does it become sufficient for state power to institutionally and coercively enforce it through law. On the contrary, under a constitutional order that protects the fundamental rights of the people, there exist diverse moral propositions and values of the good within society. For the most part, state power should not enforce specific moral propositions through coercive systems, let alone moral propositions of an extreme nature.

Abolishing the death penalty system does not mean that public authority denies the moral stance that "serious criminals deserve to die" or that "the families of victims deny the perpetrator's status as a human being"; rather, it holds that the death penalty, as a legal system, should be evaluated through constitutional law and penal theory. The passive notion that someone "deserves to die" does not mean the state is permitted to execute them.

3. There is no essential difference between "a judge's ultimate reason for sentencing someone to death" and "the public's reason for thinking someone deserves to die"

Examining death penalty judgments in our country reveals that the courts' reasons for sentencing individuals to death repeatedly employ emotive language devoid of objective standards, such as "arousing the indignation of both gods and men," "unforgivable by heavenly principles," "inexcusable," and "hair-raising." The phrase "seeking life yet unable to obtain it" is merely a euphemism for saying "they must be killed"; yet it remains a mere conclusion without reasons.

Such arbitrary judgments cannot be overcome through due process of law. Observing our country's judicial practice similarly reveals frequent instances where sentencing conclusions diverge drastically across "different court levels" for the same case; or where a case is remanded for retrial and subsequently modified by "a different trial panel within the same court"; or where different defendants in the same case have their convictions altered due to factual errors while other co-defendants have their death sentences upheld (for details, see 2024 Taiwan Death Penalty Judgment Report: Analysis of the Arbitrariness of Death Sentences for 37 Death-Row Inmates).

What is more, in vindicated miscarriage-of-justice death penalty cases (such as the cases of Hsu Tzu-chiang (徐自強), Su Chien-ho (蘇建和), Chiang Kuo-ching (江國慶), Hsieh Chih-hung (謝志宏), and Cheng Hsing-tse (鄭性澤)) as well as death penalty cases currently under rescue (such as the cases of Chiou Ho-shun and Wang Hsin-fu), even when objective doubts such as insufficient evidence or torture existed, the courts still arbitrarily imposed death sentences using reasons such as "arousing the indignation of both gods and men" and "unforgivable by heavenly principles." What is being expressed here is not an argument for abolishing the death penalty on the grounds that "the judiciary makes mistakes"; rather, it uses the fact that death sentences continue to be handed down in wrongful conviction cases to emphasize that: the arbitrariness of death penalty judgments is not a problem of individual judges or institutional design, but rather the intrinsic nature of the pronouncement of capital punishment—no matter what legal procedures are used to reinforce it, it ultimately depends entirely on the adjudicator's personal moral intuition, lacking any followable objective standard.

In short, "a judge's ultimate reason for sentencing someone to death" and "the public's reason for thinking someone deserves to die" are equally fraught with arbitrariness and emotion, and there is no essential difference between the two. Death penalty trials and sentencing are, by nature, arbitrary moral judgments lacking standards, and they can never satisfy the requirements of due process of law.

4. Severe condemnation of major crimes can achieve the same or better results through life imprisonment and other measures

Although general public opinion polls show a trend of 80% to 90% support for the death penalty system, if complementary measures for abolishing the death penalty (such as life imprisonment without parole) are listed, public support for the death penalty drops to around 50%. A further analysis reveals that a considerable amount of the public's support for the death penalty actually stems from the need for "moral signaling." Surveyed respondents feel that without supporting the death penalty, they might not adequately express their strong condemnation of serious crimes or show sufficient support for victims. In other words, the public is unclear about what alternative methods exist to express condemnation; while they believe serious criminals "deserve to die," they do not necessarily hold a strong opinion that serious crimes "must" be punished by death.

This repeatedly demonstrates that the death penalty functions as "the harshest condemnation ritual," and its "symbolic significance" in society far outweighs its "substantive significance." The problem is that this unprincipled, proportional-disregarding, arbitrary condemnation ritual possessing merely symbolic significance instead alleviates the government's responsibility to review the social safety net and analyze the causes of crime, causing the general public to stop at the illusion or transient satisfaction that "putting criminals to death can prevent serious crimes." Viewed from this perspective, the symbolic significance of supporting the death penalty system may be well-intentioned; however, in reality, the execution and pronouncement of the death penalty have mutated into a "prop" used by the state to cover up its incompetence—satisfying the moral emotions of public outrage while evading its responsibility to prevent crime and protect victims.

We believe that extremely long-term imprisonment can likewise achieve the effects of condemning crime and defending society. In addition to conveying "the harshest condemnation" through "life imprisonment," the government can also send a more proactive message to the public. For example, government agencies should annually compile information regarding major criminal cases—including occurrence circumstances, investigation and trial progress, judgment outcomes, penalty executions, and parole status—and present a solemn report to all citizens through public events, reiterating a strong condemnation of crimes and condolences to victims. Furthermore, governments should study relevant risk factors to reduce systemic factors giving rise to offenders, or issue calls to potential victims to pay attention to risks.

5. Bidding farewell to the death penalty allows the government to truly assume its due responsibility for preventing crime and protecting victims

We are deeply aware that divergences exist in society's understanding of "protecting human dignity." Different moral judgments still persist between "the equal protection of human dignity across the board" and "serious criminals having already voluntarily relinquished their human dignity," and both deserve mutual respect.

The Constitution of our country and international human rights law have both revealed the legal stance of equally protecting the fundamental rights of the people. Beyond this reason, the death penalty—as an extreme moral judgment whose arbitrary nature spanning from trial, sentencing, to execution—is incompatible with fundamental constitutional principles such as due process of law and the principle of proportionality.

Accordingly, we believe that the death penalty system is unconstitutional and should be replaced by appropriate ultra-long-term imprisonment and related complementary measures. By bidding farewell to the death penalty, which possesses merely symbolic significance, Taiwanese society can seek substantive methods of punishment and condemnation, acknowledge the social causes of crime, allow the government to truly shoulder the responsibility of social security and crime prevention, and strengthen the allocation of resources to protect and assist victims.

Press Contacts

Lü Cheng-yen, Attorney at Law, Director of the Legal Policy Department, Judicial Reform Foundation