Amicus Curiae Brief to the Constitutional Court | Case on Excessively Low Prisoner Remuneration

Principal Case Number

109-Hsien-Er-508

Amicus Curiae

Judicial Reform Foundation

Representative: Huang Hsu-t'ien (See powers of attorney for details)

Counsel

Attorney Sung Yi-hsiu (See powers of attorney for details)

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This amicus curiae brief is submitted pursuant to Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act regarding an individual petition for constitutional review of legal norms:

1. Disclosures required for submitting an amicus curiae brief:
   1. Pursuant to Article 20, Paragraph 3 and Article 19, Paragraph 3 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, individuals or organizations other than the parties or interested parties who submit professional opinions or materials shall disclose whether they have a division of labor or cooperative relationship, or any financial remuneration or sponsorship, along with the amount or value thereof, with the parties, interested parties, or their counsel.
   2. The procedural opinions in this amicus curiae brief were drafted by counsel Attorney Sung Yi-hsiu. Furthermore, regarding Judgment No. 112-Chien-Keng-I-3 of the Taiwan Hualien District Court cited in this brief, this Foundation resolved to assist in filing the lawsuit, and it was represented by pro bono attorneys Lin Chün-ju and Ch'iu Te-ju. However, Attorneys Lin Chün-ju and Ch'iu Te-ju did not participate in the drafting of this amicus curiae brief, which is hereby expressly stated.
   3. In addition, regarding the drafting of this amicus curiae brief, neither this Foundation's representative Huang Hsu-t'ien nor counsel Attorney Sung Yi-hsiu has received any financial remuneration, sponsorship, amount, or value from, nor do they have any command or supervisory relationship with, the petitioner, interested parties, or their counsel in the case numbered 109-Hsien-Er-508 (hereinafter referred to as the "Present Case").
2. Opinions and grounds regarding the Present Case:
   1. Under the constitutional intent to protect the right to life, inmates should enjoy adequate protection of their right to life, conforming to human dignity, a minimum standard of living, and even a commensurate standard of living.
      1. The protection of what is required for people to sustain a minimum level of life falls within the scope of the constitutional right to life, from which it can even be deduced that the state has certain obligations to provide for people's subsistence needs under specific conditions:
         1. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Constitution: "The right to life, bodily work, and property rights of the people shall be guaranteed," which explicitly establishes the right to life as one of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. However, the specific content and realization of this right have been extensively discussed by legal academia and judicial practice. According to the prevailing consensus in constitutional law, fundamental rights are generally recognized as possessing various functional dimensions, including the protective function, the function of a right to state performance (benefit), the objective order-guiding function, the function of institutional guarantee, and the function of procedural guarantee. Among these five functions, the protective function and the performance-claim function have long been the focus of discussions on the implementation of fundamental rights, as they pertain to active and passive dimensions respectively. Traditional views have generally held that the protection of fundamental rights should be primarily based on the protective function. From the perspective of classical liberalism, the recognition of fundamental rights originally stems from the purpose of protecting people from excessive state interference. It is not difficult to imagine that the vast majority of fundamental rights recognized by general consensus are affirmed as possessing a protective function, upon which individuals can base claims against state interference without doubt.
         2. However, in a few circumstances, if the realization of a fundamental right relies solely on the passive expectation that the state will not actively interfere, it is almost foreseeable that the realization of such a right will be reduced to nothingness. In such instances, room for discussion exists as to whether to recognize a right to state performance (benefit) for that fundamental right. Generally speaking, both legal academia and judicial practice adopt a quite cautious attitude toward whether to recognize such a functional dimension in various fundamental rights, as requesting state performance involves the allocation of limited state finances. From the perspective of the principle of optimal institutional functionality, such matters are appropriately left to the legislator to decide, granting them considerable legislative formative discretion. Therefore, recognizing an excessively broad scope of fundamental rights to state performance risks causing the judicial branch to overstep the division of powers under the separation of powers.
         3. Regarding the right to life, scholars have long strongly argued that it should possess a performance dimension, with the contents of such performance being what is required for an individual's basic subsistence. For instance, in his writings, scholar Wu Keng proposed two assertions regarding the effect of the right to life: First, unless one denies the normative effect of the right to life, maintaining the bare minimum of life in state life is a minimal requirement of the right to life; therefore, maintaining the people's minimum standard of living is an obligation of state protection. Second, a life complying with human dignity is a reasonable goal for protecting the right to life. Because living standards can be quantified, differing living standards are not equivalent to degrees of happiness, and particularly do not necessarily correspond to individual status; thus, adopting an abstract standard of a dignified life appears reasonable, emphasizing that a life complying with human dignity imposes a higher duty of affirmative action on the state, which is no longer limited to the previously discussed minimum standard of living [Exhibit A-1].
         4. In the past, the Grand Justices predominantly operated through the lens of the protective function when conducting constitutional reviews to examine whether laws and regulations unconstitutionally authorize the state to actively interfere with the right to life. For example, in Interpretation No. 476, the Court examined whether the provisions on the death penalty in the Statute for the Suppression of Narcotics and the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act infringed upon the people's right to life.
         5. However, in recent times, the Grand Justices have gradually recognized that the right to life possesses the function of a right to state performance, which can serve as a basis for requesting the state to provide specific performances; if the state fails to act through negligence, it may constitute an infringement upon the right to life. For instance, in Interpretation No. 753, the Grand Justices held that the National Health Insurance system involves the protection of people's right to life; in Interpretation No. 767, they similarly held that the pharmaceutical injury relief system is a state mechanism for protecting people's right to life, seemingly intending to affirm that the realization of the right to life relies on the state providing specific forms of performance. Furthermore, in Interpretation No. 766, the Grand Justices explicitly affirmed that the right to life possesses the function of a right to state performance, expressly stating that "if its content involves the minimum subsistence needs of the people, it shall additionally be protected by the right to life under Article 15 of the Constitution. Restrictions on such claims to social insurance benefits, which concurrently enjoy the protection of the right to life, shall be subject to stricter scrutiny." Based on this, it can be inferred that the function of the right to life as a claim to state performance has been recognized by our constitutional interpreters, and claims for minimum subsistence needs are further recognized by the interpreters as contents that can be requested from the state pursuant to the right to life.
      2. Inmates also enjoy the minimum subsistence needs protected by the right to life
         1. Commentators may argue that since inmates, through their own actions and after review by the state's judicial power, are lawfully deprived of their personal freedom and placed in correctional facilities, the rights they are entitled to enjoy are naturally subject to limitation. Observing the public reaction after prison administration issues made headlines in recent years, while it is regrettable, one must concede that the legal sentiment of the majority of our citizens perhaps favors this view.
         2. Nevertheless, as a civil society organization that has long focused on the rights of inmates, this Foundation, based on its own profession and duties, has an obligation to use the opportunity of the Present Case to emphasize to the general public that inmates are temporarily deprived of their personal freedom solely due to the operation of the state's penal power. Ultimately, they remain citizens of our country, and as subjects protected by the Constitution, they are no different from people outside correctional facilities. Moreover, an "inmate" is neither a group permanently isolated from society nor a permanent identity label; the majority of inmates will eventually return to the outside society and become members of the "general public." The notion held by some citizens that "inmates are not of our kind" lacks a foundation of support in either academic discussion or practical operation, and is merely an unrealistic imagination running counter to human rights concepts.
         3. Furthermore, from the perspective of criminal correction, the outcome of an inmate being sentenced is the operation of a rule-of-law state and the realization of the state's correctional function, with the purpose of enabling the inmate to return to society and once again become a member of the "general public," jointly maintaining Taiwan's ideal operation as a rule-of-law state. If their status as subjects protected by the Constitution is denied during the period of their lawful imprisonment, how can they be made to believe that they reside in a rule-of-law state? How can the correctional function of penal institutions be fulfilled? How can inmates be persuaded that upon returning to society, they should submit to the laws established by the state, become members of the "general public," and consequently jointly maintain the survival of this rule-of-law state?
         4. In fact, our constitutional jurisprudence has in recent years begun to positively affirm that the protection of inmates' fundamental rights is no different from that of the general public. Referring from Grand Justices' Interpretation No. 691 onwards, down to recent Interpretations No. 755 and No. 756, the Court has successively used inmates' constitutionally protected rights of litigation, freedom of expression, and freedom of un-secrecy of correspondence as the basis for reviewing the unconstitutionality of regulations. Furthermore, Interpretation No. 756 explicitly states: "The purpose of laws causing inmates to serve sentences in prison is to enable them to repent and reform and adapt to social life (refer to Article 1 of the Prison Act), rather than to deprive them of all freedom and rights (Note). During their imprisonment, except for the restriction of personal freedom which concomitantly results in the restriction of other freedoms and rights (such as the freedom of residence and change of residence), inmates' constitutional rights entitled to be enjoyed in common with the general public are in principle no different." This sufficiently demonstrates that the principle that "inmates, as subjects of fundamental rights protection, are no different from the general public" has been recognized in practice.
         5. Moreover, apart from the content of constitutional interpretations, the Grand Justices have also extensively expounded upon this in related interpretive opinions. For instance, Judicial Yuan President Justice Hsu Tzong-li (許宗力) stated in his concurring opinion to Interpretation No. 755, in essence: "According to the provisions in the chapters on constitutional rights and duties, the protection of fundamental rights should universally apply to all people without exception, and there should be no distinction in the existence of fundamental rights protection based on different statuses. Therefore, we should hold a fundamental understanding: although an inmate's personal freedom is restricted within the walls of a prison, they are not thereby exiled by the Constitution to become 'outcasts' or 'lawless vagrants' unprotected by fundamental rights; they are merely citizens wearing prison uniforms, not 'non-citizens.' Therefore, based on their status as (uniform-wearing) citizens who equally enjoy constitutional fundamental rights, during their imprisonment, among the various fundamental rights they possess—aside from the restriction of personal freedom and the concomitant natural restriction of other fundamental rights—if the prison wishes to restrict other fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, such restrictions must still meet the constitutional requirements of legitimate objectives and proportionality (Article 23 of the Constitution). For example, censoring letters restricts their freedom of un-secrecy of correspondence; prohibiting family visits restricts their right to family life; applying instruments of restraint restricts their inviolable bodily rights. All of these must comply with the requirements of the constitutional principle of proportionality and may not be arbitrarily imposed. This is a constitutional commandment that the state must faithfully fulfill and may not arbitrarily compromise or abandon." Justice Huang Chao-yuan (黃昭元) likewise stated in his concurring and dissenting opinion to Interpretation No. 756: "Inmates are also human beings, not slaves of the state. The majority opinion proclaims in paragraph 5 of the reasoning: 'During their imprisonment, except for the restriction of personal freedom which concomitantly results in the restriction of other freedoms and rights (such as the freedom of residence and change of residence), inmates' constitutional rights entitled to be enjoyed in common with the general public are in principle no different. Inmates' fundamental rights, such as freedom of un-secrecy of correspondence and freedom of expression, shall still be protected by the Constitution.' This is the first time in the history of interpretations by this Court that such a positive proclamation has been made, establishing that inmates, based on their status as right-holders, in principle continue to enjoy their constitutional rights and do not automatically forfeit constitutional rights other than personal freedom and its concomitant restrictions simply because their status as inmates differs from that of the general public. Behind the iron bars, the Constitution still exists, and the same Constitution remains applicable. This Presiding Judge believes: this is an important proclamation of the legal status of inmates by this Interpretation, and also the most important constitutional significance of this Interpretation." These statements resonate powerfully, highlighting that inmates are likewise subjects of fundamental rights protected by the Constitution, which naturally includes the protection of inmates' right to life. Therefore, this Foundation also anticipates that the Grand Justices will seize the opportunity of the Present Case to once again proclaim the aforementioned intent to the general public. In addition to fulfilling the Grand Justices' function of protecting human rights, this action symbolizes the timely role of the judicial branch in educating the general public.
         6. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the protection of the right to life—including the provision of a minimum standard of living—has repeatedly been affirmed by the Grand Justices. Since inmates are likewise subjects who enjoy the protection of the right to life, it cannot be denied that they also enjoy this performance claim. Consequently, even if inmates live within correctional facilities where fundamental rights are restricted due to the operation of the state's penal power, they should still enjoy protection based on the constitutional right to life, and the state remains under an obligation to provide a standard of living meeting their minimum subsistence level. Justice Hsu Tzong-li also held a positive attitude toward this in the aforementioned opinion, stating: "Based on fundamental rights, aside from defending against arbitrary state infringement, if living conditions within correctional facilities fail to meet basic human needs and infringe upon human dignity—such as lacking sufficient food and drinking water, clean living space, adequate medical and psychological health care, etc.—inmates also have the right to assert against the state the benefit-conferring function of fundamental rights concerning human dignity, requesting the state to provide certain material and service performances. In addition, prison subcultures involving gang associations often exist within correctional facilities, posing a grave threat to inmates' fundamental rights; for example, an inmate's personal freedom, bodily right to be free from physical and mental harm, and human dignity may all be endangered by prison peers. In such cases, the state should also fulfill the protective-obligation function of fundamental rights to ensure that inmates are not infringed upon by third parties."
   2. Aside from the deductions that can be drawn from domestic constitutional scholarship and constitutional review practice that the state bears the obligation to provide inmates with minimum subsistence necessities, related international human rights conventions also extensively expound upon this, including the two Covenants domesticated into domestic law and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners:
      1. In April 2009, our country passed the Enforcement Act of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, domesticating the two Covenants. Among them, the former part of Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) stipulates: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions," and Article 12, Paragraph 1 stipulates: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." These further specifically exemplify the physiological and psychological requirements for the minimum protection of subsistence.
      2. In addition, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) stipulates: "Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality."
      3. Based on this principle, Article 8 of the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1990 also proclaims: "Conditions shall be created enabling prisoners to undertake meaningful remunerated employment which will facilitate their reintegration into the country's labour market and permit them to contribute to their own financial support and to that of their families" [Exhibit A-2]. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 10, Paragraph 1 and the former part of Paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter the ICCPR): "1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person"; "3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation." Additionally, Article 3 of the Enforcement Act of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides: "The application of the provisions of the two Covenants shall be guided by their legislative intent and the interpretations of the Human Rights Committee of the two Covenants."
      4. Moreover, pursuant to the intent of the "General Comment No. 21" issued in 1992 by the aforementioned authoritative interpretation body of the ICCPR, namely the "Human Rights Committee": "Treating all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for their dignity is a basic and universally applicable rule... States parties are invited to indicate in their reports the extent to which they are applying the following United Nations standards for the treatment of prisoners: The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957)..." It can be seen that the said Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (i.e., the Mandela Rules) also indirectly acquires the status of domestic law in our country [Exhibit A-3]. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Enforcement Act of the Two Covenants, its contents naturally possess binding legal force upon all government agencies in our country.
      5. Referring further to the aforementioned Mandela Rules mentioned in the General Comment, Article 103 thereof explicitly stipulates: "1. Every prisoner shall be provided with meaningful employment, as determined by the prison administration. 2. To this end, prisoners shall be permitted to spend at least a part of their earnings on approved articles for their own use and to send a part of their earnings to their family. 3. The system should also provide that a part of the earnings be set aside by the prison administration so as to constitute a savings fund to be handed over to the prisoner on release." From this, it can be understood that for inmates participating in labor work within prisons, the state has an obligation to pay work remuneration in amounts sufficient for inmates to spend on themselves, partially allocate to their families, and use as transition funds after release, so as to comply with a fair remuneration system.
   3. Based on the arguments above, whether derived from historical academic views, interpretations of our constitutional provisions, individual Grand Justices' opinions, or even widely recognized and binding related international regulations, it can be known that the constitutional right to life enjoyed by inmates also encompasses the state's obligation to provide a minimum standard of subsistence. Therefore, it can be affirmed that "the state shall provide inmates with necessities meeting the minimum standard of subsistence" has become a constituent part of fundamental rights protection under our Constitution.
   4. In accordance with the aforementioned constitutional protection intent, in practical operations, the labor obligation and the payment of remuneration under Chapter 5 onwards of the Prison Act shall be paid in amounts that conform to "supporting inmates in enjoying human dignity, a minimum standard of living, and even a commensurate standard of living":
      1. Under our prison system, remuneration is the primary, or even sole, channel for inmates to acquire money to sustain subsistence through their labor:
         1. Pursuant to Article 36, Paragraph 1 of the Prison Act: "Those who participate in work shall be given remuneration." Paragraph 2: "The calculation and provision of the remuneration referred to in the preceding paragraph shall allocate the total amount of remuneration by respective ratios, and calculate the amount to be given by combining the inmate's actual working hours and labor efficiency." Paragraph 3: "Matters relating to the setting of allocation ratios and the distribution of remuneration shall be prescribed by the Ministry of Justice." This is the sole channel for inmates in our correctional facilities to exchange labor for money.
         2. Next, pursuant to Article 46, Paragraph 1 and Article 50, Paragraph 1 of the Prison Act respectively: "To safeguard the physical health of inmates, prisons shall supply food and provide necessary clothing, bedding, items, and other utensils"; "To maintain the quality of medical care for inmates within prisons and provide inpatient or convalescent services, supervisory authorities may establish medical prisons; when necessary, they may be annexed to prisons." That is, although the state must bear the sustenance and medical treatment of inmates during their imprisonment, and daily meal expenses during an inmate's imprisonment are indeed disbursed and allocated under the annual budgetary funding items of the Agency of Corrections, Ministry of Justice, upon examining actual execution by inmates in prison, daily necessities required for maintaining life—such as toilet paper, towels, laundry powder, toothpaste, toothbrush, shampoo, etc.—still need to be purchased at their own expense, and clinic visits in prison also require paying registration fees. The expenses for such daily necessities required to maintain life rely entirely on the remuneration earned by inmates through prison work.
      2. Under the value guidance of the Constitution, the remuneration system should fulfill the function of providing inmates with minimum subsistence necessities, thereby ensuring the protection of inmates' right to life:
         1. Since academic theories, constitutional jurisprudence, and international human rights norms can all be used to deduce the state's obligation to protect inmates in correctional facilities by providing performances meeting minimum subsistence requirements, and remuneration serves as the primary or even sole source for maintaining inmates' living standards within correctional facilities, there is no other alternative if one wishes to ensure that inmates acquire money conforming to minimum subsistence needs.
         2. Therefore, in the regulations and practical operations of criminal correction currently practiced in correctional facilities, the system of "remuneration" must shoulder the function of protecting inmates' minimum standard of living. Consequently, the phrase in the statutory provisions stating that "the calculation and provision of the remuneration shall allocate the total amount of remuneration by respective ratios, and calculate the amount to be given by combining the inmate's actual working hours and labor efficiency" must be interpreted as calculating the amount of remuneration that should be received based on the foundation of money required for the minimum subsistence standard, supplemented by reference factors such as the inmate's actual working hours, so as to conform to the intent of the Constitution to protect the right to life.
         3. Conversely, since the remuneration system bears the function of protecting inmates' right to life, if the performance obtained by inmates from the remuneration system cannot satisfy their minimum standard of living within correctional facilities, one can conclude that the remuneration system evidently possesses unconstitutional doubts. This is because the protection of the right to life that inmates ought to enjoy has been rendered non-existent as a result of the implementation of this system—whether caused by institutional design or practical operation—at which point the remuneration system must be determined to be unconstitutional.
      3. According to the administrative ruling of the competent authority, the amount of the minimum standard of living in correctional facilities is approximately NT$3,000 per month, which at least takes into consideration the intent of the Constitution to protect the right to life:
         1. However, the phrase "minimum standard of living" remains overly abstract, and how to specifically determine it easily gives rise to controversy. If the judicial branch were to make the determination, it might also invite criticisms of disrespecting professional decision-making. Conversely, if the administrative branch operating the remuneration system makes the determination, it might perhaps lead to a more conservative judgment, yet from the perspective of optimal institutional functionality, it should be the least controversial decision-making body.
         2. Upon examining the administrative ruling of the Agency of Corrections, Ministry of Justice, dated June 4, 2018 (Ref. No. Fa-Chiao-Shu-Ch'in-Tzu-10705003180), regarding inmates needing to reserve living requirement expenses due to confiscation, recovery of criminal proceeds, or creditor enforcement, it recommended that the standard amount for monthly living requirement expenses be uniformly adjusted to NT$3,000 regardless of gender [Exhibit A-4]. This standard amount, as stated in Control Yuan Investigation Report 109-Ssu-Tiao-0036, notes: "Inquiries made to the Agency of Corrections, Ministry of Justice, indicate that the scope of considerations for the aforementioned amount includes four major categories: daily necessities, medical drugs, dietary supplements, and other expenses, each amounting to approximately NT$600-800, which was favorably and liberally determined as NT$3,000. Regarding the adjustment mechanism, if the price index growth exceeds 10% in the future (taking the 2018 price index as the baseline, and subsequent years deduced analogously), the reserved amount will be reviewed and raised to reflect price fluctuations in a timely manner." [Exhibit A-5] It can be seen that this is a judgment made by the competent authority based on actual living needs within correctional facilities and should possess reference value.
         3. Nevertheless, in practice, the prison remuneration of inmates has long been far lower than this standard. Referring to Control Yuan Investigation Report 108-Ssu-Tiao-0014, it explicitly records: "In summary, according to current laws and regulations, except for illness, moral education, or where laws provide otherwise, inmates in correctional facilities shall all participate in work. However, according to statistical data, among the 45 correctional facilities nationwide, 35,758 inmates (accounting for 58.4%) are engaged in commissioned processing work, yet their monthly income is extremely meager (as many as 33 correctional facilities have an average monthly remuneration of less than NT$500 for those engaged in commissioned processing work, among which 8 correctional facilities are below NT$200). Compared to only 3,692 inmates (accounting for 6%) engaged in self-operated work, whose average monthly income is many times higher than the remuneration of inmates engaged in commissioned processing work (only 5 correctional facilities have an average monthly remuneration of less than NT$500 for inmates engaged in self-operated work, while those higher than NT$1,000 reach 32 correctional facilities). Not only is the remuneration obtained by inmates excessively disparate, easily breeding feelings of unfairness, but it also fails to comply with Rule 76 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which stipulates that correctional facilities shall establish a fair remuneration system for prisoner work." [Exhibit A-6] The living needs of inmates are evidently unable to be satisfied as a result. Accordingly, it can be established that the remuneration system, as an important mechanism bearing the protection of inmates' right to life, has resulted in a serious infringement upon the constitutionally protected right to life of inmates because it is unable to pay the monetary amount required for inmates' minimum standard of living, thus manifestly exhibiting unconstitutional doubts.
      4. Current administrative court practice has begun to recognize the existence of the aforementioned unreasonable phenomenon and adopts the aforementioned NT$3,000 proposed by the competent authority (the Agency of Corrections, Ministry of Justice) as the "lawful" standard for the remuneration that inmates should receive. For example, Judgment No. 112-Chien-Keng-I-3 of the Taiwan Hualien District Court, which the petitioner in the Present Case separately received, explicitly affirmed: "The administrative ruling of the Agency of Corrections, Ministry of Justice, dated June 4, 2018 (Ref. No. Fa-Chiao-Shu-Ch'in-Tzu-10705003180), regarding inmates needing to reserve living requirement expenses due to confiscation, recovery of criminal proceeds, or creditor enforcement, recommended that the standard amount for monthly living requirement expenses be uniformly adjusted to NT$3,000 regardless of gender. It can be seen that aside from being provided by the state, the daily sustenance of inmates requires reserving NT$3,000 per month to live adequately. Failing to obtain sufficient sustenance and having to bear daily living expenses oneself is, rather than relying on the state's responsibility for relief through correctional facilities, better enabled by making the remuneration obtained from inmates' work commensurate so they can bear it themselves. Therefore, if an inmate's work performance or labor efficiency has reached the statutory qualified standard, at least NT$3,000 in remuneration should be given to pay for daily living expenses that are not fully supplied and must be borne by themselves, so as to maintain their basic human dignity and ensure that their right to life and right to work are not infringed."
      5. By way of further comment, even without considering doubts of violating the protection of the right to life, excessively low remuneration amounts inherently carry the risk of violating human dignity. This is because "establishing human dignity through others' evaluation of one's own labor" has long been a norm in modern social life, and advanced rule-of-law countries mostly enact provisions on minimum wage. Aside from protecting basic labor rights, the purpose also incorporates the implication of preventing people from suffering labor exploitation and the debasement of their human dignity. Although labor within correctional facilities possesses the nature of high state power and cannot universally apply labor laws—including minimum wage provisions—attention should still be paid to preventing excessively low labor remuneration from debasing human dignity. In particular, correctional facilities bear the function of correctional education; if inmates feel their human dignity is debased during labor within correctional facilities due to the excessive depreciation of their labor value, it will in turn affect the fulfillment of the correctional function and may even produce counterproductive effects. Therefore, even apart from the protection of the right to life emphasized as the main axis of this brief, excessively low prison remuneration itself carries the risk of debasing human dignity. The aforementioned Judgment No. 112-Chien-Keng-I-3 of the Taiwan Hualien District Court took this as the core axis of its judgment and offered admonishing advice: "Giving excessively low labor remuneration is not only an exploitation of labor freedom and a squeezing of labor value, but also a debasement and insult to personal dignity. Although the work of inmates is based on correctional treatment for the execution of punishment, belonging to a public law relationship and excluding the application of the Labor Standards Act, the minimum wage stipulated by the Labor Standards Act is already the lowest possible remuneration condition for ordinary citizens. Therefore, even under the guise of a public law relationship, although the remuneration given may differ from the minimum wage, it cannot differ too much; otherwise, it risks reducing the labor of inmates to slavery, which should not be tolerated by a civilized rule-of-law state." This is well worth our reference.
      6. In summary, the current remuneration system within the Prison Act plunges inmates into the dilemma of being unable to satisfy their minimum standard of living through their own efforts while inside correctional facilities—a fact acknowledged even by the competent authority. Whether viewed from the perspective of our Constitution protecting the right to life, or drawing lessons from discussions and practices in related international human rights law, the dilemma of meager remuneration faced by inmates in our country is manifestly unreasonable and even raises unconstitutional doubts. As admonished in the aforementioned Judgment No. 112-Chien-Keng-I-3 of the Taiwan Hualien District Court regarding excessively low prison remuneration: "How to enable inmates to repent and reform? Fundamentally, it is first necessary to enable inmates to establish an awareness of self-esteem and self-respect. A person who looks down on themselves and lacks self-esteem cannot reform. Society's evaluation of an individual is, to a greater or lesser degree, measured by their labor value. Paying labor remuneration at a consideration close to slave labor debases a person's labor value, which is to debase their survival value and personal value. Private contracts prohibit the exploitation or debasement of others' labor value, and performance administration by the state based on public law relations permits it even less. Providing working conditions sufficient to debase labor value not only fails to achieve the purpose of 'social reintegration' enabling inmates to re-adapt to social life, but is sufficient to plunge them into a vicious cycle of personality degradation and self-abandonment. If the planning of inmate work content still fails to achieve an economic level meeting basic living needs within prison, is it not an unlawful treatment measure that strikes at the self-confidence, self-esteem, and sound values of inmates regarding their social reintegration? The constitutional interpretation reasons, international covenant contents, or views of the German Federal Constitutional Court raised by the plaintiff should have already provided the answer." This is truly worthy of our profound reflection.
3. The above is respectfully submitted to the Grand Justices for examination.

To
The Constitutional Court

[Name and Number of Exhibits] (All Photocopies)

Exhibit A-1: Wu Keng, Interpretation and Application of the Constitution, 3rd ed., pp. 271-272 (excerpted).
Exhibit A-2: Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. res. 45/111, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 200, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990).
Exhibit A-3: Sun Chien-chih, On the Implementation of International Human Rights Conventions from the Perspective of Legal Dogmatics - Also Reviewing Criminal Ruling No. 107-An-107 of the Taiwan High Court (Part 1), Judicial Weekly, Issue No. 1961.
Exhibit A-4: Agency of Corrections, Ministry of Justice, Ref. No. Fa-Chiao-Shu-Ch'in-Tzu-10705003180, June 4, 2018.
Exhibit A-5: Control Yuan Investigation Report 109-Ssu-Tiao-0036.
Exhibit A-6: Control Yuan Investigation Report 108-Ssu-Tiao-0014

September 18, 2023

[End of Brief Follows]