Op-Ed | Supervisory Responsibility for Judicial Heads Cannot Rely on Personal Conscience: The Judges Act Needs to Be Amended

Since the Judges Act was amended in 2019, members of the public have been permitted to request individual evaluations of judges and prosecutors directly from the relevant evaluation committees. However, over the following four years or so, only one citizen-requested case was found substantiated by the Judicial Evaluation Committee and referred for disciplinary proceedings, while the Prosecutor Evaluation Committee had none. Faced with such figures, many people naturally ask: Have judges and prosecutors truly improved, or has the system simply become unable to identify unfit personnel?

Of course, among cases initiated not by individual citizens but by institutions, nine cases from the Judicial Evaluation Committee and ten cases from the Prosecutor Evaluation Committee were referred for disciplinary proceedings. The Judicial Evaluation Committee therefore noted in its report marking the third anniversary of the amended system that, although few "citizen-requested" cases had resulted in substantiated findings, the system still performed an "indirect function"—encouraging judicial administrators with supervisory responsibilities to proactively address problematic individual cases and thereby creating a broader deterrent effect.

Indeed, official supervision is crucial. Insiders who are willing to expose wrongdoing can often act far more efficiently than external monitors. But in reality, is anyone truly willing to do so?

Why Are People Only Now Willing to Deal with the "Black Sheep"?

Over the past thirty years, unfit judges and prosecutors exposed by civil society organizations were often criticized for "poor attitudes." Today, however, "attitude" alone is no longer the issue of greatest public concern. More often, what truly disappoints the public is "quality"—especially the quality of adjudication, which is difficult to supervise from outside the judiciary.

This is also where disputes over judicial evaluation most often arise: What falls within the "core of adjudication" and is therefore beyond the reach of supervision?

A recently issued judgment by the Disciplinary Court's Court of the Judiciary, Judgment 114-Su-1 (2025), offered important guidance on the meaning of the "core of adjudication." The plaintiff, Judge Yao Guimei, had for a long period been inefficient in handling cases. For example, between January and September 2024, the average time she took to dispose of supplementary civil cases bearing the "Bu" case designation was nearly four times that of other judges in the civil division of the same court. One case was delayed for as long as 222 days. These problems seriously affected case progress and the rights of the parties, yet she argued that such matters fell within the core of adjudication and should not be subject to supervision.

The Disciplinary Court rejected this argument and drew a clear distinction: the "core of adjudication" refers to matters in which judges exercise independent judicial discretion in accordance with law and therefore may not be interfered with. By contrast, matters concerning the "external order" of judicial work may properly be subject to supervisory measures by officials vested with authority over judicial administration. The court held that the measures imposed by the Keelung District Court on Judge Yao did not infringe the guarantee of judicial independence.

Regrettably, Judge Yao had served as a judge for more than twenty years, and the problems at issue were not new. Had it not been for Judge Chen Yaling, who became president of the Keelung District Court and proactively initiated official supervision, the matter might still have gone unaddressed. Could previous court presidents truly have failed to notice? Did colleagues never pay attention? Was there really no internal discussion? The problem may not have been a failure to discover the issue, but rather a choice "not to deal with it."

Is There Systemic Support for Judicial Leaders Who Have the Courage to Exercise Official Supervision?

Court President Chen Yaling, who proactively issued written warnings and other supervisory measures concerning Judge Yao Guimei, had previously referred Judge Chou Ching-ni—who had repeatedly become embroiled in controversy and had been absent from work for extended periods—for disciplinary proceedings while Chen was serving as president of the Miaoli District Court. Chou was ultimately removed from judicial office and barred from public service for three years. The Judicial Evaluation Committee had previously handled her conduct in Decisions 110-Ping-3 and 111-Ping-3. Chen did not evade responsibility or shield colleagues, yet media reports later suggested that she had come under considerable pressure and was considering early retirement.

Such an outcome inevitably raises a question: Does the judicial system truly support and encourage leaders who are willing to take responsibility?

At present, the Judges Act provides only limited safeguards concerning the selection, evaluation, and removal of judicial leaders who bear official supervisory responsibilities. As early as 2020, after the major disciplinary scandal involving former senior judge Shih Mu-chin, the Judicial Reform Foundation proposed draft amendments to the Judges Act, arguing that court presidents and chief prosecutors should be expressly required to possess professional competence and integrity worthy of emulation, while also establishing mechanisms for removing unfit judicial administrators.

Most importantly, the draft also expressly provided that judicial leaders have a responsibility to proactively supervise misconduct by judges or prosecutors under their authority, including violations of judicial ethics. The purpose was to institutionalize society's expectation that judicial leaders actively exercise official supervision, so that those willing to pursue reform and address problems would no longer remain a small minority.

After all, rumors, evaluations, and performance concerns involving problematic judges are often no secret within the judiciary. Supervision should not intervene only after an incident occurs; it must be institutionalized and regularized so that problems can be prevented before they escalate.

In mid-July, the Judicial Evaluation Committee announced its decision concerning Taipei District Court Judge Wang Xiuhui, who had pressured a complainant to appear in court by threatening the possibility of compulsory appearance. Years earlier, while serving at the Taoyuan District Court, Judge Wang had already been subjected to official supervision after abruptly ordering a defendant detained without first advising the defendant of the relevant detention rights and loudly berating the defendant after the defendant refused to plead guilty. Yet in the more recent case, the Judicial Evaluation Committee again concluded that disciplinary action was unnecessary and referred the matter only for official supervision. Leaving aside the weakness of the evaluation system itself, if so much responsibility is being placed on official supervision, how can that mechanism be strengthened?

From the 2024 sexual-harassment allegations involving a presiding judge at the Shilin District Court, the disciplinary scandal involving a former head of the Disciplinary Court, and the workplace-bullying controversy at the Tainan District Court, to the recent case involving Judge Yao, it is not difficult to see that strengthening the official supervisory responsibilities of judicial leaders has become an urgent priority.

The Legislative Yuan's current session has been extended until the end of August, and the next session will soon begin. We hope there will be an opportunity to address major legislation affecting public trust in the judiciary—particularly by placing amendments to the Judges Act on the priority agenda and comprehensively strengthening the supervisory responsibilities of judicial leaders. This would ensure that leaders willing to take responsibility no longer have to fight alone, but instead receive institutional support and protection. Otherwise, we will remain unable to effectively remove unfit judges and prosecutors.

This article was published on July 28, 2025, on ETtoday News Cloud.