Clarifying Issues Related to Minimum-Security Prisons Following the Police Officer Homicide Case

 

On August 22, 2022, two police officers in Taiwan were stabbed to death by a suspect while pursuing a car-theft case. The suspect seized a police firearm and fled, causing an immense shock to Taiwanese society. Under an all-out manhunt by the police, the suspect was arrested the very next day. Media disclosures revealed that the suspect was Lin Hsin-wu, an escaped inmate from the Mingteh Minimum-Security Prison, which subsequently triggered a wave of further reports and questioning concerning "minimum-security prisons."

Because correctional institutions are generally difficult for the public to access, some reports and queries are at times erroneous or fail to grasp the core of the issue.

The Judicial Reform Foundation (JRF) has previously authored "Correctional Institution Encyclopedia: What on Earth is a 'Minimum-Security Prison'? The Current Status and Issues of Taiwan's Minimum-Security Prisons" (監所小百科：「外役監」揪竟是什麼？台灣外役監的現狀與問題), and also held the "Symposium on Progressive Treatment and Minimum-Security Prison System Reform" in November 2019. To ensure that public discussions regarding minimum-security prisons are grounded in correct factual foundations and grasp major controversies, the JRF has re-examined relevant literature and Legislative Yuan legislative records, consulted experts and scholars, and compiled and explained some common questions from the incident to the present in order to clarify controversies.
 

I. Why do "minimum-security prisons" exist? Would it be better to simply abolish them?

Within a week of the police homicide case, members of the public proposed the abolition of minimum-security prisons on the Public Policy Network Participation Platform, arguing that their original purpose was to allow inmates to turn over a new leaf, but it is difficult to guard against inmates "putting on a good act" in regular prisons and then seizing the opportunity to escape once transferred to a minimum-security prison. To prevent such situations from recurring, minimum-security prisons should be abolished. Reports also pointed out that compared to regular prisons, the number of escapes from minimum-security prisons is nearly five times higher, raising potential security concerns.

Minimum-security prisons allow inmates to work and even return home without the surveillance of prison personnel and without wearing handcuffs or leg irons. This mode of operation differs drastically from regular prisons, where inmates spend almost all day indoors and cannot leave the protective sight of prison personnel, making minimum-security prisons carry a higher risk of escape compared to regular prisons. Then, compared to regular prisons, why did the government originally believe there was a necessity to establish minimum-security prisons, and what were their purposes?
 

1. What is the purpose of establishing minimum-security prisons?

   The Control Yuan Investigation Report (111 Judicial Investigation 0022), "An Exploration of the Implementation Performance of Minimum-Security Prisons," points out that provisions such as the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates, Regulations on Home Visits for Minimum-Security Prison Inmates, Statute for the Progressive Execution of Sentences, and Regulations on the Granting of Remuneration for Prison and Detention Center Work, take the ultimate goal of correctional education as reintegration into society, positioning them as low-management correctional institutions. The greatest purpose and value of a minimum-security prison is to allow selected inmates to gradually adapt to the world outside the prison within an intermediate treatment environment, and to have the opportunity for home visits in accordance with the law, thereby strengthening family connections, reducing maladjustment after returning to society, and further lowering the possibility of recidivism.

   Citing relevant literature, the Control Yuan pointed out that in closed facilities, inmates must accept strict rules, habits, and obedience to the prison system, surviving only by psychologically adapting to this system; inmates must learn formal and informal specific behavioral rules to adapt to prison subculture. Although inmates can live under restricted conditions, their ability to live independently in the community is very poor, and the longer the sentence, the more entrenched their adaptation to the prison lifestyle becomes. Compared to absolutely closed prisons, open prisons are more inclusive and humanized, considered an alternative model to traditional prisons. Many countries have implemented open prisons, including the United Kingdom, India, and Spain, among others. Open prisons utilize various treatment programs and employment opportunities within the prison grounds or communities to maintain the quality of facilities, thereby providing more "meaningful" rehabilitative support.

   In short, the closed operational model of regular prisons forces inmates to psychologically adapt to the prison subculture, weakening their independent living skills and hindering their return to society. In contrast, minimum-security prisons adopt low-level management, allowing inmates to gradually adapt to the outside world and reduce the likelihood of recidivism. In other words, if the vast majority of inmates will eventually return to society, there must inevitably be some phased treatment programs in existence, and minimum-security prisons are one such type; another even more common type is actually parole with protective supervision. Without these phased treatment programs, if inmates released upon completion of their sentences commit crimes again due to an inability to adapt to social life, society may become even less safe as a result.
    

2. What is the effectiveness of minimum-security prisons?

   The current purpose of establishing minimum-security prisons is the belief that they are better able to assist inmates in reintegrating into society and reducing recidivism compared to regular prisons. Although they carry a higher risk of escape, upon weighing the pros and cons, it is still deemed necessary for them to exist. The above is the theoretical justification for the necessity of minimum-security prisons; what is the empirical basis for this explanation?

   The Control Yuan Investigation Report (111 Judicial Investigation 0022), "An Exploration of the Implementation Performance of Minimum-Security Prisons," is currently the latest literature collected and organized regarding the implementation performance of minimum-security prisons. According to the research reviewed in the investigation report that discusses the effectiveness of minimum-security prison implementation, the treatment efficacy of minimum-security prisons is affirmed. Unfortunately, when discussing whether specific treatments are evidence-based, it is generally recommended to adopt research designs at or above the quasi-experimental design level, yet the research designs adopted by existing studies do not meet the rigor required by the aforementioned evidence level.

   During the 2017 National Confederation on Judicial Reform, Fifth Division, one resolution recommended expanding the application of autonomous work outside the prison. The nature of autonomous work outside the prison is similar to that of minimum-security prisons, allowing inmates to go out to work unaccompanied by prison personnel. In the resolution and explanatory notes for issue 5-4 of the National Confederation on Judicial Reform concerning "Expanding the Application of Autonomous Work Outside the Prison," the explanatory notes state: "The implementation of autonomous work outside the prison may encounter certain social pressures—namely, the fear that inmates will take the opportunity to escape or even re-offend. The demands of 'zero escapes' and 'zero recidivism' will be a restrictive constraint on autonomous work outside the prison, and should someone take advantage of autonomous work outside the prison to escape or re-offend, the entire policy could be upended. Therefore, if possible, we suggest that the Agency of Corrections should scientifically evaluate the cost-effectiveness of autonomous work outside the prison and present the results to the general public. Because slots for autonomous work outside the prison are currently limited, a selection process is bound to occur; under the same qualifications or conditions, some individuals may be able to participate in autonomous work outside the prison while others may not. Consequently, a quasi-experimental method can be utilized to compare whether individuals with similar qualifications and conditions who participate in autonomous work outside the prison differ from those who do not in terms of subsequent recidivism rates, employment status, interpersonal connections, and other directions..." It is suggested that future research on the effectiveness of minimum-security prisons may reference the explanations in the aforementioned judicial reform conference resolution to examine the effectiveness of minimum-security prisons using more rigorous research designs.
    

II. What are the selection criteria for minimum-security prison inmates?

Following the police homicide case, criticisms regarding minimum-security prisons mostly focused on the "selection criteria for minimum-security prison inmates." Below are several common criticisms concerning selection criteria collected after the incident.
 

1. Did the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) forcibly amend the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons to relax selection qualifications and allow recidivists into minimum-security prisons, thereby enabling the prolific offender Lin Hsin-wu to be selected for one?

   In 2020, Article 4 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons was amended to relax qualifications, allowing recidivists "whose previously executed prior convictions were all sentenced to imprisonment for fixed terms of six months or less" to also participate in minimum-security prison selection. Some media outlets and public submissions argued that it was precisely due to the relaxation of this selection threshold that prolific offenders like Lin Hsin-wu were able to serve their sentences in a minimum-security prison.^[1]

   First, it must be explained that the definition of a "recidivist" under our country's Criminal Code is quite different from the concept of a "prolific offender" as imagined by the general public. Current recidivism regulations in our country can be found in Article 47, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code: "A person who, within five years after the execution of a sentence of imprisonment has been completed or after a partial execution has been pardoned, intentionally commits a crime punishable by imprisonment for a definite term or heavier again shall be a recidivist, and the punishment prescribed for the subsequent crime may be increased up to one-half." If crimes are committed before the execution of a prison sentence is completed, even if many crimes were committed, they do not constitute a recidivist as defined by the Criminal Code. Generally speaking, whether a person constitutes a recidivist is declared concurrently with the judgment of the case at hand.

   Upon reviewing Lin Hsin-wu's judgment, he did indeed commit multiple offenses, but he was not a "recidivist." Therefore, strictly speaking, restricting or relaxing whether recidivists may participate in minimum-security prison selection is completely unrelated to whether Lin Hsin-wu was eligible to participate in minimum-security prison selection.

   Regarding the amendments to Article 4 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons to relax participation in minimum-security prison selection for certain types of recidivists, there have actually been two historical instances, both of which were related to problems produced in practice by the concept of "recidivism."

   Earliest on, the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons stipulated that any recidivist was barred from participating in minimum-security prison selection. However, because our country's early definition of a recidivist did not exclude prior offenses that were negligent crimes, the 1994 amendment to the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons held that recidivists resulting from renewed negligent crimes, lacking the intent to re-offend, should be permitted to be selected to serve sentences in minimum-security prisons. Consequently, the rule was relaxed to allow recidivists through renewed negligent crimes to participate in minimum-security prison selection. Subsequently, the major overhaul of the Criminal Code in 2006 changed the elements of recidivism from "A person who, within five years after the execution of a sentence of imprisonment has been completed, or after a partial execution of a sentence of life imprisonment or imprisonment has been pardoned, commits a crime punishable by imprisonment for a definite term or heavier again..." to "A person who, within five years after the execution of a sentence of imprisonment has been completed or after a partial execution has been pardoned, intentionally commits a crime punishable by imprisonment for a definite term or heavier again..." To align with this amendment, the 2014 Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons removed the wording "except for those who commit crimes again through negligence."

   On February 2, 2019, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 775 declared part of Article 47, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional. The Grand Justices held that increasing the minimum statutory penalty for recidivists indiscriminately without regard to circumstances may cause the punishment suffered by an offender in certain individual cases to exceed the culpability they ought to bear. According to the explanation by Plain Law Movement, the constitutional interpretation petitioner A:

   ...was previously sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment for the "offense of unsafe driving." However, he later received a "military education muster order," which is probably the nightmare of all men—a muster order meaning that even after completing military service, you may still receive this order and must report for training at a military district near your home. Yes, because it was troublesome, A did not intend to report back, thus violating the Statute Governing Punishment for Offenses Against Military Duty, which carries a sentence of imprisonment of three years or less. But because he violated this offense less than a year after finishing his prison sentence, he was clearly a "recidivist" whose punishment should be increased, facing imprisonment of up to 4 years and 6 months.
   The Grand Justices held that "increased punishment for recidivism (Article 47 of the Criminal Code)" is unconstitutional! Because this regulation completely ignores "differing circumstances in individual cases." For example, there really is someone who is a "recidivist," but after reviewing the case, the judge finds that the circumstances of this "subsequent offense" are actually not serious at all, and very much wants to hand down a lighter sentence, or even just a "fine commutable to imprisonment" or "social labor." Yet under the current regulation, the statutory penalty is forcibly raised, highly likely resulting in a judge being forced to imprison someone who committed a minor offense and didn't necessarily need to go to prison! This could cause offenders to bear excessive punishment. Therefore, the Grand Justices held that the part concerning the "increase of the minimum statutory penalty" violates the principle of proportionality and the principle of culpability, and is thus unconstitutional!

   Interpretation No. 775 did not directly declare the recidivism provision unconstitutional; it only declared unconstitutional the part that indiscriminately increased the minimum statutory penalty regardless of circumstances. The practical result of this in practice is that as long as the elements of Article 47, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code are met—namely, "A person who, within five years after the execution of a sentence of imprisonment has been completed or after a partial execution has been pardoned, intentionally commits a crime punishable by imprisonment for a definite term or heavier again"—courts will declare someone a recidivist regardless of circumstances, but will deliberate on the circumstances to decide whether to increase the minimum statutory penalty.

   Taking constitutional interpretation petitioner A as an example, if he were sentenced after Interpretation No. 775 was issued, he would still be determined to be a recidivist, just without an increased minimum statutory penalty. Consequently, an unresolved problem remained: some individuals are determined to be recidivists, but their prior offenses involved minor circumstances and lacked a connection to the subsequent offense.

   In the 2020 amendment to Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, Subparagraph 3 of the scope of ineligible persons was revised to: "Recidivists. However, this shall not apply if the previously executed prior convictions were all sentences of imprisonment for fixed terms of six months or less." The legislative rationale was: "Under the original Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, the blanket prohibition against recidivists being selected as minimum-security prison inmates may not align with the intent of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 775 and modern penological principles. Therefore, incorporating minor recidivists from prior sentencing into selection qualifications during sentence execution is appropriate." This amendment indeed aligns with the direction of Interpretation No. 775 and further addresses the issues not fully resolved by Interpretation No. 775.

   Regarding the 2020 amendment to Article 4 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, Legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin (徐巧芯) mentioned that both the New Power Party and the Kuomintang (KMT) had attempted to make the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons stricter, but it was ultimately passed by the DPP using its numerical advantage to relax selection qualifications. Referring to the legislative records at the time, the actual situation was more as follows:

   • The addition of the proviso regarding recidivists in Article 4, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 3 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons was indeed proposed by DPP legislators, and this case was supported by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). In addition, KMT legislators did speak up, stating: "Regardless of whether it is a minor offense or a serious offense, he is a recidivist. If he is truly capable of being reformed, he should not be a recidivist," thereby opposing the addition of the proviso. Because no one raised objections during the second reading, there is no voting record for this amendment. In reality, however, the addition of this recidivist proviso has absolutely nothing to do with Lin Hsin-wu being able to participate in minimum-security prison selection, because Lin Hsin-wu's offense did not meet the elements of a recidivist under the Criminal Code.

   • The New Power Party's proposed amendment primarily sought to add that "those who commit offenses under the Anti-Corruption Act or major economic crimes whose criminal proceeds that should be confiscated or recovered by law have not yet been recovered" are barred from participating in minimum-security prison selection. The rationale was: "The practice of the current minimum-security prison system often devolves into powerful political figures and tycoons enjoying privileges under the current prison administration system after committing offenses under the Anti-Corruption Act or major economic crimes, severely undermining the realization of fair justice values and public trust in the criminal justice system." The reason for narrowing eligibility was unrelated to recidivism risk; it was primarily to severely punish those who commit offenses under the Anti-Corruption Act or major economic crimes. In this case, the MOJ considered it referenceable, but noted that offenses under the Anti-Corruption Act vary in scale and economic crimes may also have issues of magnitude, so it recommended against an absolute blanket exclusion; instead, it suggested prescribing how to determine genuine repentance and the proportion of recovered criminal proceeds within the authorized selection regulations. During the bill's voting, most DPP legislators voted against it, while KMT legislators abstained. However, the key to this case—namely, requiring the MOJ to establish specific determination criteria for "genuine repentance" for inmates convicted of corruption and major economic crimes—was embodied in a supplementary resolution proposed by the DPP, which passed without objection. It must be pointed out, however, that public data available at present does not reveal the impact of this supplementary resolution on selection criteria.

   • The KMT's proposed amendment actually sought to exclude perpetrators of Article 235 (offenses of distributing, selling, and manufacturing or holding obscene articles), Article 315-1 (offenses of interference with privacy), and Article 315-2 (offense of profiting from interference with privacy) of the Criminal Code from the scope of minimum-security prison selection. The primary reason for narrowing eligibility was likewise not recidivism risk, but the belief that the clandestine recording and dissemination of sexually private images should be severely punished. The MOJ did not support this amendment, mainly feeling that the penalties could be further weighed to avoid imbalances. During the bill's voting, most DPP legislators voted against it, while New Power Party legislators were absent from the vote. Nonetheless, examining the text of this proposed amendment reveals that it was indeed not yet fully mature, because the subjects regulated by Articles 235, 315-1, and 315-2 of the Criminal Code are not limited to the surreptitious recording and dissemination of sexually private images; thus, there was an incomplete correspondence between the content of the amended provisions and the intended purpose.

   In summary, the matters that various parties believed should be relaxed or tightened in the 2020 amendment to Article 4 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons were entirely unrelated to whether Lin Hsin-wu could be selected for a minimum-security prison. As for the KMT caucus's separate questioning suggesting that this amendment was tailor-made for a specific individual who had committed a minor offense constituting recidivism (Li Ching-fu), such circumstances cannot be confirmed from the legislative records and await investigation by prosecutors and investigators.
    

2. Who on earth amended the law to allow parole-revoked offenders and those with other pending cases to all go to minimum-security prisons?

   KMT Legislator Yeh Yu-lan (葉毓蘭) questioned: Who amended the law to relax qualifications so that parole-revoked offenders and those with other pending cases could go to minimum-security prisons? She accused the DPP of wielding its absolute majority to do as it pleased, bearing unshirkable blame!^[2] However, looking back at the amendment history of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, the facts are as follows:

   • Can parole-revoked offenders go to minimum-security prisons? When the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons was enacted in 1962, "parole-revoked offenders" were not excluded from minimum-security prison selection. They were only excluded during the 1994 amendment to the statute. They have not been relaxed to participate in minimum-security prison selection since then. Under current law, parole-revoked offenders are fundamentally ineligible to participate in minimum-security prison selection, and the relevant legislative amendments have nothing to do with Lin Hsin-wu being able to participate in it either.

   • Can those with other pending cases go to minimum-security prisons?
     • The statutory basis for authorization of implementation measures was added to Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons in 1994, leading to the enactment of the Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates. Article 3, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 5 of these measures stipulated that "not having other pending cases under investigation or trial" was one of the requirements for participating in minimum-security prison selection—marking the first explicit exclusion of individuals with other pending cases from participating in selection.

     • During the full amendment of the Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates in 2014, the restriction on individuals with other pending cases participating in selection was relocated to Article 2, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 5. On July 6, 2016, Article 3, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 5 of the measures was amended to: "The current case involves execution following arrest by a warrant, and there are other criminal cases concurrently under investigation or trial." Subsequently, on October 11 of the same year, the restriction on individuals with other pending cases participating in minimum-security prison selection was deleted. This amendment was handled by the MOJ in accordance with a resolution of the 6th plenary meeting of the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee of the Legislative Yuan's 9th Congress, 1st Session. The resolution stated: "Whether an inmate has other criminal cases under investigation or trial bears no relation whatsoever to whether they show genuine repentance and whether their physical and mental health is suitable for minimum-security prison work. The aforementioned measures have clearly exceeded the scope of authorization by the parent statute and added restrictions not provided by law, which not only fails to align with the policy objective currently promoted by the MOJ to increase the number of minimum-security prison inmates, but also effectively punishes and deters inmates from exercising their right to litigation to file for a retrial when they raise a retrial advantageous to their interests. Furthermore, regarding the circumstance where an inmate has another case still under investigation, no indictment has even been brought yet, and yet this excludes the inmate from participating in minimum-security prison selection, which also runs counter to the presumption of innocence." The proposer was a DPP legislator, and the cosigners were originally DPP legislators as well, though KMT legislators subsequently joined as cosigners. During the discussion of this case, no divergence of opinions due to different political party affiliations was apparent.

     • Although the October 11, 2016 amendment to the Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates deleted the restriction on individuals with other pending cases participating in selection, the amendment's rationale also explained that based on the needs of guard safety management, selection operations, and procedures in minimum-security prisons, the review item for inmates showing "genuine repentance" was substantively added and the selection review benchmark table was amended. In the amended selection review benchmark table, the review item questioning whether an inmate "currently has other criminal cases under investigation or trial that pose a risk of disrupting guard safety" was added under the dimension of "guard risk." In short, although individuals with other pending cases were no longer explicitly excluded from minimum-security prison selection after October 11, 2016, an assessment is still made during the selection review based on whether the inmate 'currently has other criminal cases under investigation or trial that pose a risk of disrupting guard safety.' Finally, Lin Hsin-wu did not have other pending cases; his eligibility to participate in minimum-security prison selection was unrelated to the relevant amendments here.

3. Who on earth amended the law to lower the progressive treatment threshold for minimum-security prison selection from Grade 2 to Grade 3, and even lacked restrictions for long-term prisoners?

   Lin Hsin-wu's 應執行刑 sentence to be executed was 8 years and 4 months. After serving just over a year with 6 years remaining on his sentence, he was transferred to the Mingteh Minimum-Security Prison.

   KMT Legislator Yeh Yu-lan questioned: Who amended the law to relax the progressive treatment from the original Grade 2 down to Grade 3, or even left sentences under seven years unrestricted? She accused the DPP of wielding its absolute majority to do as it pleased, bearing unshirkable blame!

   In addition, reports pointed out that DPP Legislator Lo Chih-cheng (羅致政) believed that prior to 2014, one of the provisions governing minimum-security prison selection stipulated a remaining prison term of less than 5 years or 5 years or more with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 2 or above, but the KMT pushed for legislative amendments to relax this to prison terms under 7 years, or prison terms exceeding 7 years but under 15 years with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 3 or above, questioning whether the KMT-pushed amendments were the reason Lin Hsin-wu was able to be selected for a minimum-security prison.

   The fact that Lin Hsin-wu could be selected for a minimum-security prison after serving a little over a year with 6 years remaining on his sentence is indeed related to the 2014 relaxation of the progressive treatment grade for selection participants in the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons. A comparison of the amended provisions is shown in the table below:

   Article 4, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the 2014 Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons	Article 4, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the 1994 Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons
   A prison term of seven years or less, or a prison term exceeding seven years but under fifteen years with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 3 or above, or a prison term of fifteen years or more with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 2 or above. Progressive treatment for life imprisonment must advance to Grade 1.	A prison term of less than five years, or a prison term of five years or more with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 2 or above. For life imprisonment, execution has reached eight years, or detention prior to the final judgment of life imprisonment exceeded three years and execution has reached seven years, with progressive treatment having advanced to Grade 1 in both instances.

   At that time, the KMT was the ruling party and held the parliamentary majority, and the DPP did not possess a majority advantage in legislative seats. However, referring to the legislative records of the Legislative Yuan, the relevant proposers of this amendment included both KMT and DPP legislators; this amendment cannot be solely attributed to the KMT. Moreover, the MOJ also considered that this amendment balanced the effectiveness of correctional treatment with risk management and fulfilled the functional orientation of minimum-security prisons. Thus, this amendment was passed under a situation where the ruling and opposition parties shared the same direction and the MOJ deemed it feasible.

   However, the phenomenon pointed out by Legislator Yeh Yu-lan—namely, that Lin Hsin-wu was sentenced to over 8 years in prison and selected for a minimum-security prison after serving just over a year—indeed runs counter to the primary purpose for which minimum-security prisons were established today: "implementing phased treatment." Starting from the concept of "phased treatment," transfer to a minimum-security prison should occur in the later stages of execution, focusing primarily on helping inmates prepare to return to society. This is related to the shifting positioning of minimum-security prisons in our country's history (which was originally not based on the goal of implementing phased treatment) and a failure to clarify differing directional orientations such as prison labor, open treatment in individual treatments, and intermediate prisons. For related discussions, see the article by scholar Lin Cheng-yu (林政佑), "An Exploration of the Positioning of Minimum-Security Prisons".
    

4. Robbers can apply for minimum-security prisons—is the threshold for minimum-security prisons simply too low?

   Lin Hsin-wu entered prison after committing robbery and other offenses. Members of the public and legislators raised widespread questions: robbers can apply for minimum-security prisons—is the threshold for minimum-security prisons simply too low?

   Reviewing the amendment history of our country's Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, earlier versions directly excluded individuals convicted of robbery from participating in minimum-security prison selection. It was only after the 1994 amendment to the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons that individuals convicted of robbery were permitted to participate in selection. However, being able to participate in selection does not mean one will definitely go to a minimum-security prison, because there are other selection review requirements.

   Article 4 of the 1994 Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons

   Article 4 of the 1978 Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons

   Inmates of minimum-security prisons shall be selected by the supervisory agency from among inmates of various prisons who meet the following provisions: 1. Having served an execution of imprisonment exceeding two months. 2. Having a prison term of less than five years, or five years or more with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 2 or above. For life imprisonment, execution has reached eight years, or detention prior to the final judgment of life imprisonment exceeded three years and execution has reached seven years, with progressive treatment having advanced to Grade 1 in both instances. 3. Showing genuine repentance, with physical and mental health suitable for minimum-security prison work. Inmates with any of the following circumstances shall not be selected: 1. Committing an offense under Article 161 of the Criminal Code, Paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 9 of the Suppression of Smuggling and Opium Poisoning Statute, or Subparagraph 4, Paragraph 2 of Article 13-1 of the Narcotic Drugs Control Statute. 2. Recidivists. However, this shall not apply to those who commit crimes again through negligence. 3. Parole revocation due to crime. 4. Having mandatory labor or reformatory education disposition pending execution. The selection under Paragraph 1 shall be decided by the selection committee with reference to the inmates' wishes. Selection measures shall be prescribed by the Ministry of Justice.

   Inmates of minimum-security prisons shall be selected by the supervisory agency from among inmates of various prisons who meet the following provisions: 1. Having served an execution of imprisonment exceeding three months, having applied progressive treatment, and having a remaining prison term of nine months or more. 2. Not having committed the offenses of rebellion, treason, robbery, opium poisoning, plunder, or offenses under Articles 223, 271, and 272 of the Criminal Code. 3. Not being a recidivist and not having been subjected to a mandatory labor disposition. 4. Physically healthy, of good conduct, or possessing specialized skills suitable for minimum-security prison work. When an inmate is transferred to a minimum-security prison to serve a sentence, their identity register and related case data shall be transferred simultaneously; the same applies when sent to other prisons for any reason.

   Referring to the Legislative Yuan legislative records concerning the 1994 amendment to the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, the amendment at that time was not simply a relaxation of the selection scope; rather, an adjustment was made to the regulatory method of the selection scope. The rationale for the amendment states: "Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the current Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons regulates by crime name, which is not entirely reasonable; it is therefore changed to regulate by prison term, using three years as the boundary..." and "Minimum-security prisons are low-management, open correctional institutions. To avoid affecting guard management, the prison term must be less than three years as one of the selection qualifications, whereas those with prison terms of three years or more should generally not be selected. However, for those whose progressive treatment has advanced to Grade 2 or above, in order to encourage reform and cooperate with the parole system to facilitate the smooth reintegration of inmates into society, selection is also permitted, and this is explicitly stipulated in Subparagraph 2."

   In other words, at that time, Article 4, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons was changed to determine guard risk based on the length of the prison term—shorter prison terms carried lower guard risk. For longer prison terms, selection was generally barred, but if progressive treatment had advanced to Grade 2, it indicated that the inmate could comply with prison rules, allowing the conclusion that guard risk had decreased, thus permitting their participation in selection. As for the original Article 4, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2, the practice of directly excluding perpetrators of certain crimes from the scope of minimum-security prison selection was retained and relocated to Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 1.

   The 1994 amendment to the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons relaxed qualifications to allow certain inmates who were originally directly excluded from minimum-security prison selection due to their crime names to participate in selection; this direction is understandable. Because even under the same crime name, specific behaviors can still vary considerably. Taking the crime of homicide as an example, there are also cases such as long-term care family-caregiver homicide tragedies. Long-term care family-caregiver killers generally do not fall under high recidivism-risk categories. However, during the 2014 amendment to the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, they were excluded from minimum-security prison selection because domestic violence crimes (crimes defined by other laws established by intentionally committing domestic violence acts among family members) were viewed at the time as "crimes with high recidivism and immense impact on social perception." Consequently, Article 4 was amended to add that individuals who commit domestic violence crimes as referred to in Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act are ineligible to participate in minimum-security prison selection. This demonstrates the problem of directly determining recidivism risk solely by crime name.

   In addition, the 1994 amendment to the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons added the statutory basis for authorization of implementation measures. Based on this, the MOJ enacted the Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates, stipulating more detailed minimum-security prison selection requirements and criteria, which more concretely and substantively structured the practical operation of our country's minimum-security prison selection. 

   Currently, our country's complete minimum-security prison selection requirements and criteria are as follows:

   Article 4 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons:
   Inmates of minimum-security prisons shall be selected by the Agency of Corrections, Ministry of Justice from among inmates of various prisons who meet all of the following provisions:
   1. Having served an execution of imprisonment exceeding two months.
   2. Having a prison term of seven years or less, or a prison term exceeding seven years but under fifteen years with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 3 or above, or a prison term of fifteen years or more with progressive treatment advanced to Grade 2 or above. Progressive treatment for life imprisonment must advance to Grade 1.
   3. Showing genuine repentance, with physical and mental health suitable for minimum-security prison work.
   Inmates with any of the following circumstances shall not be selected:
   1. Committing an offense under Article 161 of the Criminal Code.
   2. Committing an offense under the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act.
   3. Recidivists. However, this shall not apply if the previously executed prior convictions were all sentences of imprisonment for fixed terms of six months or less.
   4. Parole revocation due to crime.
   5. Having a security disposition pending execution.
   6. Committing offenses listed in various items of Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act or domestic violence crimes referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act.
   Measures for the handling methods, procedures, selection conditions, review benchmarks, and other compliance matters for the selection of minimum-security prison inmates shall be prescribed by the Ministry of Justice.

   Article 2 of the Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates:
   The requirement of showing genuine repentance, with physical and mental health suitable for minimum-security prison work, as referred to in Subparagraph 3, Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Statute, means that during the period of serving a sentence in prison, there are none of the following circumstances:
   1. Gathering crowds to riot or using violence or intimidation against execution officials or medical and counseling personnel.
   2. Committing acts of escape or having factual grounds sufficient to deem there is a risk of escape.
   3. Repeatedly engaging in false accusations, vexatious litigation, or insulting disciplinary personnel.
   4. Having a disciplinary record within the most recent year or being disciplined three or more times during the execution period.
   5. Having previously been selected to serve a sentence in a minimum-security prison, and having been approved for transfer to serve a sentence in another prison due to serious violations of discipline or dereliction of duty.
   6. Having previously been selected to engage in work outside the prison, and having been suspended from work outside the prison due to serious violations of discipline or dereliction of duty.
   7. Currently suffering from a statutory communicable disease or mental illness.
   8. Severe physical disability.

   Finally, and most easily overlooked by outsiders, Article 6 of the Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates stipulates that for inmates participating in minimum-security prison selection, prisons must fill out the "Review Benchmark Table for Inmates Participating in Minimum-Security Prison Selection," submit it to the prison affairs meeting for review and initial appraisal, and then report it to the Agency of Corrections, MOJ. The Agency of Corrections, MOJ will review the benchmark table and compile it for submission to the selection committee for deliberation. Inmates are ranked in order based on the number of points in the benchmark table and distributed according to their ranking.

   Referring to the appendix to Article 6 of the current Implementation Measures for the Selection of Minimum-Security Prison Inmates, it does not provide an explanation of point calculations. The Control Yuan Investigation Report (108 Judicial Investigation 0033) provided an explanation of the point calculations for the October 11, 2016 version of the "Review Benchmark Table for Inmates Participating in Minimum-Security Prison Selection" as follows:

   Proportion	Scoring Benchmark
   In-prison conduct (20%)	Scoring benchmark: This item totals a maximum of 20 points and a minimum of 0 points. For point 1, checking "Yes" deducts 10 points for each additional instance; for point 2, checking "Yes" deducts 5 points for each additional instance; for point 3, checking "Yes" adds 5 points for each additional instance starting from the second instance; for points 4~5, checking "No" deducts 5 points per point item; for points 6~8, checking "No" deducts 5 points per point item.
   Family support (10%)	Scoring benchmark: This item totals a maximum of 10 points and a minimum of 0 points. Checking "No" or "Unstable" for points 1~5 deducts 5 points per point item.
   Health status (20%)	Scoring benchmark: This item totals a maximum of 20 points and a minimum of 0 points. Checking "Yes" for points 1~6 deducts 20 points; checking "Yes" for point 7 deducts 5 points; points 8~9 are not scored, but if "Yes" is checked, please explain the causes for guarded external medical treatment (hospitalization) and the current treatment status of the medical condition in the remarks column of this table.
   Guard risk (30%)	Scoring benchmark: This item totals a maximum of 30 points and a minimum of 0 points. Checking "Yes" for points 1~4 deducts 30 points; checking "Yes" for point 5 deducts 20 points.
   Recidivism risk (20%)	Scoring benchmark: This item totals a maximum of 30 points and a minimum of 0 points. Checking "Yes" for points 1~5 among points 1~5 [sic] deducts 20 points; checking "Yes" for points 6~7 deducts 10 points.

   Note: This table represents the point calculation method of the October 11, 2016 version; no public data is available to confirm whether the point calculation method has changed.

   However, Control Yuan Investigation Report (108 Judicial Investigation 0033) found that there were instances where inmates with relatively low scores were selected for minimum-security prisons. The Agency of Corrections explained this by stating that the score on the review benchmark table is not the sole standard; members of the selection committee still comprehensively consider and deliberate based on other relevant data such as the individual case's remaining prison term, offense, and circumstances of other pending cases using their professional knowledge. The Control Yuan considered this aspect to be unspecified in the selection measures, which easily invites public skepticism regarding the fairness of selection, and requested the Agency of Corrections to review and improve. Regarding the implementation status of this improvement, there is no public data available for confirmation.

   Referring to Control Yuan Investigation Report (108 Judicial Investigation 0033), the number of applicants applying for minimum-security prison selection and the number of individuals actually transferred to minimum-security prisons each year between 2013 and 2018 are as follows:

   Year	Number of Applicants	Number Actually Transferred to Minimum-Security Prisons	Selection Rate of Applicants
   2013	4721	1031	21.8%
   2014	5390	1176	21.8%
   2015	3873	1054	27.2%
   2016	3393	1261	37.2%
   2017	2898	899	31.0%
   2018	3172	987	31.1%

   As can be seen from the table above, applying for minimum-security prison selection does not mean one will truly be selected and transferred to a minimum-security prison. In fact, some inmates participating in minimum-security prison selection feel they clearly meet the qualifications, yet repeatedly participate in selection only to consistently fail to be selected for a minimum-security prison. Comparing with the table above, 70% to 80% of applicants for minimum-security prison selection are rejected each year. To say the threshold for minimum-security prisons is too low is likely not the case.

   Theoretically, although Lin Hsin-wu committed robbery, he was not directly excluded from the scope of minimum-security prison selection, nor did he have other circumstances explicitly designated for exclusion. Furthermore, it can be reasonably deduced that his score on the "Review Benchmark Table for Inmates Participating in Minimum-Security Prison Selection" likely ranked ahead of many inmates, which is why he was selected and transferred to a minimum-security prison. The current selection mechanism may warrant review, but it is probably simplistic to view the problem solely as the threshold for minimum-security prison selection being too low.
    

5. Is it a good approach to directly exclude robbers and major violent criminals from participating in minimum-security prison selection through legislative amendments?

   Media reports pointed out that since Lin Hsin-wu was a robber, why could he be included in a minimum-security prison? Minister of Justice Tsai Ching-hsiang explained that according to the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, currently the only persons barred from serving sentences in minimum-security prisons are sex offenders, drug offenders, and escapees; the suspect was a robber and was not excluded from the minimum-security prison roster, and future amendments would also be made to include major murderers such as police killers, barring them from being selected to serve sentences in minimum-security prisons.

   Legislator Yeh Yu-lan further cited comparative law, listing the selection criteria for Japanese minimum-security prisons as follows:

   • Aged 45 or younger, physically without special defects, capable of enduring heavy labor and dangerous work
   • Intelligence quotient equivalent of 80 or above, without personality deviations, capable of adapting to open-treatment communal living
   • Remaining prison term of 1 year and 6 months or more, deemed capable of early parole
   • Not belonging to anti-social groups such as violent syndicates (boryokudan), without prominent tattoos
   • Generally excluding heinous crimes, sex crimes, arson, or habitual stimulant drug offenses if protective relationships are considered adjusted
   • Willing to engage in minimum-security prison work and unfamiliar with the geographical environment of the work location.

   She further pointed out: "The Tsai administration always cites the US and Japan; they all know violent elements cannot go to minimum-security prisons—why has our country relaxed it so that violent criminals, robbers, and murderers can all go?"

   Both the MOJ and legislators currently intend to study and deliberate amending the law to directly exclude robbers and major violent criminals from the qualifications to participate in minimum-security prison selection. Is this a good approach?

   It must first be pointed out here that Legislator Yeh Yu-lan's understanding of the selection criteria for Japanese minimum-security prisons is actually insufficiently precise, because what Legislator Yeh cited was merely the selection criteria for the open facility known as the "Ohi Shipyard Work Course." Japan has other open facilities whose selection criteria do not completely exclude the possibility of housing violent elements, as can be seen in the explanations in scholar Lin Cheng-yu's article, "Building a Staircase? Or a Sheer Cliff? The Status Quo and Challenges of the Minimum-Security Prison System"^[3]. In addition, the greatest purpose and value of minimum-security prisons is to provide a transitional adaptation phase for long-term prisoners who are about to leave prison. If robbers and major violent criminals are excluded from participating in minimum-security prison selection due to a higher risk of recidivism, but these inmates will eventually return to society anyway, then precisely what treatment measures will be adopted for these inmates to help them gradually adapt to life upon returning to society? If appropriate intermediate treatment is not provided at all, will society ultimately become safer or more dangerous?

   Minimum-security prisons are not a type of prison exclusive to Taiwan; the UK, the US, Germany, and Japan—jurisdictions frequently referenced in Taiwan's legislative amendments—all have similar systems. Such systems generally belong to low-security-management prisons. While their establishment purposes may not be entirely identical, they similarly encounter the problem of how to conduct risk assessments on inmates in order to select appropriate individuals for low-security-management prisons. Looking to other countries, the currently more recommended approach is to develop evidence-based risk assessment tools.

   The research report "A Study on Risk Management of Inmates in Correctional Institutions" by Lu Ying-chieh (盧映潔) et al. points out: "Methods of recidivism risk assessment have undergone changes across several periods: earliest on, starting with clinical judgments provided by psychiatric and forensic psychology experts to courts, but because early professional clinical judgment relied solely on personal experience without structure or theoretical basis, the reliability of its conclusions was highly questioned; subsequently, risk assessment methods utilizing actuarial static risk factors emerged, but relying solely on static factors that cannot be altered for risk assessment remains insufficient, giving birth to the third-generation risk assessment which incorporates dynamic risk factors; to this day, the fourth-generation Structural Professional Judgment (SPJ) risk assessment has become the new trend, incorporating both risk management and treatment management into assessments and providing space for professional personnel to conduct clinical judgments." The development trend of current risk assessment tools is to integrate various risk factors and protective factors; not adopting solely static factors while simultaneously incorporating dynamic factors; and not relying purely on quantitative data for assessment while leaving room for qualitative, professional judgment. Finally, and most importantly, current risk assessment tools must possess reliability and validity. No assessment tool can predict the future with 100% certainty, but with requirements for reliability and validity, one can know within what scope the assessment tool being used is reliable, and adjustments to the assessment tool can be made in response to actual predictions or prediction inaccuracies.

   From the development of current risk assessment tools, it can actually be understood that unless empirical data shows that, after controlling for other variables, inmates convicted of specific crimes exhibit high recidivism rates and are difficult to reduce in recidivism through appropriate treatment, it is inappropriate to decide based on a "feeling of great danger" which crimes and prison-experience backgrounds of inmates should be excluded from the scope of minimum-security prison selection.

   Judging from the design of the "Review Benchmark Table for Inmates Participating in Minimum-Security Prison Selection," our country has indeed attempted to conduct risk assessments on inmates participating in minimum-security prison selection. This is a good direction of development, but our country's development in this aspect remains at a very preliminary stage, with tremendous room for effort.

   Why say that the development of risk assessment concepts and tools in our country's correctional institutions remains at a very preliminary stage? This can be seen by examining our country's current selection requirements and criteria for minimum-security prison inmates, especially the "Review Benchmark Table for Inmates Participating in Minimum-Security Prison Selection." On the surface, the benchmark table encompasses various risk factors (such as a past history of escape) and protective factors (such as good family support), static factors (such as past criminal records) and dynamic factors (such as in-prison conduct), but the problem is: what is the reliability and validity of this benchmark table? What is the scoring basis for different scoring points? Is the aggregation of points for these benchmark points a good presentation method for risk assessment? No relevant literature can be found to clarify this.

   Another reason for feeling that the development of risk assessment concepts and tools in our country remains at a very preliminary stage is that the connection between reviews of escape incidents and adjustments to assessment tools is unclear. The occurrence of an escape incident is actually an opportunity to understand the limitations of assessment tools or whether further adjustments are needed through qualitative methods. Regarding the escape incident involving the Lin surname inmate at Mingteh Minimum-Security Prison in August 2020, Control Yuan Investigation Report (109 Judicial Investigation 0075) suggested: "If the Lin surname inmate is poor at self-control, disregards laws and discipline as well as external public perception, and poses a potential hazard to public security, yet was able to meet the selection qualifications for autonomous work outside the prison and participate in work outside without guard management, it amply demonstrates that current relevant systems lack an evaluation mechanism between autonomous work outside the prison and guarded work outside the prison. The Agency of Corrections should duly review the screening conditions for inmates engaged in autonomous work outside the prison..." Furthermore, in Control Yuan Investigation Report (111 Judicial Investigation 0022), it can be seen that the correctional agency's current analysis of the causes of escape primarily features the following two points:

   • (1) Poor self-control among inmates: Inmates in cases of escape and failure to return from home visits are usually younger with poorer self-control; having committed disciplinary violations, they suddenly conceived an intent to escape out of fear that their wrongdoings would come to light and result in transfer to another prison.
   • (2) Complex social circles outside: Inmates have complex interpersonal situations outside, and during home visits there are no guard police forces by their side, making the actual social contacts they maintain during their time outside difficult to grasp, generating negative stimuli such as family, friend, and financial disputes, thereby leading them to fail to report back to the prison at the designated time.

   Meanwhile, the anti-escape planning is stated as: "Strengthening the selection matters for inmates, conducting statistical analyses on data such as the prison terms, ages, and crime names of those involved in recent escape and failure-to-return-from-home-visit incidents, providing references for members of the Minimum-Security Prison Inmate Selection Committee of the Agency of Corrections, and excluding the aforementioned escape-risk factors during front-end selection operations." From qualitative "poor self-control" and "complex social circles outside" to quantitatively analyzing data on prison terms, ages, and crime names of recent escape and failure-to-return-from-home-visit incidents, the connection in between is actually not very clear. The only connection with stronger ties is that the qualitative investigation appears to have established the hypothesis that "younger age correlates with poorer self-control" and attempted to verify it through quantitative data (though research hypotheses and methods were not provided).

   Aside from problems with the risk assessment tool itself, successfully enabling risk assessment tools to perform their functions also requires personnel capable of using assessment tools and methods to provide appropriate treatment allowing inmates to change (which is the vital significance of incorporating dynamic factors). However, considerable difficulties currently exist in these areas, requiring greater resource investment to improve. The research report "A Study on Risk Management of Inmates in Correctional Institutions" by Lu Ying-chieh et al. points out:

   Synthesizing the opinions of participants in the focus group discussions, under the premise that manpower remains insufficient and resources lacking, participants exhibited pessimistic and apprehensive reactions regarding the implementation of individual treatment plans, and held highly reserved attitudes toward whether prisons are suited to concepts akin to individual treatment plans within the juvenile justice system. The reasons are that the practical utility of work assignments, study courses, or vocational training currently provided to inmates in our country's prisons is often disconnected from society, while the lack of external resource introduction leads to limited choices in work, and resources for education and family services are also extremely scarce...
   When speaking of the challenges of working with inmates, focus group participants unanimously expressed problems of insufficient manpower and professional inadequacy, posing a major challenge for prison management personnel. The high turnover rate of prison staff creates a disconnect between training and practice, which in turn impacts assistance provided to inmates. Coupled with new policies continually being launched, this causes practitioners to experience redundant layers of operations or energy depletion. Moreover, professional inadequacy and insufficient ability to identify inmates with mental illnesses and personality disorders may lead to mistakenly treating the manifestations of an episode as intentional disciplinary violations, or falling into traps and taking the tricks of inmates with personality disorders as genuine, thereby being manipulated by them. To break through our country's prison administration management, the quality and professional caliber of prison administration personnel must be substantially increased in order to overturn the current situation.

    

III. Can electronic monitoring be applied to minimum-security prison inmates when they are outside? How are cases of failing to return to the prison on time handled?

1. Applying electronic monitoring to minimum-security prison inmates who are outside?

   Legislator Yeh Yu-lan pointed out: "During the pandemic, the government extensively utilized electronic fences and electronic monitoring to control the whereabouts of confirmed or home-quarantined citizens; such highly comprehensive monitoring can also be applied to monitoring minimum-security prison inmates when they go out to work or visit home. I call upon the government to carefully consider the feasibility of using electronic monitoring methods to prevent inmates from escaping, and to acquire relevant legal backing through legislation. 'This unfortunate incident is precisely the opportune moment to comprehensively review various systems.'"

   Legislator Yeh Yu-lan's suggestion is feasible on a legal level and does not require legislative amendment, though it requires funding and equipment investment. Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons stipulates: "Matters not provided for in this Statute shall be governed by the Prison Act, the Prison Organization Act, the Statute for the Progressive Execution of Sentences, and other relevant laws and regulations." Paragraph 2 of Article 24 of the Prison Act stipulates: "When an inmate goes out or engages in activities outside the prison, the prison may utilize technological equipment to apply electronic monitoring measures." Originally, under the Prison Act, prisons were already empowered to apply electronic monitoring measures to inmates going outside. This statutory provision has existed since the new Prison Act took effect on July 15, 2020; it's just that applying electronic monitoring requires funding and equipment. If the MOJ assesses and deems it necessary, the legal basis already exists to advance this.
    

2. Is it "escape" or "failing to return on time"?

   On August 23—the very day Lin Hsin-wu was arrested—the Agency of Corrections issued a press release titled: "This Agency Expresses Deep Regret and Condolences Regarding the Mingteh Minimum-Security Prison Inmate of the Lin Surname Failing to Return from Home Visit on Time and Being Implicated in the Police Homicide Case," and the Director-General of the Agency of Corrections appeared in person to explain.

   According to media reports, the Director-General of the Agency of Corrections stated that Lin Hsin-wu was "late in returning from leave" and did not escape, which sparked the fury of the families of the fallen police officers. The uncle of police officer Tsao Jui-chieh (曹瑞傑) lambasted the remark as completely devoid of human nature and a blatant shirking of responsibility.

   Meanwhile, according to reports, when the Minister of Justice was later questioned about this matter by the media, he explained that whether late in returning from leave or escaping from a correctional institution, both constitute the "crime of escape." The Mingteh Minimum-Security Prison referred the suspect Lin to the prosecutors office for investigation on the 15th on charges of the crime of escape. Perhaps the Agency of Corrections was merely describing the state of the suspect's escape, but as long as regulations are not complied with to return to the correctional institution on time, it is effectively an escape.

   To understand why a controversy over the aforementioned terminology arose, one must return to the provisions of our country's Criminal Code and Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons.

   Article 161 of the Criminal Code stipulates:
   A person who lawfully is arrested or detained and escapes shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year.
   A person who damages instruments of detention or uses violence or intimidation to commit the offense in the preceding paragraph shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years.
   A person who gathers crowds to use violence or intimidation to commit the offense in Paragraph 1, and persons assisting and abetting at the scene, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years and not more than ten years. Ringleaders and those personally executing violence and intimidation shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five years.
   Attempts to commit the offenses in the preceding three paragraphs are punishable.
   Where an inmate is permitted to visit home pursuant to the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs and fails to return to the prison on the designated date without justifiable reason, the days spent outside shall not be included in the executed prison term. Where intentional, it shall likewise be punished as the crime of escape.

   Paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons stipulates:
   Where an inmate is permitted to visit home pursuant to the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs and fails to return to the prison on the designated date without justifiable reason, the days spent outside shall not be included in the executed prison term. Where intentional, it shall likewise be punished as the crime of escape.

   The phrase "punished as the crime of escape" in Paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons is referred to in legal doctrine as a "quasi-crime of escape." The relationship between this provision and Article 161 of the Criminal Code—specifically whether it is a true quasi-application relationship (fictionalizing differing things as identical) or another execution-behavior type of Paragraph 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code (realizing the constituent elements of Paragraph 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code through impure omission)—can be consulted in the article by scholar Wu Chun-yi (吳俊毅), "On the So-Called 'Quasi' Self-Help Crime of Escape", and will not be elaborated upon here. Members of the general public do not necessarily know these academic discussions, and in daily life, there is indeed no special need to make a distinction; therefore, broadly referring to it as an escape does not cause communication problems.

   The press release of the Agency of Corrections stated: "...Among the 11,323 individuals selected to serve sentences in minimum-security prisons over the past 10 years, 4 escaped, 45 failed to return from home visits, and 2 remain uncaptured..." Referring to the terminology used by correctional institutions in the past to present forms of escape, the "escape" in the press release likely refers to the crime of escape under Article 161 of the Criminal Code, whereas "failing to return from home visit" refers to the quasi-crime of escape under Paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons. However, because the word "escape" was used within the context of the text, it easily led members of the general public to wonder: "Failing to return from a home visit isn't an escape?"

   In fact, in relevant literature, whether "escape" refers to "broadly defined escape" (including the crime of escape under Paragraph 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code, the quasi-crime of escape under Paragraph 3 of Article 21 of the Statute for Minimum-Security Prisons, and similar wording) or "narrowly defined escape" (limited solely to the crime of escape under Paragraph 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code) is not distinguished by terminology, requiring readers to infer the meaning through context. For example, Control Yuan Investigation Report (109 Judicial Investigation 0075) states: "According to statistics from the Agency of Corrections, over the past 10 years (from 2011 to November 2, 2020), a total of 8 inmates escaped from regular prisons, whereas as many as 39 inmates escaped from minimum-security prisons (35 failed to return from home visits, 3 escaped during guarded work outside the prison, and 1 failed to return from autonomous work outside the prison), among which the most—19—escaped from Chih-chiang Minimum-Security Prison..." In this context, "39 inmates escaped from minimum-security prisons" is "broadly defined escape," while "3 escaped during guarded work outside the prison" is "narrowly defined escape." This is likewise easily confusing to readers, and it is hoped that relevant authorities will pay attention to distinguishing terminology in future explanations.
    

3. Did the Agency of Corrections fail to immediately publicize the news of an inmate at large when an escape occurred at a minimum-security prison simply because it was "afraid of losing face"?

   The media ran headlines such as "Tainan Police Homicide Suspect Escaped Prison Last Week! 39 Runaways from Minimum-Security Prisons in 10 Years; Agency of Corrections Suspected of 'Being Afraid of Losing Face and Daring Not Speak'" to report: "...Lin Hsin-wu was captured in Hsinchu at around 4 a.m. today (the 23rd), yet he had escaped prison from the Mingteh Minimum-Security Prison just on the 15th. Between 2011 and 2021, as many as 39 prisoners ran away from minimum-security prisons. Media reports alleged that the Agency of Corrections delayed making public the news that inmates were still at large because it was afraid of losing face..."

   The handling procedure for a minimum-security prison inmate on a home visit failing to return on time without justifiable reason is not public. Currently, the only publicly available information for reference is the operational workflow for an inmate engaged in autonomous work outside the prison who fails to return to the prison or report to the designated place within the designated time slot (included on page 14 of Control Yuan Investigation Report (109 Judicial Investigation 0075)).

   According to this workflow, if an inmate engaged in autonomous work outside the prison fails without justifiable reason to return to the prison or report to the designated place within the designated time slot, the prison must report to the Agency of Corrections and request local police authorities to track and apprehend them. Subsequently, an official dispatch is issued notifying the prosecutors office that originally directed the execution to handle the issuance of a warrant, and the relevant materials regarding the inmate's suspected crime of escape (which here should refer to the "quasi-crime of escape") are transferred to the prosecutors office where the prison is located for investigation.

   After the prosecutors office issues the warrant, it notifies the police. Currently, all fugitives are logged in the National Police Agency's (NPA) Online Public Inquiry System for Fugitive Apprehension, where searches can be conducted via name and ID number. As for fugitives in high-profile cases deemed by the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) to require intensified apprehension efforts, their photos and related information are published on the Special Important Emergency Apprehension Project website for browsing by the general public, which is handled in accordance with the Regulations on Crime and Important Case Data Reporting Operations of Police Agencies.

   That is to say, under current regulations, publishing photos and related information of escaped inmates for general public browsing requires a prosecutor's warrant and notification to the police, with the police deciding based on the necessity of apprehension. This arrangement currently appears reasonable, because the inmate is housed in the prison under the direction of the prosecutor. When an inmate escapes, the prison must report to the executing prosecutor, who handles the issuance of a warrant in accordance with relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, aligning with the logic of directing sentence execution. Aside from issuing an official dispatch to the originally directing prosecutors office, the prison transfers the case to the local prosecutors office upon knowing that the inmate is suspected of committing a quasi-crime of escape, which aligns with the principle that civil servants have an obligation to report offenses. After the prosecutor issues a warrant, the police decide whether to publish photos and related information of the fugitive inmate for public browsing based on apprehension necessity, aligning with the rationale that the police possess the authority and responsibility to investigate and apprehend crimes.

   Therefore, media speculation that the Agency of Corrections failed to publicize information regarding escaped inmates due to being "afraid of losing face" should be a misunderstanding.

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