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Article source：Summary of TCC Judgment 113-Hsien-Pan-8 (2024) 【The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Case】

Headnotes

    Mandatory death penalty for homicide during extortionate kidnapping, without consideration of circumstances, is unconstitutional. 

    Death penalty for homicide, homicide during rape and aggravated rape, homicide during robbery, and homicide during extortionate kidnapping under the Criminal Code (hereinafter the "Code") is constitutional if applied in the most serious cases and conformed with the strictest requirements of due process in criminal procedures. Specific procedural safeguards are required for the offenses above: (1) Mandatory counsel during criminal investigation and on final appeal; (2) Mandatory oral arguments on final appeal; and (3) A unanimous decision by a collegial panel of professional judges for death sentences. 

    The Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) specified several extra procedural safeguards for defendants with mental conditions (disorders or deficiencies) in the cases in question: (1) The death penalty will not be imposed if an individual's mental conditions significantly reduced their ability to make judgments at the time of the offense or rendered them incompetent to stand trial; (2) Inmates shall not be executed if their mental conditions impede their competency for execution. 
 

Background Note

    In Taiwan, about 50 provisions in several separate criminal statutory laws stipulate capital punishment as the maximum punishment. Under the Code, the maximum punishment for certain crimes (e.g., homicide, homicide during robbery, rape and homicide, homicide during extortionate kidnapping) is the death penalty. The TCC has formerly upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty applicable under special criminal law provisions in J.Y. Interpretation Nos. 194 (1985), 263 (1990), and 476 (1999). Years after the announcement of J.Y. Interpretation No. 476 (1999), the question of whether the death penalty is constitutional—and if so, what are the substantive and procedural requirements—arises again upon the petitions filed by petitioners in this case. 

    Insofar as there are thirty-seven death row inmates in Taiwan, all of them are petitioners in this case[1]. The petitioners were found guilty of at least one of the following four crimes: (1) homicide (offense of Article 271, Paragraph 1 of the Code), (2) homicide during rape and aggravated rape (offense under the First Clause of Article 226-1 of the Code), (3) homicide during a robbery (offense of Article 332, Paragraph 1 of the Code), and (4) homicide during kidnapping for ransom (offense of Article 348, Paragraph 1 of the Code, both the current and the April 21, 1999 version). The petitioners were all found guilty and sentenced to death in their respective final court decisions between 2000 and 2020. After exhausting all ordinary judicial remedies, the petitioners filed for constitutional reviews respectively. They argued mainly that (1) The punishment of the death penalty or mandatory death penalty, applicable under the said criminal provisions that they were found guilty of, was unconstitutional for violating their right to life; (2) The criminal procedures they underwent violated the due process of law, as such procedures had left them without effective assistance of counsel and proper oral argument during their last appeal; (3) Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the Code was unconstitutional insofar as it did not prohibit death penalty from being sentenced or executed on those defendants with mental disorders. 

    The petitioners' cases were consolidated and argued on April 23, 2024. Justice Jeong-Duen TSAI, Justice Tsai-Chen TSAI, and Justice Po-Hsiang YU recused themselves and took no part in the deliberation, oral arguments, or the decision of this case.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding

1. Article 271, Paragraph 1 of the Code (hereinafter "Provision I") stipulates, "A person who takes the life of another shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than ten years." The First Clause of Article 226-1 of the Code (hereinafter "Provision II") stipulates, "A person who commits the offense specified in Article 221, 222…and intentionally kills the victim, shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment…." Article 332, Paragraph 1 of the Code (hereinafter "Provision III") stipulates, "A person who commits robbery and intentionally kills another shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment." Article 348, Paragraph 1 of the Code (hereinafter "Provision IV") stipulates, "A person who commits an offense specified in paragraph 1 of the preceding article[2] and intentionally kills his victim shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment." Intentional homicide under said provisions is the most serious offense against a person's right to life, which may be punished most severely to the extent of the death penalty. However, the death penalty must be applied to cases with the most serious circumstances and conform to the strictest requirements of due process. Within this scope, the said provisions do not violate the right to life enshrined in the Constitution. 
2. The April 2, 1999 version of Article 348, Paragraph 1 of the Code (hereinafter "Provision V"), which stipulated "A person who commits an offense specified in paragraph 1 of the preceding article and intentionally kills his victim shall be sentenced to death," violates the constitutional principle of nulla poena sine culpa (Schuldprinzip) because it fails to distinguish whether the circumstances invoking the mandatory death penalty are the gravest. Within this scope, the provision does not conform to the right to life under the Constitution. 
3. A person suspected of committing the offense in Part 1 of the Holding (Provisions I-IV cases) shall be represented by a legal counsel when questioned or examined. The Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter "CoCP") is unconstitutional insofar as it lacks relevant provisions requiring so. It contravened the constitutional protection of the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the due process of law. Authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions following this Judgment within a two-year grace period. If the amendment is past due, investigations shall be conducted in the manner required by this Judgment. However, the concluded investigations remain valid and unaffected. 
4. Mandatory counsel shall apply to final appeals for Provisions I-IV cases. Such application is not required in Article 388 of the CoCP (hereinafter "Provision VI"), which provides that "Article 31 does not apply to a trial of third instance." Within this scope, the provision contravenes the constitutional protection of the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the due process of law. The said provision shall cease to be effective upon the announcement of this Judgment. Authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions following this Judgment within a two-year grace period. Courts of final appeal (third instance) shall immediately apply mandatory counsel when hearing Provisions I-IV cases. 
5. Regarding Provisions I-IV cases, oral argument shall be required for the courts of final appeal to hand down a death penalty or to uphold lower courts' death penalty decisions. Such requirement is not provided in Article 389, Paragraph 1 of the CoCP (hereinafter "Provision VII"), which stipulates, "The court of third instance may be trial without oral argument; provided that the court may order arguments if necessary." Within this scope, the provision contravenes the constitutional protection of the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the due process of law. Authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions following this Judgment within a two-year grace period. Courts of final appeal shall try with oral argument when hearing the cases in question immediately.
6. The death penalty must be imposed only by a unanimous decision from a collegial panel of (professional) judges. The Court Organization Act does not specify so for Provisions I-IV cases, which contravenes the constitutional protection of people's right to life and the due process of law. Authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions following the Judgment within a two-year grace period. The courts at all levels shall apply such requirements immediately. However, the effectiveness of previous decisions made before this Judgment shall not be affected.
7. To conform to the constitutional principle of nulla poena sine culpa, death penalty must not be imposed if the defendant at the time of the offense was in the circumstance described in Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the CoCP (hereinafter "Provision VIII"), which is a significant decrease in the ability to perceive the illegality of an act or to act accordingly due to mental impairment. The authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions within a two-year grace period. Before the amendment, the death penalty shall not be rendered in cases with such conditions.
8. To conform with the constitutional guarantee of the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the due process of law, the courts shall not sentence the defendants of Provisions I-IV cases to death if they had mental conditions that clearly diminished their ability to defend themselves in court. The authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions within a two-year grace period. Before the amendment, the death penalty shall not be rendered in cases with such conditions.
9. Those sentenced to death in Provisions I-IV cases shall not be executed if they have mental conditions that impeded their competency for execution. The CoCP and the Prison Act violate the constitutional guarantee of the right to life and due process of law insofar as it lacked provisions prohibiting such inmates from being executed. The authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions as appropriate within a two-year grace period. Before the amendment, the death penalty shall not be rendered in cases with such conditions.
10. All petitioners sentenced to death may file for extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General if their cases were not the most serious. The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio for such cases. 
11. Petitioners Nos. 36 and 37 may file an extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General for their final court decision, Supreme Court Criminal Judgment 89-Tai-Shang-2196 (2000). The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio. After revoking their decision, the Supreme Court shall apply Provision IV in accordance with this Judgment. 
12. All petitioners may file for extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General for the parts in which Articles 388 and 389 (Paragraph 1) of the CoCP, which were applied in their final court decisions, violated Parts 4 or 5 of the Holding. The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio. The petitioners may not lodge such an appeal if their final court decisions had undergone oral argument and had been assisted by defense counsel. 
13. Petitioners may file an extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General if the deliberation under the Court Organization Act resulting in their sentence did not comply with Part 6 of the Holding. Unless there is proof that their decisions were rendered unanimously by a collegial panel, the petitioners may file for extraordinary with the Prosecutor-General, or the Prosecutor-General may file one ex officio. 
14. The legal provisions applied in the final court decisions of Petitioners Nos. 12, 13, and 14 (Supreme Court Criminal Judgments 99-Tai-Shang-5659, 100-Tai-Shang-6514, and 102-Tai-Shang-2392) did not conform with Part 8 of the Holding. They shall not be executed before the concerned authorities amend the relevant laws as appropriate. After the amendment, the petitioners may file an extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General, or the Prosecutor-General may file one ex officio. 
15. When the Supreme Court revokes those original decisions on extraordinary appeals, detention in the remitted cases shall be handled by respective competent courts according to relevant procedures. The number of times and duration of detention specified in Article 5, Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Criminal Speedy Trial Act and the eight-year period specified in Article 6 of the same Act shall be recalculated from the revocation of the original decision under Article 447 of the CoCP. 
16. The remaining parts of the petitions shall be dismissed. 
17. Preliminary injunction applications shall all be rejected. 

Reasoning (some parts rearranged for better understanding)

1. Standard of review and the constitutional rights involved:

    The right to life is an inherent right of all human beings. Its existence need not be recognized by a State or be enumerated in the Constitution. It is the supreme constitutional right because a person's life is the precondition for realizing other fundamental rights. It shall be protected at the highest level under the Constitution. Nevertheless, such protection is not absolute, as it may be deduced from the designs in our legal system that the harm to a person's life may be justified in military actions, action by police during law enforcement, self-defense, and in defense of others. Furthermore, with the evolution of medical science and societal values, the legal arguments on whether to legalize abortion and voluntary euthanasia also demonstrate that the right to life may be balanced with other rights.【61-62】

    The State may punish the offense of homicide for the purpose of just retribution and maintaining social order, so long as the punishment conforms with the principle of nulla poena sine culpa and the due process of law. In principle, the types of applicable punishment fall under legislative discretion. Nevertheless, as the death penalty is the most severe punishment and irreversible, its application and procedural safeguard (from investigation to execution) should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.【63-64】

    The scope of review of this Judgment is confined to Provisions I-IV offenses (that the petitioners were involved in) and their accompanying procedural issues. This Judgment did not address the constitutionality of the death penalty in general or those imposed on other offenses (e.g., treason, drug crimes).【85】

2. The constitutionality of death penalty:

(1) Death penalty as the most severe punishment under Provisions I-IV:

    The legislative purpose of choosing the death penalty as the most severe punishment for homicide is just retribution, and the hope that its deterrence function may reduce crime and maintain the social order. Such a function is supported by the sense of justice of the general public. Although the death penalty applicable under Provisions I-IV does not serve a specific deterrence function for the imposed inmates, just retribution and deterrence of major life-infringing crimes are still of especially compelling public interest in this country's historical and social context. The death penalty applicable in the cases in question is of constitutional purpose.【68】

    Death penalty as a punishment under Provisions I-IV is a measure that irretrievably deprives the defendants' life and, subsequently, other rights, which causes significant negative effects in terms of the scope and degree. Therefore, the death penalty shall only be applied to the most serious types of crimes, i.e., the type and extent of the infringement caused by such crimes should be at least equivalent to the defendant’s deprived life under general knowledge at the time of judgment. Only in such a way that the application of the death penalty conforms to the constitutional principle of nulla poena sine culpa.【69】

    The death penalty, as the most severe punishment under Provisions I-IV, shall only be applied to the most serious circumstances and must conform with the strictest requirements of due process in terms of criminal procedure. Within this scope, such a measure can be deemed as the necessary measure to achieve its retributive and deterrence purposes.【70】

    For a case in question to be the most serious, the mens rea of intentional homicide found in the case shall be limited to dolus directus (direct intent), dolus generalis (general intent), or dolus alternativus (alternative intent, in which two intent directed to two different offenses mutually excluded but equally desired by the offender). Intentional homicide committed under dolus eventualis (subjective foresight of risk and extreme indifference), without a general or undifferentiated intent to cause one or more deaths, cannot be considered the most serious. Moreover, meeting the said requirement in mens rea does not necessarily lead to the death penalty under Provisions I-IV. When determining whether the case has presented the most serious circumstances, the courts shall consider the motives, purposes, provocations, methods used, the damages or hazard caused, degree of breach of duty, and the defendant’s relation with the victim, etc. This is to further establish that the defendant's motive and purpose were especially condemnable ethically and legally, or that the means were especially cruel, or that the results were seriously destructive and harmful, thus the most serious. Afterward, the courts shall consider the defendant's condition when sentencing—whether the defendant is highly prone to recidivism and is impossible to rehabilitate, thus warranted to be excluded permanently by the death penalty.【71, 77, 83】

    The types of conduct satisfying the constituent elements of intentional homicide under Provisions I-IV are vast and complicated. However, distinguishing them on a statutory level may be possible. Relevant authorities are advised to review periodically the differentiations between types of conduct to limit the application of the death penalty or to develop appropriate alternatives (e.g., a special life sentence with a raised threshold for parole or prolonged imprisonment).【84】

(2) Mandatory death penalty for murder during extortionate kidnapping (before January 30, 2002): 

    It shall be left to the courts to decide whether an individual case involving Provision V is of the most serious circumstances, thus warranting the death penalty. However, Provision V imposed the mandatory death penalty on the offense of homicide during extortionate kidnapping without taking into account the circumstances. It is obviously draconian and violates the constitutional principle of nulla poena sine culpa. Within this scope, this provision violates the right to life under the Constitution. 【88】

3.  Procedural safeguards for sentencing the death penalty on the offenses of the cases in question:

(1) The right to be assisted by counsel during investigation (Part 3 of the Holding):

    Mandatory counsel is required for Provisions I-IV cases during trial. However, it is not required when suspects in such cases are under prosecutorial or police investigation. In the past, a few wrongfully convicted death penalty cases were later found with multiple procedural flaws during police investigation, which were not identified during the subsequent trial proceedings. In Provisions I-IV cases, procedural flaws may be reduced if counsel assisted the suspects during prosecutorial and police investigations. This allows defense counsels to promptly address unfavorable evidence and highlight favorable evidence to the police and prosecutors, thereby increasing the accuracy of evidence examination and fact-finding. 【92-94】

    Considering procedural safeguards provided by mandatory counsel in felonies and the abovementioned problems in practice, suspects of Provisions I-IV cases, which are punishable most severely by death, shall have the right to be assisted by counsel during prosecutorial or police investigation. In this way, the suspects may effectively exercise their right of defense, reducing possible miscarriage of justice and uncovering the truth.【95】

    The CoCP violates the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the due process of law insofar as it lacks specific provisions requiring mandatory counsel for Provision I-IV suspects during a criminal investigation. The authorities concerned shall amend the relevant provisions per this Judgment within a period of two years. If the amendment is overdue, prosecutorial and police investigations shall be conducted per the requirements of this Judgment. However, the validity of completed investigations shall not be affected.【98】

(2) Mandatory counsel upon final appeal (Part 4 of the Holding):

    To comply with the constitutional guarantees of the right to life and due process of law, defendants of Provisions I-IV cases shall have the right to assistance of counsel during trials at all levels of court. The procedural safeguards of these cases shall be at least as strict as those not punishable by the death penalty. 【100】

    Article 31, Paragraph, Subparagraph 1 of the CoCP requires mandatory counsel for cases "where the minimum punishment is no less than three-year imprisonment." However, Provision VI excludes such application at final appeals, consequently making mandatory counsel inapplicable for Provisions I-IV cases upon final appeal. Within this scope, Provision VI violates the constitutional guarantee of the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the due process of law. Provision VI shall cease to be effective upon the announcement of this Judgment. The authorities concerned shall amend the relevant provisions per this Judgment within a period of two years. Mandatory counsel shall apply to final appeals for Provisions I-IV cases immediately. 【101, 103】

(3) Oral argument upon final appeal (Part 5 of the Holding):

    Provision VII stipulates that the court of final appeal (third instance) may render a judgment without oral argument. However, as the most severe punishment for Provisions I-IV cases is the death penalty, the court must apply the procedure with the strictest requirement of due process to enhance procedural safeguards. Oral arguments in final appeals are necessary for the judges to determine whether a Provisions I-IV offense qualifies as the most serious and warrants the death penalty. Therefore, the court of final appeal must hold oral arguments before rendering a judgment either upholding its lower court's death penalty decision or imposing the death penalty itself.【105】

    Provision VII violates the constitutional guarantee of the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the due process of law insofar as it lacked specific provisions requiring the court of final appeals to hold oral arguments before handing down or upholding the death penalty for Provisions I-IV cases. Authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions per this Judgment within a two-year grace period. From this Judgment's announcement date, courts of final appeals shall hear Provisions I-IV cases following this Judgment. 【106】

(4) Unanimous decision from a collegial panel of professional judges (Part 6 of the Holding):

    The threshold for a collegial panel decision is essential to the adjudicative power of the courts. In principle, it conforms with the due process of law to set such a threshold at more than half of the panel judges at all levels of courts to increase efficiency. In addition, Article 83, Paragraph 3 of the Citizen Judges Act (Act on Criminal Trials with the participation of Citizen Judge) requires a death penalty decision to be rendered with a two-third special majority to heighten the procedural safeguard for the defendant’s right to life.【108-109】

    Death penalty for Provisions I-IV cases must be rendered unanimously by the collegial panel to meet the strictest requirement of due process. This way, the judges could ensure beyond reasonable doubt that there are aggravating factors to support the death penalty, be urged to consider the seriousness of the death penalty, and avoid inequality in sentencing between cases. For cases that were trialed with citizen judges at the first instance, collegial panel "judges" means professional criminal panel judges from any court level as defined under Article 2, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 3 of the Judges Act.【111-112】

    To conclude, the Court Organization Act violates the constitutional guarantee of the defendant's right to life and the due process of law because it lacks specific provisions requiring the death penalty to be imposed by a unanimous decision from a collegial panel of judges for Provisions I-IV cases. The authorities concerned shall amend the relevant provisions per this Judgment within a two-year grace period. From the date of this Judgment's announcement, courts at all levels shall hear Provisions I-IV cases in accordance with this Judgment. However, the validity of previous decisions in such cases shall not be affected.【113

4. Procedural safeguards for defendants with mental conditions in Provisions I-IV cases:

(1) Defendants with significantly reduced ability of judgment at the time of offense (Part 7 of the Holding):

    Under Provision VIII, the court may reduce the punishment for an offender whose mental condition did lead to a significant reduction in the ability of judgment at the time of offense. The reduction is not mandatory because the provision contends that the offender still bears certain culpability. This optional reduction adopted therein, allowing the court to assess case-based individual circumstances, is justifiable and reasonable.【119】

    However, if mental conditions had significantly reduced an offender's ability to judgment at the time of offense, he or she is less reprehensible than those who are in their full mental capacity. Since the legal culpability is impeded, imposing the death penalty is not justified. It is also difficult to achieve the purpose of retribution. Therefore, the courts shall not impose the death penalty on defendants with Provision VIII conditions so that it complies with the principle of nulla poena sine culpa under the Constitution. 【120】

    Defendants of Provisions I-IV cases shall not be sentenced to death if they were under mental conditions that significantly reduce their ability of judgment at the time of the offense. The authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions within a two-year grace period. Before the amendment, the death penalty shall not be rendered in such cases.【121】

(2) Defendants lacking the competency to stand trial (Part 8 of the Holding):

    Defendants who did not meet the criteria under Provision VIII at the time of the offense but have since been diagnosed with a mental condition that made their cognitive functioning no longer comparable to that of an average person cannot be expected to fully comprehend the meaning of the death penalty. They also cannot be expected to understand the implications of criminal proceedings, let alone mount an effective defense. The fairness and credibility of the criminal proceedings involving such defendants would thus be questioned inevitably. Impose the death penalty in such cases may even constitute torture, which the Constitution prohibits.【123】

    Therefore, if the defendant is found to have a mental condition that renders him or her incapable of effective self-defense in court—even if the court finds that the defendant does not meet the requirements for suspension—the death penalty must not be imposed. This ensures compliance with the constitutional protection of the right to life, the defendant's right of defense, and the principle of due process of law.【124】

    In conclusion, defendant of Provisions I-IV cases shall not be sentenced to death if a mental condition has clearly diminished their ability to defend themselves during trial. The authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions as appropriate within a two-year grace period. Before the amendment, the death penalty shall not be rendered in cases with such a condition.【125】

(3) Inmates lacking the competency for execution (Part 9 of the Holding):

    The execution of the death penalty and its manner must comply with the due process of law and must not violate the defendant’s human dignity. Otherwise, it would constitute torture. If a defendant sentenced to death lacks the level of common understanding of the reason and nature of execution, then his or her competency for execution is impeded. In such cases, the death penalty must not be carried out to comply with the constitutional guarantee of the right to life and the due process of law.【129】

    The CoCP and the Prison Act are unconstitutional insofar as they fell short of preventing such death-role inmates from being executed. Within this scope, the two laws violate the constitutional guarantee of the right to life and the due process of law. Authorities concerned shall amend relevant provisions as appropriate within a two-year grace period. Before the amendment, death row inmates whose competency for execution is impeded by mental conditions shall not be executed.【130】

5. Post-judgment remedies and preliminary injunctions: 

(1) Post-judgment remedies (Parts 10-15 of the Holding):

    All petitioners may file for extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General if the application of Provisions I-IV in their final court decisions did not conform with Part 1 of the Holding. The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio for their cases.【134】

    Petitioners Nos. 36 and 37 may file for an extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General on the ground that Provision V, the criminal provision applied in their final court decision, has been declared unconstitutional. The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio for their cases.【136】

    All petitioners may file for extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General on the grounds that Provisions VI and VII have been declared unconstitutional under Parts 4 and 5 of the Holding. The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio for their cases. However, this does not apply to cases that had been represented by counsel and had gone through oral arguments upon final appeals.【138, 140】

    All petitioners may file for extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General on the grounds that the Court Organization Act, which was applied in the final appeals of their cases at the Supreme Court, lacks specific provisions requiring the death sentence to be rendered by a unanimous decision by a collegial panel of judges. The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio for their cases. However, if there is evidence proving that the final court decision in their respective cases was made by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor-General shall not file an extraordinary appeal. Even if an extraordinary appeal is filed, the Supreme Court shall dismiss it as unfounded.【142】

    Based on their final court decisions, Petitioners Nos. 12, 13, and 14 have displayed mental conditions of different degrees. Per Part 8 of the Holding, Petitioners Nos. 12, 13, and 14 shall not be sentenced to death if their mental conditions had significantly reduced their competency to stand trial when they were tried. After the amendment of relevant criteria for the competency to stand trial, the three petitioners may file for extraordinary appeal with the Prosecutor-General. The Prosecutor-General may also lodge an extraordinary appeal ex officio for their cases after the amendment. 【144-145】

    In cases where the Supreme Court approves the extraordinary appeal by quashing the final court decision and remitting the case, the adjudicating court of the remitted case shall determine whether to order detention, restrictions from going abroad, or necessary measures against the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the length of the detention period stipulated in the Criminal Speedy Trial Act (maximum of accumulative five years for detention per Article 5; maximum of accumulative eight years for applying the maximum punishment prescribed in each applicable provision) shall be recalculated from the time when the final court decision is quashed under Article 447 of the CoCP. Courts at all levels shall complete trials as quickly as possible and avoid delays to protect the petitioners’ right to a judicial remedy.【147】

(2) Preliminary injunctions (Part 17 of the Holding):

    Under Article 2, Paragraph 1 (Subparagraph 4) and Paragraph 2 of the Regulations for Executing the Death Penalty, when the Ministry of Justice accepts a death penalty case submitted by the Supreme Prosecutor's Office and finds that a constitutional review petition is pending for the case, it shall not order execution until the relevant proceedings have been concluded. As the Ministry of Justice has suspended the execution of the death penalty in the petitioners' cases, their lives are not in imminent danger, therefore not meeting the requirement for the issuance of a preliminary injunction under Article 43, Paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act. The petitioners' cases will be disposed of after the announcement of this Judgment, which will also make preliminary injunctions unnecessary. 【152-153】

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Justice Jau-Yuan HWANG authored this Judgment.
Justice Sheng-Lin JAN, Justice Tai-Lang LU (joined by Justice Fu-Meei JU), Justice Hui-Chin YANG (joined by Justice Chong-Wen CHANG in whole and Justice Fu-Meei JU in Part 1), Justice Tzung-Jen TSAI (joined by Justice Chong-Wen CHANG and Justice Fu-Meei JU), and Justice Fu-Meei JU (joined by Justice Chong-Wen CHANG in Parts 2 and 4) each filed an opinion dissenting in part.
 

Notes: 

[1] Translator's note: This background note was written in September 2024, after which one of the petitioners was executed on January 16, 2025. 

[2] Translator's note: This is the offense of extortionate kidnapping.